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There is more to life than working on a dissertation. There is a danger of getting 
sucked into the topic, to focus on everything that is remotely of relevance for the 
research, to wake up and go to bed with all kinds of novel ideas for finding that 
answer to the main question and to be too close to the research to see the bigger 
picture. I have been aware of that danger from the beginning and successfully 
avoided walking into that trap. Perhaps too succesfully, being at times too distracted 
and occupied with other very important things, as such lengthening the process of 
the research. Yet I am very thankful for the opportunity Tilburg University has 
given me to write this dissertation – on a topic of my own choosing and which has 
with every disaster occurring over the last six years proved its importance (at the 
time of writing these acknowledgements I hear the sad news that the death toll of 
the earthquake in Nepal (and other Himalayan countries) passed 2500) – and for 
allowing me to teach, to organize a conference on international humanitarian 
assistance, to visit conferences abroad and to do many other activities (not always 
directly related to the research). I would love to thank a whole list of people who 
enabled me to do this research and who distracted me at the same time, but there is 
too little room to write down the full list. A couple of names are mentioned here 
nonetheless.  
First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisors, Willem van Genugten 
and Conny Rijken. You have patiently read all those draft chapters and given me 
feedback, comments and useful insights. During our ‘tissues & issues’ meetings 
(luckily the tissues were not always necessary) you helped me brainstorm on all 
those questions that still needed to be answered and also on the structure of the 
book (the question of which came first, the chicken or the egg, now has a new 
meaning). Although you both are extremely busy with your own work, you have 
always made time to read my drafts and give feedback. At the moments that I 
thought I was heading nowhere, you were both very encouraging. Willem, you put 
me on the PhD-track during the Master’s programme at Tilburg University and you 
have always expressed your faith in me. I am happy that joking around did not 
lessen that faith (although to be fair, you were the one who once threw a breadroll at 
me during a staff meeting). Conny, you were my mentor during the Research 
Master and have kept the mentor-role throughout the PhD-track. The detailed 
feedback you give – although very welcome – can be daunting at times, yet it is 
amazing how you always see the tiniest of gaps in the reasoning, even when reading 







I would also like to express my gratitude towards the members of the reading 
committee, Professors Cees Flinterman, Jenny Goldschmidt, Nicola Jägers, Nico 
Schrijver and Eduardo Valencia-Ospina. Thank you for taking the time to read the 
manuscript and for your comments. Your feedback has been very valuable in 
finalizing the dissertation. A special word of thanks to Mr Valencia-Ospina for 
allowing me to assist with the preparation of his Fourth Report for the ILC. Also 
thanks to Pleased2ReadYou for proofreading my dissertation on such short notice 
(any remaining mistakes are my own). 
To all my collegues at the Department of International and European Public Law 
(past and present): thank you so much for the wonderful time. It has been great 
working with you (and drinking coffee, and having lunch, and drinks, and dinner…). 
While the group as a whole creates such a great atmosphere, I would like to single 
out a few people. Bas, you were my partner-in-crime during the Master’s, the 
Research Master and while we were roommates during our PhD. You always 
managed to stop me from worrying about the PhD (‘its just a couple of theses put 
together’). Thanks for sharing in your endeavours for the rights of indigenous 
peoples and for agreeing that the window should always be open. Drazan, thank you 
for being an excellent new roommate (albeit with a closed window) and for putting 
up with two girls questioning everything you say. Perhaps one day I will learn to 
pronounce your name correctly. Laura and Zahra, thank you for introducing me to 
the phenomenon of statelessness and to the difficulties it poses in the lives of those 
without nationality and for giving me the opportunity to contribute to combating it, 
small as the contribution may be. Good luck with your Institute on Statelessness 
and Inclusion. Hopefully you will one day manage to eradicate statelessness and 
still have time inbetween all the research to visit a theme park again (with Eefje and 
me of course). To Simone, Byung Sook, Niels and others who joined in our daily 
lunches: thanks for the non-academic discussions and for agreeing that talking 
about unimportant topics is important too. I am grateful that the senior staff (Anna, 
Cees, Conny, Floor, Helen, Jonathan, Nicola, Willem, and all others) acknowledged 
this as well and made plenty of time available for drinks and outings. Finally, 
Femke, Inge and the other ladies at the secretariat, thank you for your support and 
for the many chats over coffee and cookies. 
Throughout the years the research took place I have met wonderful fellow-PhD-
students who made the PhD a social endeavour through drinks, lunches or other 
activities and who were available for ‘complaining’ about our ‘hard’ lives as PhD-
students at times of getting stuck. Annemarie, Esther, Iris, Lorena, Pinar, Shamiso 
and all others: thank you for sharing in the experience. A special thanks to co-PhD-
student Emilie, with whom I was also able to share in the frustration about the 
scarcity of conferences on the legal aspects of international humanitarian assistance 
(so we organized a conference ourselves). Good luck with finalizing your 
dissertation. Another word of gratitute goes to Chenny, who adjusted so easily to 
life in the Netherlands but found an amazing job back in China. I hope I can soon 
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1.1 Disaster strikes 
 
Disasters will always have certain consequences in terms of casualties, injuries, and 
material damage, although the degree varies from one disaster to another.1 It is up 
to the state on which territory the disaster takes place (that state will henceforth be 
referred to as the ‘affected state’) to address these consequences. In some cases, the 
damage as a result of the disaster is so severe that a state needs assistance from 
others – like states, international organisations, NGOs or a combination of these – 
to respond to a disaster and to work on reconstruction. The earthquake that struck 
Haiti in 2010 provides a clear example of a disaster where international assistance 
was needed and requested by the state. 
In the late afternoon of 12 January 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 
Mw struck Haiti, its epicentre lying about 25 kilometres from Port-au-Prince.2 Not 
only due to the enormous scale of the disaster but also because it is one of the 
poorest countries in the Americas, Haiti found itself struggling to cope with the 
consequences of the earthquake.3 The damage was indeed of massive proportions. 
Over 200.000 people were killed and many homes were destroyed along with the 
capital’s main infrastructure.4 Survivors tried to find refuge with relatives in the 
countryside or – in most cases – found shelter in refugee camps. For the distribution 
of tents, water and food the refugees were largely depending on international 
humanitarian aid, delivered with the permission of Haiti’s government. 
                                                        
1 When referring to a ‘disaster’, an event with natural causes is meant rather than a man-made 
disaster, like an industrial or technical accident or armed conflict. In section 3 it will be explained 
in more detail what is understood with ‘disaster’ in this research. 
2 The references to the magnitude of an earthquake are according to the Moment Magnitudes 
Scale (Mw) and based on the information of the US Geological Survey <http://www.usgs.gov/>. 
3  According to the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) human development 
index of 2009, Haiti ranks 149 out of 182 of the most developed States. The Human Development 
Report of 2009, including the index, can be found at: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/> accessed 
22 April 2010. 
4 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Haiti Earthquake Situation Report 





Not in all disasters is the affected state willing to make use of aid offered by 
international actors. When the Italian city of L’Aquila was hit by an earthquake in 
2009, the Italian government made clear that international assistance for 
reconstruction was not required. The L’Aquila earthquake, which struck on 6 April 
at 3:32 am local time with a magnitude of 6.3 Mw,5 killed over 300 people and 
made around 55,000 people homeless.6 Many buildings in the historic centre of the 
city were damaged. The total cost of the earthquake was estimated at 2.5 billion US 
dollars7 and yet – at the time – Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated that ‘Italians 
were “proud people” and had sufficient resources to deal with the crisis’.8 Italy did 
therefore not make use of offers of aid made by international actors.9 This response 
by the Italian government was initially received with some scepticism and more 
critical voices could be heard around the earthquake’s first anniversary when it was 
reported that approximately 4,000 people were still living in Red Cross 
accommodation and around 17,000 people were still living in hotels.10 Moreover, at 
that time there did not seem to be a clear plan for the reconstruction of the non-
historical parts of L’Aquila.11 It was then questioned whether Italy should not have 
accepted aid since its own response did not yield satisfying results. This discussion 
was preceded and therefore probably influenced by a disaster of larger scale, 
namely cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar, where the affected state’s refusal of 
international assistance prompted much criticism on Myanmar’s government from 
the international community.  
When cyclone Nargis swept over the Irrawaddy Delta in southern Myanmar on 2 
May 2008, approximately 140,000 people lost their lives and around 2.4 million 
people were affected as they lost their homes and livelihoods.12 During the first 
days after the disaster the government of Myanmar did not accept international 
assistance. Other states and international organisations disapproved of this decision 
of the government, pressuring Myanmar to allow humanitarian relief into the 
country. After some time, the government indeed accepted assistance but insisted 
                                                        
5  US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2009/us2009fcaf/ 
#details > accessed 28 April 2010. 
6 According to the database used by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
(CRED) of the University of Louvain called ‘EM-DAT’. When this database is used, reference is 
made to ‘EM-DAT’ (<http://www.cred.be/> and <http://www.emdat.be/>). 
7 EM-DAT. 
8 —— ‘Death Toll Rises in Italy Quake’ BBC News (7 April 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/ 
fr/-/2/hi/europe/7987698.stm> accessed 28 April 2010. 
9 This does not mean that no international resources reached Italy. For example through the Red 
Cross system funding can easily be transferred. This system will be discussed in more detail in 
section 2.3 of Chapter II. 
10  —— ‘L’Aquila Earthquake Survivors Plan Protest March’ The Guardian (5 April 2010) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/05/laquila-earthquake-survivors-plan-protest-march> 







on distributing the relief goods itself. Later also aid workers were allowed to enter 
the country. Ten days after Nargis struck, only a quarter of the required aid was 
being allowed into the country.13 Around three weeks after the disaster only an 
estimated 500,000 out of 2.4 million affected people had received some form of 
international assistance. 14  The decision of Myanmar’s government to refuse 
assistance incited much international discussion. Not only were strong reactions 
found in the international media15 but also an academic debate arose on the limits of 
international law in such situations.16 
There is absolutely no guarantee that disaster recovery is better, faster, more 
effective, or of overall higher quality when the affected state accepts international 
assistance. From updates appearing in the media and being published by 
humanitarian organisations around the anniversaries of the Haitian earthquake, it 
becomes clear that many people are still struggling to get back on their feet year 
after year, despite the massive international response and the many international 
organisations and NGOs working in Haiti. Yet there is a feeling of common sense 
that when disaster survivors do not have access to food, water, health care or shelter 
because their state is unable or unwilling to provide it, these survivors do not need 
to suffer or even perish when offers of assistance are made by foreign actors. 
Problems therefore arise when the affected state is unable or unwilling to respond 
adequately to a disaster and refuses to accept offers of international assistance.  
Cyclone Nargis and the earthquake in L’Aquila are only two examples where a 
state does not accept international humanitarian assistance. The scale of the 
problem exceeds these two examples. Three factors determine how many people are 
affected by the decision of affected states to refuse assistance: (i) the frequency with 
which disasters occur; (ii) the number of times states refuse international assistance; 
and (iii) the capacity of the affected state. The first factor, the frequency with which 
disasters happen, lies between 500 and 650 a year. In the years 2009 to 2013, a total 
of 598, 646, 592, 553 and 529 disasters occurred. In 2010, 304,472 people were 
killed (for a large part as a result of the earthquake in Haiti), in the other years the 
                                                        
13 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Disasters and ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Should Nations Force Aid on 
Others? A Cyclone is Not Enough’ (2010) 34 Natural Hazards Observer [3] 1, 9. 
14 United Kingdom Department for International Development (23 May 2008) 
<http://www.reliefweb.int> accessed 28 April 2010. 
15 See for example A. Buncombe, ‘Burma under pressure to let outside world help after cyclone 
kills hundreds’ The Independent (5 May 2008); B. Pisik, ‘Cyclone toll feared above 100,000; 
Burma blocks aid; workers await visas’ The Washington Times (8 May 2008); S. Sengupta, 
‘International Pressure on Myanmar Junta is Building’ The New York Times (18 May 2008); M. 
Lillis, ‘Debate Storms over Burma Aid’ Washington Independent (20 May 2008). 
16 See for example John Arendshorst, ‘The Dilemma of Non-Interference: Myanmar, Human 
Rights, and the ASEAN Charter’ (2009) 8 Northwestern University Journal of International 
Human Rights 102; Morton Abramowitz & Thomas Pickering, ‘Making Intervention Work. 
Improving the UN’s Ability to Act’ (2008) 87 Foreign Affairs 100; Rebecca J. Barber, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect the Survivors of Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis, A Case Study’ (2009) 





numbers vary between 15,585 (2012) and 37,907 (2011).  The numbers of people 
affected in these years vary from 99,837,000 in 2013 to 340,671,000 in 2010. The 
average amount of damage in these five years is 178,226 million US dollars per 
year. 17  Although 2013 shows a dip in the number of affected people, there is 
general concern for the ever growing impact disasters have. The number of disasters 
occurring each year is quite stable, but the number of affected people is likely to 
grow.18  
An empirical study published in 2010 sheds light on the second factor, i.e. how 
often humanitarian assistance is refused. Of the disaster situations between 1989 
and 2004 included in the research, aid was being refused to some extent in 
approximately 25% of the cases.19 This number does not even include states which 
have a default policy to refuse international offers of assistance, like the US, China, 
India and Japan. 20  Reasons for refusing international offers of assistance are 
manifold, and since decades studies have looked into the arguments given by 
refusing states. 21  Some states declare that they are capable of responding to a 
disaster themselves so that international assistance is not needed, arriving at the 
third factor. If a state is indeed equipped to adequately respond to a disaster, victims 
can obtain sufficient assistance. In the cases where a state is not capable to respond 
adequately or is unwilling to use the resources at its disposal for responding to a 
disaster, the refusal of international humanitarian assistance poses a problem. 
 
                                                        
17 These numbers are provided by the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) in the 
World Disaster Report of 2014 (annexes, tables 1 to 4) and are based on data provided by EM-
DAT. ‘Disaster’ according to these statistics are those events with a natural and or technological 
trigger, excluding wars, conflict-related famines, diseases or epidemics. IFRC, ‘World Disaster 
Report 2014: Focus on Culture and Risk’ (IFRC, Geneva 2014) 220-223 <http://www.ifrc.org/ 
Global/Documents/Secretariat/201410/WDR%202014.pdf> accessed 27 October 2014. 
18 A number of factors cause this trend, like climate change, poverty and overcrowding in cities. 
19 Sometimes an affected state refused aid from one particular state, sometimes from a particular 
group of states, and more rarely from all states as a whole. Travis Nelson, ‘Rejecting the Gift 
Horse: International Politics of Disaster Aid Refusal’ (2010) 10 Conflict, Security and 
Development 379. 
20 Ibid.  
21  See for example an analysis from 1979 by Ellen Freudenheim, ‘Politics in International 
Disasters: Fact, Not Fiction’ in Lynn H. Stephens & Stephen J. Green (eds) Disaster Assistance: 
Appraisal, Reform and New Approaches (1979) 228. Freudenheim identifies four major political 
problems: domestic politics (the domestic politics obstruct formal acknowledgement of the 
disaster or the acceptance and coordination of relief); domestic corruption (e.g. misallocation of 
relief goods); rejection of aid (blatant rejection of offers of foreign governments); international 
politics (relief operations do not come off the ground due to international politics). A more recent 
study is done by Dorothea Hilhorst & Bram J. Jansen, ‘Humanitarian Space as an Arena: A 
Perspective on the Everyday Politics of Aid’ (2010) 41 Development and Change 1117, where for 






1.2 Legal regulation of disaster response 
 
Given the facts that people have been dealing with disasters for centuries, that 
disasters happen frequently worldwide, and that disasters can have strong 
international impacts like population displacement and the outbreak of diseases, it 
would be expected that a vast body of specialized international law regulates 
international disaster response and dictates whether or not a state should accept or is 
allowed to refuse international humanitarian assistance. The contrary is however 
true. According to the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), ‘(d)isaster 
response is a “long-neglected facet of international law” and “it is unlikely that any 
other challenge looming so large in world affairs has received so little attention in 
the legal realm”.’22 Indeed, at first glance, public international law does not seem to 
offer many specific instruments dictating states’ action in disaster situations, 
although at closer scrutiny a small number of legal instruments can be found that 
focus on aspects of international disaster response.23 
Despite the absence of an explicit legal framework on disaster response, 
scattered sources of international law can nonetheless be found from which rights, 
rules and principles can be derived to be applied after the occurrence of a disaster. 
The principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, non-interference and 
territorial integrity grant the freedom to an affected state to determine which aid is 
needed after a disaster and to decide which international actors are allowed to cross 
the borders of its territory to provide assistance.24 Other rules of international law 
dictate states to take care of the persons living on a state’s territory or who are 
under a state’s jurisdiction. Human rights law, as the main example, has grown into 
a system of many international and regional instruments aimed at the protection of 
(groups of) persons. International humanitarian law, applicable in situations of 
armed conflict, explicitly deals with humanitarian assistance going for example into 
situations where a civilian population is in need of assistance and where this 
assistance would be delivered by international actors.  
Nevertheless, even though some fields of public international law can be used, 
in situations where an affected state refuses international humanitarian assistance, 
the legal implications are not clear-cut: 
 
There is no definitive, broadly accepted source of international law which spells out 
the legal standards, procedures, rights and duties pertaining to disaster response and 
                                                        
22 IFRC, ‘World Disaster Report 2000’ (IFRC, Geneva 2000) 157 cited by David P. Fidler, 
‘Disaster Relief and Governance after the Indian Ocean Tsunami: What Role for International 
Law?’ (2005) 6 Melbourne Journal of International Law 458, 459. 
23 In the next Chapter an overview will be provided of the legal framework of international 
disaster response and the development of this framework. In that Chapter the instruments aimed 
specifically at disaster response will also be discussed. 
24 These principles are laid down in, inter alia, article 2 under paragraph (1), (4) and (7) of the 





assistance. No systematic attempt has been made to pull together the disparate 
threads of existing law, to formalize customary law or to expand and develop the law 
in new ways. (…) At the dawn of the 21st century, a cohesive approach to 
international disaster response law is not much farther along than it was at the start of 
the 20th.25 
 
Consequently, at first-face public international law does not provide a clear 
overview of the duties of affected states in responding to a disaster. It is therefore 
difficult to define how much freedom a state has to accept or refuse (offers of) 
international humanitarian assistance. 
 
1.3 Research goal and main research question  
 
Considering the problems that too often arise in the aftermath of a disaster with 
respect to acceptance and refusal of international humanitarian assistance and 
taking into account that the largely scattered legal framework is not helpful here, 
this research will look into the amount of freedom affected states have to refuse 
offers of international humanitarian assistance. While the body of specialized law 
on disaster response and international humanitarian assistance is not very extended, 
it is possible that standards can be found in the wider field of public international 
law. Formulated as a question, this research aims to seek an answer to the following:  
 
To what extent does public international law contain standards for affected states 
determining whether the affected state must accept international humanitarian 
assistance after the occurrence of a disaster?  
 
To come to an answer of this question, certain choices must be made with regard to 
the scope and content of the research. In the following, the scope will be 
demarcated. In section 3 of this Chapter it will be explained what is understood with 
‘disaster’ and ‘humanitarian assistance’ and in the fourth section the structure and 
research methodology will be explained. 
 
2 THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
2.1 Focus on affected states’ obligations to accept 
 
The focus of this research will lie on the obligation(s) for affected states with regard 
to accepting international humanitarian assistance. The nature of this research is 
legal and departs from public international law. Traditionally, public international 
law mainly evolved around states. Being created and ratified by states, treaties 
focused on regulating the relations between states in numerous aspects. Over time 
                                                        
25 IFRC, ‘International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice: Reflections, Prospects, 





this body of state-centric law became increasingly concerned with rights and 
obligations of other actors in the international sphere. 26  Still, when looking at 
disaster response, it immediately becomes clear that a fundamental concept like 
state sovereignty lies at the centre of the issue. In Chapter II, sovereignty will be 
discussed in more detail, but in anticipation of that Chapter an implication of the 
concept is mentioned here. A traditional reading of state sovereignty includes 
territorial integrity and non-interference. In disaster-context this means that 
international actors cannot enter an affected state to deliver humanitarian assistance 
without the affected state’s permission. During and right after a disaster the first and 
foremost responder and distributor of humanitarian relief is therefore the affected 
state itself. The obligations of this first responder are under scrutiny here to see 
what these rules of general international law mean in disaster-context, not the 
obligations of other actors. Consequently, it will not be considered whether non-
state actors have any obligations in this respect.27 
Accepting and offering humanitarian assistance are two sides of the same coin. 
Usually, a wide variety of actors offer assistance after a disaster. Here, only 
obligations to accept international humanitarian assistance will be researched. 
Whether or not there is an obligation for offering assistance is a different question 
than the research question posed here. The offering-side is only included insofar 
they are relevant for answering the main research question. Offers are in that case 
not limited to offers made by other states, but also offers made by international 
organisations and NGOs are included. If a state refuses an offer made by another 
state that happens to the state’s political nemesis, there is less controversy than 
when a state refuses an offer made by a neutral humanitarian organisation.28 
As a corollary to the obligations of the affected states, the thesis pays much 
interest to the position of disaster victims. The interests of disaster victims are a 
common theme throughout this research. Within the analysis of the legal framework 
fields like human rights law and refugee law will be included, fields that provide 
standards seeking to protect individuals while directing obligations to states. 29 
When looking at the obligations of states to accept international humanitarian 
assistance, the protection of disaster victims (especially through human rights law) 
will continuously be under consideration.  
 
                                                        
26 Take for example the developments taking place in trying to regulate the conduct of private 
corporations under international law. 
27 Non-state actors relevant in disaster situations are international organisations like the UN or 
UN-affiliated organisations, NGOs, individuals, and to increasing extent also private corporations. 
28 Joana Abrisketa, ‘The Right to Humanitarian Aid: Basis and Limitations’ in Humanitarian 
Studies Unit (ed.), Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions 
(Pluto Press, London/Sterling 2001) 60. 
29 In this line many examples can be found of state-centric law which aim to protect individuals, 
like the parts of international humanitarian law which focus at protecting civilians in armed 






2.2 Legal scope  
 
To find an answer to the research question, it will be analysed what rules and 
principles on accepting humanitarian assistance can be found in public international 
law. Public international law is a very broad and extensive category of law, 
encompassing many fields that are not relevant for the present research. Only those 
fields of public international law that could potentially be relevant for answering the 
research question will be included. On the one hand, these are fields of law that are 
not developed for the purpose of disaster response, but which are nonetheless to a 
certain extent or with regard to a certain topic explanatory on what states should do 
after a disaster struck. Examples are international humanitarian law and refugee law. 
On the other hand, (soft law) instruments are included that deal specifically with 
elements of international disaster response. Taking all these sources together, it is 
possible to identify the rules and principles that currently dictate affected states’ 
behaviour in the aftermath of a disaster, reflecting lex lata.  
A remark must be made on the inclusion of international humanitarian law and 
the understanding of ‘disaster’ in this research. In the next section, it will be 
explained that situations of armed conflict are excluded from the definition of 
‘disaster’ to be used. Nonetheless, international humanitarian law contains much 
information on international humanitarian assistance and is generally considered to 
be a well-developed and clear framework on delivering and accepting humanitarian 
assistance:   
 
Although far from constituting a comprehensive legal regime (…) the legal 
framework for humanitarian assistance in armed conflict constitutes a rather detailed 
one, in particular if compared with the regime for situations outside armed 
conflicts.30  
 
Even though armed conflicts are excluded from the definition of ‘disaster’ and are 
outside the scope of this research, much can be learned from the rules of 
international humanitarian law because of the rather detailed legal framework on 
humanitarian assistance. Therefore, this field of law will be included in the legal 
analysis of Chapter II so that the rules and principles found within international 
humanitarian law can be used to explain and clarify the further findings of the legal 
analysis. At the same time, the existing rules and principles during peace-time 
disasters can be compared to the framework provided for situations of armed 
conflict to find out if the discrepancy is indeed as large as is commonly believed. 
 
                                                        
30 Heike Spieker, ‘The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance’ in Hans-Joachim 
Heintze & Andrej Zwitter (eds.), International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut 
Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism (Springer, Heidelberg/Dordrecht/London/ 





2.3 The phases of disasters and their correlative legal issues 
 
Disaster studies focus on roughly three phases surrounding the occurrence of a 
disaster. First, there is the phase in which no disaster has taken place but where the 
state prepares for the possible future occurrence of a disaster. Some states are more 
disaster-prone than others and being aware of disaster risks can lead to a level of 
preparedness that limits the number of victims when disasters do in fact occur. 
Studies must identify disaster risks, and states are encouraged to invest in disaster 
preparedness. Legal questions in this respect relate to the actual duties that states 
have to prepare for a disaster, for instance when it comes to questions of liability 
after a disaster occurred. To what extent a state must prepare for a future event of 
which it is not sure that it will actually happen is an interesting but difficult question. 
This first phase, the disaster preparedness-phase, will not be included in this 
research because only affected states’ obligations in the aftermath of a disaster will 
be considered.  
The subsequent phase is the actual occurrence of a disaster and the immediate 
response to it (the disaster-proper phase). The type of disaster is determining how 
long the actual occurrence of a disaster lasts. Earthquakes are usually very short, but 
are often followed by aftershocks which can be as severe as the initial earthquake. 
Floods may also occur quickly, but not always does the water disappear again easily. 
A drought can be ongoing for years. No matter how long a disaster lasts, it is 
essential that there is immediate response to rescue people and to coordinate the 
assistance for survivors. If the immediate response is in any way flawed, it can 
result in further loss of life. Therefore, the main focus of this research lies on the 
immediate response-phase. 
After the disaster and the first response, the phase of reconstruction starts. It is 
not always easy to pinpoint where the initial response ends and where 
reconstruction begins, and often these phases overlap. One way to distinguish 
between disaster response and recovery is by looking at the nature of assistance 
offered. In the disaster-proper phase or in immediate response, the assistance 
offered is humanitarian assistance. At a later stage, the humanitarian assistance can 
(in full or partly) turn into development assistance. The difference lies in the nature 
of the assistance: development assistance is usually the result of a policy and of 
agreements with the receiving state, and is long-term in nature. Humanitarian 
assistance is usually ad hoc and cannot have any conditions set for the affected state 
to comply with in return. The reconstruction-phase turns again into the disaster-
preparedness phase, since reconstruction-planning should take into account the 
occurrence of another disaster and development assistance can be used for 
preparing for such an event. Development assistance is not included in this research. 
Although the disaster-proper and disaster recovery phases overlap, the line is drawn 







3 DEFINITIONS  
 
3.1 The definition of ‘disaster’ 
 
Disasters form the basis of this research. The legal obligations that are sought here 
apply in the event of a disaster, or – in other words – the occurrence of a disaster 
triggers a certain set of legal rules. Therefore, it is necessary to define what is 
understood with ‘disaster’. In addition, throughout this research examples of 
disasters are used to illustrate points that are made.31 The definition of ‘disaster’ 
also has the function of selecting these examples.  
Generally, the word ‘disaster’ is associated with a certain event with a severe 
and dramatic impact on the society in which it occurs.32 According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary a disaster is ‘an unexpected event, such as a very bad accident, a 
flood or a fire, that kills a lot of people or causes a lot of damage’.33 Nonetheless, it 
is difficult to pinpoint which events can be considered ‘disasters’ and which events 
are merely ‘unfortunate incidents’ and why. When looking closely at definitions 
used by various organisations, a number of elements can be identified that 
determine what a disaster is. These elements are generally related to the causes and 
the effects of an event that could potentially be a disaster. Of further influence is the 
goal with which a definition of disaster is made, like the collection of certain data 
for research.  
Disasters can either be caused by a natural event, by human action, or both. 
Amongst natural disasters are earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, droughts, landslides, 
cyclones and volcanic eruptions. Man-made disasters are for example nuclear 
disasters (like the Chernobyl disaster which occurred in Ukraine in 1986 due to an 
explosion in the nuclear power plant), industrial disasters (of which the Bhopal 
disaster of 1984 where a gas-leak killed thousands of people in India is the main 
example), and technical disasters (which generally concern accidents in industrial 
transportation, like the Shell oil leaks in Nigeria, causing environmental damage 
and illnesses due to ground contamination). A disaster can also be caused by a 
natural trigger but have a clear man-made element at the same time (like the 
Fukushima disaster in Japan of 2011 which was the result of a tsunami hitting the 
nuclear power plant resulting in a nuclear disaster). Armed conflicts are sometimes 
considered to be man-made disasters.34 However, there are also those who explicitly 
                                                        
31 What exactly the function is of these cases and how they are used in this research will be 
explained in section 4 below on Structure and Methodology. 
32 Quite commonly there is an understanding of disasters as incredibly chaotic situations where 
people panic and turn on each other, resulting in situations of lawlessness and disarray. Such 
images are not helped by popular disaster films and are in most cases far from the truth.   
33 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (7th edition 2007) 432. The word ‘disaster’ comes from 
disastro or ‘unfavourable (positioned) star’. The occurrence of a disaster was (and sometimes still 
is) usually subscribed to bad fortunes or a punishment by a deity.  
34 EM-DAT provides in its glossary a definition of ‘disaster’ which explicitly includes armed 






exclude armed conflict from the definition of disaster35 and use the term ‘complex 
disaster’ to indicate a situation in which a disaster takes place within a context of 
violence and armed conflict.36 
The causes of a disaster can be further divided in slow- and sudden-onset. A 
slow-onset disaster takes a longer time to develop and to reach its peak than a 
sudden-onset disaster. A very clear example of a slow-onset disaster is a drought for 
which it is necessary that rain stays out for a number of subsequent rainy seasons. 
Such a disaster is relatively easy to predict, yet not all states have the capacity to 
respond effectively. Even though sudden-onset disasters like earthquakes and 
tsunamis are more difficult to predict, early warning systems do help in decreasing 
the effects of such disasters. 
Categorizing disasters according to cause is useful when looking at questions on 
liability and preparedness. Yet it is in many cases very difficult to determine 
whether a disaster had natural or man-made causes, as it is often a combination of 
both. An earthquake is a natural disaster, but when construction regulations for 
earthquake-prone areas are ignored, man-made elements are included.37  Also a 
hurricane is a natural disaster, but when the affected state is slow in its response and 
the situation for survivors deteriorates as a result, the disaster becomes partly man-
made. Moreover, many disasters are somehow related to climate change which 
arguably has a certain man-made element. To avoid the difficulty of determining if 
a disaster is truly natural or whether there are man-made elements, it is more 
convenient to define what a disaster is by looking at the consequences and not at the 
cause.38  
Defining a disaster based on consequences can include a variety of elements, 
like the number of casualties, the number of people affected, the total costs of the 
damage, or the broader impact of the event on a particular society.39 However, a 
certain line must be drawn to determine how many casualties or how much damage 
is required before an event can be called a disaster. If such a line is not drawn in 
absolute terms (e.g. ten casualties constitutes disaster), the definition would 
necessarily be relative because in that case impact is determined by the 
                                                        
included among the causes of disasters.’ The database itself does not, however, include situations 
of armed conflict. 
35 See also the definition used in the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA) 
Agreement article 1(d).  
36 IFRC <www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/about/types/manmade/conflict.asp> accessed 3 May 2010. 
37 In the case of L’Aquila, for example, a number of builders were found guilty for the deaths of 
eight students because their dormitory collapsed during the disaster. Faulty construction work 
weakened the dormitory. ——, ‘Builders Found Guilty in L’Aquila Quake Deaths’ The 
Australian (17 February 2013) <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/ world/builders-found-
guilty-in-laquila-quake-deaths/story-e6frg6so-1226579660625> accessed 25 February 2013. 
38 It is possible to do this in this research because questions of blame and liability are not relevant. 
The only man-made element that is excluded is armed conflict. 
39 EM-DAT includes an event as a disaster when a minimum of ten persons have died or when the 





vulnerability of a society before a disaster strikes, the severity of the disaster and 
the capacity that the society has to rebuild. A group of disadvantaged victims is 
often less prepared than a more privileged group and a richer society is usually 
more capable to address the aftermath of a disaster, so that it depends on the 
circumstances whether an event is a ‘disaster’. A hurricane can be considered a 
‘disaster’ in one state based on the damage caused but not in the next if that other 
state was better prepared or has more capacity to respond. The IFRC uses the 
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When looking at the definitions of ‘disaster’ which are created for different 
purposes, the options of departing from cause or from consequence can be 
recognized. A number of definitions will be discussed here that form the basis for 
the definition of ‘disaster’ that will be used in this research.  
The definition used in the Tampere Convention on Telecommunication is often 
cited in legal contexts, possibly because it is a definition created for legal purposes. 
It is therefore also a good starting point here. The Tampere Convention’s definition 
of disaster is the following:41   
 
Disaster means a serious disruption of the functioning of society, posing a significant, 
widespread threat to human life, health, property or the environment, whether caused 
by accident, nature or human activity, and whether developing suddenly or as the 
result of complex long-term processes.42  
 
According to this definition there must in the first place be a ‘serious disruption of 
the functioning of society’, meaning that the effect of an event must influence the 
everyday life of people in a severe way. Consequences are formulated in a relative 
way. It is not determined in absolute numbers what a disaster is; it is the serious 
disruption that counts. Minor disruptions are not included, but when is a disruption 
serious enough to be considered a disaster? The description of consequences 
provides more insight in the level of ‘seriousness’ that is required to make a certain 
disruption a disaster. The disruption must be so severe to be a threat to ‘human life, 
health, property or the environment’. 43 For the Tampere Convention’s definition, it 
                                                        
40 IFRC <http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/about/index.asp> accessed 3 May 2010. 
41 Officially called the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources 
for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations 1998, entered into force in January 2005. This 
Convention regulates the use of telecommunication in times of disaster, setting aside national 
regulations on telecommunication in order to make communication more efficient. 
42 Article 1 of the Tampere Convention. This definition is also considered by the ILC ‘Second 
Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, 
Special Rapporteur’ (UN Doc A/CN.4/615 of 7 May 2009) para 33 and by the IFRC in its 
‘Guidelines’: IFRC, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation 
of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’ (IFRC, Geneva 2008). 
43 Some definitions are not specific on the type of consequences that must be included in their 
understanding of ‘disaster’, but speak generally of ‘consequences’. See for example the UN Inter-






is enough that a certain event could potentially have these effects: the definition 
does not require the actual loss of life or damage to property. The only requirement 
of the definition is that there is a disruption. Apart from looking at the consequences, 
this definition also names possible causes, including natural as well as man-made 
causes (‘caused by accident, nature or human activity’) and both slow- and sudden-
onset disasters (‘developing suddenly or as the result of complex long-term 
processes’). Even armed conflicts are not excluded.  
Many other definitions are not satisfied with a ‘threat’ that certain effects will 
follow the disaster but require that a certain event or disruption must have caused 
actual negative effects like loss of life or damage. In its work on the ‘Protection of 
Persons in the Event of Disasters’, the UN International Law Commission (ILC) 
reflects this in its definition: ‘“Disaster” means a calamitous event or series of 
events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or 
large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society’. 44  Noticeable in this definition is the absence of any 
reference to the cause of the ‘calamitous event or series of events’. Apparently, it 
does not matter what caused it, but an event can be considered a disaster when there 
is ‘widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale 
material or environmental damage’. Again, it is required that this damage is severe 
enough to ‘seriously’ disrupt the everyday life of a society. The amount of suffering 
or damage that must be present before the ILC speaks of a disaster is determined by 
the degree in which the functioning of society is disrupted, where the word 
‘seriously’ provides a minimum standard and indicators of what can be considered 
as ‘seriously’ are given through ‘widespread’, ‘great’, and ‘large-scale’. The ILC 
excludes armed conflicts from its work because the ILC is of the opinion that ‘a 
well-developed body of law exists to cover such situations’.45  
An important organisation in disaster response is the Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) which is the successor of the UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). When looking at the definition used by the DHA, it 
immediately becomes clear that the ILC used this as a source of inspiration:   
 
A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread human, 
material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope 
                                                        
consequence of events (…) that overwhelm local response capacity (…)’, IASC, ‘Protecting 
Persons Affected by Natural Disasters: IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and 
Natural Disasters’ (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington DC 2006) 8. 
44 ILC Drafting Committee, ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Texts of draft articles 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.758 of 
24 July 2009), draft article 3. 






using only its own resources. Disasters are often classified according to their cause 
(natural or manmade).46 
 
In this definition the causes are only mentioned as a means of classification, but are 
not determining which situations can be considered as disasters. Again, there must 
be a ‘serious’ disruption, to be determined by the extent to which losses exist. 
Consequently, this definition refers to actual losses and damage, not merely to the 
threat that this might occur. Besides these elements that were also present in the 
ILC-definition, there is one very important element that was also taken into account 
in the formula of the IFRC. The DHA-definition states that a situation that disrupts 
societies by causing losses can only be considered a disaster when the losses 
‘exceed the ability’ of the affected society ‘to cope using only its own resources’. 
As a result, no matter how big or severe the event causing a disruption is, it is not 
considered to be a disaster as long as the affected state has the ability to deal with 
the consequences. This line is also followed by the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED): ‘a situation or event, which overwhelms local 
capacity, necessitating a request to national or international level for external 
assistance’.47 
The definitions of disasters described in the foregoing may include choices 
which appear striking at first glance, yet it must be called to mind that definitions 
may serve to identify a certain dataset. Excluding armed conflicts means excluding 
a certain field of law and only taking into consideration those events that exceed the 
affected state’s ability results in including cases in which international assistance 
becomes a major issue. In this line a definition of ‘disaster’ will be created here for 
the purpose of this particular research.  
In the first place, the situations this research will focus on are events taking 
place in peace-time. The reason for excluding situations of armed conflict is the 
general presumption that international humanitarian law has a (relatively) clear-cut 
and comprehensive framework on international humanitarian assistance. It is more 
interesting to consider obligations of states to accept humanitarian assistance 
outside the scope of this relative legal clarity. Still, in the analysis of the legal 
framework in the next Chapter, international humanitarian law will be included to 
see what this field has to offer and to compare these findings with the findings of 
the rest of the legal framework. In addition, the rules found in international 
humanitarian law may be helpful to explain or interpret rules and concepts found in 
                                                        
46 UNDHA, ‘Internationally Agreed Glossary of Basic Terms Related to Disaster Management’ 
(UN Doc. DHA/93/36 of December 1992) 27. The original uses ‘manmade’ rather than ‘man-
made’. The – more or less – same definition is used by the UN International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (ISDR): ‘A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the 
affected community or society to cope using its own resources’. UN ISDR (2006), cited by 
George Kent, ‘Disasters and ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Should Nations Force Aid on Others? 
Rights and Obligations’ (2010) 34 Natural Hazards Observer [3], 18. 





other fields of law. In order not to enter into the difficult debate on what constitutes 
‘armed conflict’, ‘peace-time’ is considered to be a state where international 
humanitarian law is not applicable.48 
It is not necessary for answering the main research question to make any claims 
on the cause of a disaster. The goal is to find state obligations in the aftermath of a 
disaster, no matter what caused it. At the basis of this decision also lies a more 
practical consideration: it is often very difficult to determine whether a disaster is 
caused by nature or by human action or inaction (either in the disaster preparedness 
phase or in the response to a disaster). Therefore, to determine whether a certain 
event can be considered as a disaster the emphasis will lie on the consequences of 
the event.49 
For the purposes of this research, situations in which a certain event took place 
but where the affected state could easily cope with the consequences using its own 
resources are not interesting to include. The definition of ‘disaster’ in this research 
must therefore include reference to the capacity of the affected state (as in the 
formula of the IFRC or in the definition of the DHA: ‘which exceed the ability of 
(the) affected society to cope using only its own resources’).50 In addition, there are 
situations in which the affected state would be able to adequately respond to a 
disaster using solely its own resources, but where the state is unable to allocate its 
resources effectively (for example due to a weak government or corruption) or 
unwilling to help (parts of) its population. Here, the question whether the state has 
obligations to accept assistance is relevant as well. The definition of ‘disaster’ must 
therefore include cases where the capacity of the affected state is exceeded, where 
states are unwilling to deal with the consequences of a disaster, and situations that 
are a combination of the two.51  
A rather pressing problem is announcing itself here. If the capacity of a state or 
the willingness of a state to respond to an event are determining whether or not that 
event can be considered to be a disaster, the question arises how it must be decided 
if the affected state’s capacity is overwhelmed or if the state is indeed unwilling to 
respond adequately. To overcome this problem, the determination whether an event 
was beyond a state’s capacity to address or whether a state was unwilling to 
respond adequately is based on a variety of sources and comments (resulting in a 
                                                        
48 Complex disasters are therefore excluded from the definition as well. 
49 Following the approach taken by the organisations described above. 
50 UNDHA (n 46). That capacity is overwhelmed could mean that a disaster is of such a massive 
scale that it exceeds a state’s ability to cope, but also the situation where in some small states, like 
island-states, the economy is too small to generally address the consequences of disasters. See e.g. 
Victoria Bannon, ‘International Disaster Response Law and the Commonwealth: Answering the 
Call to Action’ (2008) 34 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 843, 844.  
51 These are for example the cases in which a state appears to be willing to accept assistance but at 
the same time blocks it by strict customs regulations or other barriers; the cases in which 
assistance is only refused from a particular state or small group of states; or examples in which 
the affected state claims that it responded well enough but where the contrary can also be argued, 





hint of subjectivity). Ultimately, the inclusion of human rights law will prove useful 
in determining whether the affected state has sufficient capacity to address the 
consequences of a disaster. 
Taking all these considerations together, in this research a ‘disaster’ is: an event 
occurring in peace-time with natural causes, man-made causes, or a combination of 
both, which causes harm to the affected population to an extent that it is beyond the 
affected state’s capacity to address. This includes situations in which the affected 
state is not willing to address the consequences and refuses to accept international 
assistance. 
 
3.2 Humanitarian assistance 
 
The term (international) ‘humanitarian assistance’ is part of the main research 
question. There is no universal definition of ‘humanitarian assistance’, so to define 
the concept a number of sources is used here.52 ‘Humanitarian assistance’ includes 
the support that is offered to reduce human suffering after the occurrence of a 
disaster. It has already been explained that short-term humanitarian assistance must 
be distinguished from longer-term development assistance as it is ‘an activity within 
‘humanitarian action’, which is short term relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, 
even leading to development cooperation’.53 Development assistance is not directly 
connected to the occurrence of a disaster and constitutes long-term plans and 
agreements between donors and receiving parties.54  
Alternative terms for ‘humanitarian assistance’ exist and will also be used 
throughout this study. ‘Humanitarian aid’ basically means the same as assistance, 
yet a certain prejudice nonetheless exists towards ‘aid’ in the sense that it appears to 
indicate that the receiving party is somehow weak. In this study ‘humanitarian 
assistance’ and ‘humanitarian aid’ are used as synonyms without having any 
prejudice towards the affected state’s capacity. Other varieties are ‘humanitarian 
relief’, ‘relief assistance’ and ‘relief action’.  
Assistance can comprise many types of goods and services. Depending on what 
is required in a particular situation, assistance can consist of financial assistance, of 
goods, and of personnel delivering these goods or providing services (for example 
medical personnel or search and rescue teams). The International Court of Justice 
determined that humanitarian assistance includes ‘food, clothing, medicine and 
other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, 
weapons systems, ammunition, other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be 
                                                        
52  Rohan Hardcastle & Adrian Chua, ‘Victims of Natural Disasters: The Right to Receive 
Humanitarian Assistance’ (1997) 4 The International Journal of Human Rights 35, 36. 
53 Spieker (n 30) 7. 
54  Development cooperation is also sometimes indicated as ‘foreign aid’: ‘Humanitarian 
assistance is to be distinguished from foreign aid by its emergency character and use for relieving 





used to inflict serious bodily harm or death’.55  Assistance is in the first place 
provided by the affected state and organisations working on the affected state’s 
territory and when speaking of international humanitarian assistance foreign actors, 
like the UN or UN-affiliated organisations, other states sending goods and 
personnel, NGOs and private parties like individuals and corporations are the ones 
delivering (either through the affected state or directly to disaster victims).56 
The word ‘humanitarian’ is often believed to relate to the humanitarian 
principles, which are the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and 
independence.57 Varieties exist on the humanitarian principles. Some mention only 
the first three, others have more, like the seven principles of the IFRC. 58  The 
humanitarian principles must make sure that the assistance offered is meeting 
certain quality standards, so that aid is not conditional or tied in any way. In 
practice assistance that is called ‘humanitarian’ does not always meet these criteria. 
It is nonetheless a presupposition here that humanitarian assistance must always 
aspire to adhere to the humanitarian principles.59 The implications of not bringing 
an offer of assistance in line with these principles will return throughout this 
research. 
Finally, perhaps needless to say, the word ‘humanitarian’ in humanitarian 
assistance is not equal to the word ‘humanitarian’ in international humanitarian law. 
Truly, the field of international humanitarian law also contains rules on the delivery 
and acceptance of humanitarian assistance, but humanitarian assistance is not 
limited to conflict situations. Moreover, the research focuses on disasters occurring 
in peacetime. Although ‘humanitarian’ can cause confusion with regard to the legal 
implication that armed conflict is included, it is certainly not part of its meaning in 
the present research. 
 
 
                                                        
55 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 47. 
56 The role of civil society in disaster response is ever increasing. When the Indian Ocean tsunami 
struck in 2004, private donations to NGOs and the UN exceeded governmental donations for the 
first time. David Fisher, ‘Fast Food: Regulating Emergency Food Aid in Sudden-Impact Disasters’ 
(2007) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1127, 1133. 
57  OCHA, ‘What are Humanitarian Principles?’ (2012)  <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/ 
Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf> accessed 22 January 2015.  
58 Spieker (n 30) 7; the IFRC adds ‘voluntary service’, ‘unity’ and ‘universality’. IFRC, ‘The 
Seven Fundamental Principles’ <http://www.ifrc.org/who-we-are/vision-and-mission/the-seven-
fundamental-principles/> accessed 22 January 2015. 
59 Considering the possible obligation to accept international humanitarian assistance, it is of 
importance that an offer of assistance is purely humanitarian. If an offer is for example 
conditional or earmarked for members of a certain religious group, there is a strong argument for 
an affected state to refuse that offer. Naturally, what exactly the effect of the humanitarian nature 





4 STRUCTURE AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
As said, there is no clearly demarcated field of public international law on disaster 
response, but in various areas of international law rules and principles can be found 
contributing to the total set of rules applicable in disaster settings. Instruments have 
been identified that contain the elements of a legal framework on accepting 
international humanitarian assistance, which will be analysed in Chapter II. This 
legal framework will contain the obligations for states on accepting (and refusing) 
assistance. To gain more insight into the origins of these rules, Chapter II will also 
consider developments within the main organisations working on disaster response 
and which are those stimulating legal developments most strongly. The outcome of 
this Chapter (an overview of the status of the law) will not only explain the rules 
but will at the same time make it possible to identify where the gaps in the 
framework lie. Chapter III will subsequently take these findings and place them in 
the reality of disaster response.  
In this third Chapter examples of disasters are included based on which it is 
analysed to what extent the legal rules found in Chapter II direct states in accepting 
assistance. Based on this analysis, it is possible to identify the difficulties that 
application of the legal framework of Chapter II causes in practice. The examples 
that are included are disasters that occurred roughly since 2004.60 In the selection of 
examples the definition of ‘disaster’ as used in this research forms the basis, 
meaning that the disasters are considered beyond the state’s capacity to address. As 
already explained, determining whether this is the case is rather subjective and 
difficult: a state can deem its response adequate while others may disagree. There is, 
therefore, room for discussion on the cases selected, although that discussion is not 
held here; it is assumed that in the examples included throughout the research the 
disaster’s consequences were beyond the state’s capacity (or willingness) to address. 
This is determined based on a variety of sources, like statements or reports on the 
status of recovery after some time has passed since the actual occurrence of a 
disaster. Consequently, disasters on which hardly any reliable information is 
available are not included.61 In addition, situations of armed conflict are excluded 
                                                        
60 In 2004, the Boxing Day Tsunami (or Indian Ocean Tsunami) killed an enormous number of 
people and posed many difficulties in humanitarian efforts. Consequently, this tsunami renewed 
the (legal) attention to disaster response and sources on disasters since that time are more readily 
available than sources on disasters prior to 2004.  
61 There have for example been many cases of famine in North Korea in the last decades due to 
mismanagement of natural factors like drought. It is, however, difficult to find reliable 
information on these cases so the North Korean famines are not included. Even for disasters that 
are extensively documented information is not always reliable, as was seen after hurricane 
Katrina when it hit New Orleans in 2005. Many newspapers that are usually considered to be 
reliable, published stories of horrible crimes that were committed at the refuge Super Dome, like 
murder and rape. Also, people were supposedly looting and pillaging on a large scale, making 
New Orleans too dangerous a place for relief workers. Later, it became clear that many of these 






from the definition of ‘disaster’ to be used here. Therefore, cases concerning armed 
conflict (even when a natural disaster occurs in the context of an armed conflict) are 
not included. Two exceptions are made: the cases of Syria (humanitarian 
emergency during an armed conflict while no natural disaster takes place) and 
Somalia (humanitarian emergency as the result of a natural disaster taking place in 
the context of an armed conflict). Both cases make a particular legal point 
(explained in Chapters II and III) which is important for the understanding of the 
legal framework as a whole. Finally, it must be stressed that the included cases do 
not have the purpose of an empirical study into disaster response. Only the elements 
of each example that illustrate a certain point are included in the research. No 
general conclusions can be made based on the examples alone.  
What becomes clear from Chapters II and III is that a set of rules and principles 
exist which dictates what states must do in terms of seeking and accepting 
international humanitarian assistance, but when these rules are applied in practice, 
they are not concrete enough to set standards for state behaviour. It is therefore 
necessary to seek another way of concretizing the rules that are identified in 
Chapters II and III. There are multiple possibilities through which this can be 
attempted and it would be interesting to compare different options and outcomes.62 
In this research the approach is however taken to look at one possibility in-depth 
rather than exploring a variety of alternatives superficially. Underlying this decision 
is the promising potential of the option taken and the desire to be thorough in the 
analysis. 
 When considering the entire framework of laws, resolutions, guidelines and 
other instruments on humanitarian assistance and disaster response, the field of 
human rights law stands out for its standard-setting potential in disaster response. 
Human rights standards can be used to concretize and therefore define obligations 
to accept international humanitarian assistance. One human rights instrument in 
particular is of special relevance because of the rights it contains. The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides the rights to 
housing, food, water and health, rights which are commonly affected by the 
occurrence of a disaster. In addition, under the general obligations stemming from 
this treaty states appear to be directed in their international disaster response 
through stating that parties must make use of ‘international assistance and 
cooperation’ and ‘the maximum of its available resources’ for the full realization of 
the rights.63 In the second part of this research the ICESCR will therefore be closely 
                                                        
examples of unusual violence. See for example Lisa Grow Sun, ‘Disaster Mythology and the Law’ 
(2011) 96 Cornell Law Review 1131 and Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Andersen Jones, 
‘Disaggregating Disasters’ (2013) 60 UCLA Law Review 884, 931. 
62 These options do not only lie in the legal realm but can also be sought in the field of political 
science, philosophy and/or economics or at the cross-sections of public international law and 
politics or other disciplines.  





examined to establish to what extent the ICESCR can provide more concrete 
obligations for state parties on accepting international humanitarian assistance.64 
Through treaty interpretation according to the rules of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT) it will be analysed in Chapter IV what exactly is meant 
with article 2(1) ICESCR in terms of concrete obligations. The findings will be 
placed in the light of disaster response in Chapter V. This Chapter will go in more 
detail into state parties’ human rights obligations after a disaster. Here, the general 
obligations as found in Chapter IV will be specified further by including four 
substantive rights of the ICESCR: the rights to housing, food, water and health.65 In 
the final conclusion it will be considered to what extent public international law is 
able to dictate states whether they should accept international humanitarian 
assistance and what concrete standards follow from the ICESCR.  
 
 
                                                        
64  That the ICESCR may be useful to identify obligations for states in disaster contexts is 
recognized by others as well. For example, when considering the case in which Pakistan did not 
participate in international cooperation with the goal to help the victims of cyclones and floods in 
Southern Pakistan in 2007, Barber argues that Pakistan could as such violate its obligations under 
the ICESCR if it was a party to that Covenant. Rebecca J. Barber, ‘Protecting the Right to 
Housing in the Aftermath of Natural Disaster: Standards in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 432, 459. 
65 The rights to housing and food are laid down in article 11 and the right to health in article 12. 
The right to water is an implied element of both articles. These rights have been selected for their 
relevance in most disaster situations, not implying that other rights are not relevant in disaster 
response. The right to education, for example, is probably not the first right springing to mind in 
relation to disasters, yet providing education is a valuable tool in protecting children against 
forced labour and other forms of exploitation and also to reduce child marriage. It would however 
go beyond the scope of this research to include all rights of the ICESCR. Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 11 on ‘Plans of Action for Primary Education’ (UN 
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Various attempts have been made to create more clarity in the rules and principles 
that apply in disaster situations. However, the international legal developments of 
the last century  
 
Are all at the periphery of the issue. At the core is a yawning gap. There is no 
definitive, broadly accepted source of international law which spells out the legal 
standards, procedures, rights and duties pertaining to disaster response and assistance. 
No systematic attempt has been made to pull together the disparate threads of 
existing law, to formalize customary law or to expand and develop the law in new 
ways. 1  
 
Although there is no coherent system, this Chapter will look into the rules and 
principles that can be derived from legal sources. These sources consist of general 
international law that is relevant for the topic of humanitarian assistance as disaster 
response, and of sources that were developed especially for this topic.  
Before going into the legal framework, a number of developments will be 
discussed that proved determining factors for the way international humanitarian 
assistance is perceived today. Over the centuries, different views have existed on 
what the role of international humanitarian assistance should be when a natural 
disaster struck. A number of these views were put into practice in setting up special 
organisations or attempts at codifying principles of disaster response. These 
developments will illustrate what have been successful or – in most cases – less 
successful approaches to international disaster response and humanitarian assistance. 
Moreover, keeping the past attempts in mind, it is possible to explain where certain 
rules and principles come from and to understand why certain developments and 
attempts at codification will (potentially) be successful or likely to fail.  
 
 
                                                        











Until roughly the end of the nineteenth Century and the beginning of the twentieth 
Century, the ideas on international disaster response, and more specifically the 
delivery of international humanitarian relief, developed along a more or less 
singular line of thought. A new way of looking at humanitarian assistance was 
proposed by diplomat Emer De Vattel during the 18th Century. After De Vattel’s 
new insights, further developments led to major changes in the course of the 
nineteenth Century. Initiatives arose to bundle disaster relief efforts in a specialized 
organisation. A positive result is the establishment and the development of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Parallel, the less fruitful International Relief 
Union was created under auspices of the League of Nations, followed by further 
initiatives taken in UN context. After discussing the developments prior to the 
twentieth Century, this section will successively discuss the initiatives of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent, the establishment and quiet ending of the International 
Relief Union and finally the activities within the UN-framework.  
 
2.2 International disaster relief prior to the 20th Century 
 
Going back to the Middle Ages, it becomes apparent that the attention for providing 
humanitarian assistance was wider than merely the provision of humanitarian 
assistance in response to a disaster. In a legal sense this can be recognized in the 
rules that started to develop early on the conduct of war trying to make battles more 
‘humane’. Humanitarian relief work was mainly organised in the form of 
‘Samaritan work’. This system of voluntary work responded to local needs for 
many centuries and can still be seen in a modern version today.2 With the rise of 
Christianity, providing humanitarian assistance was placed within a more religious 
context and structure. Orders were established on a non-governmental basis to bring 
relief for those in need, like the Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem of the 
12th Century. 3 Being a non-military order of knights, the Order of St. John cared for 
those who were wounded and sick, both in war and in peacetime.4 This way of 
                                                        
2 Many examples exist today where private initiatives make altruistic efforts to provide relief 
when need requires so, like the many calls to fold paper-cranes for Japan after the tsunami hit in 
2011 or marathon runners providing food to the victims of hurricane Sandy after the New York 
marathon was cancelled in October 2012. 
3  Peter Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in 
International Law and Organization (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1985) 9.  
4 David Fisher, ‘Law and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study’ (IFRC, 
Geneva 2007) 25. 
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organizing the provision of relief can still be recognized today in the form of 
organisations like the Red Cross and Red Crescent.  
Private initiatives formed the main body of humanitarian responders. Not much 
state activity could be found in this field, though bilateral agreements on the 
provision of humanitarian assistance between states as they exist today have been 
around for a very long time.5 Nonetheless, the role of states in international disaster 
response and in the provision of humanitarian assistance was rather underexposed, 
although one author, inspired by a major disaster halfway the eighteenth Century, 
started to think about what the duties of states should be. This author is Emer de 
Vattel.  
When an earthquake with an estimated magnitude of 8.7 Mw destroyed major 
parts of Lisbon in 1755,6 King George II of England appealed to parliament to send 
relief.7 The Lisbon earthquake drew international attention due to the size of the 
disaster and the importance and fame of the city at the time of the earthquake. The 
initial shock of the earthquake was followed by heavy aftershocks, after which  
 
There appeared, at some small distance, a large body of water, rising as it were like a 
mountain. It came on foaming and roaring, and rushed towards the shore with such 
impetuosity, that we all immediately ran for our lives as fast as possible; many were 
actually swept away, and the rest above their waist in water at a good distance from 
the banks.8 
 
The earthquake and tsunami were followed by fires: ‘the whole city appeared in a 
blaze (…). It may be said without exaggeration, it was on fire at least in a hundred 
different places at once, and thus continued burning for six days together, without 
intermission, or the least attempt being made to stop its progress’.9 As a result, 
about a quarter of the population of Lisbon died.10 The appeal of King George II 
was not based on any sense of legal obligation but on religious and humanitarian 
considerations. Emer de Vattel, author of ‘Les Droits des Gens’, 11 referred to the 
Lisbon earthquake as an example of natural international solidarity.12 In addition, 
                                                        
5 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 17. 
6  USGS <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1755_11_01.php> accessed 12 
November 2012. 
7 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 17. 
8 Eva March Tappan (ed), The World's Story: A History of the World in Story, Song and Art (14 
Vols. Eyewitness report, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Vol. V: Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, 
1914) 618-628, Internet Modern History Sourcebook: <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/ 
1755 lisbonquake.asp> accessed 12 November 2012. 
9 Ibid. 
10  USGS <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1755_11_01.php> accessed 12 
November 2012. The eyewitness report states that at least 60,000 people lost their lives, which 
seems an accurate estimate based on a population at the time (250,000 people). 
11 Emerich de Vattel, Les Droits des Gens. Ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle Appliques à la 
Conduite & Aux Affairs des Nations & des Souverains (Book II, London 1758).  






De Vattel introduced the possibility of looking at ‘natural’ solidarity from an angle 
of international legal obligations. In his work De Vattel describes the ‘offices of 
humanities between nations’.13 With this phrase he refers to altruistic ‘obligations’ 
of a state to do ‘every thing in [its] power for the preservation and happiness of 
others, as far as such conduct is reconcilable with [its] duties towards [itself]’.14 
This means for example that states should help others in case of famine:15  
 
If a nation is visited with famine, all those who have provisions enough and to spare 
should come to its assistance, though not to the extent of self-impoverishment (…). 
Help in such an extremity is so much in accord with the dictates of humanity that no 
civilized nation could altogether fail to respond (…). Whatever the nature of the 
disaster that overtakes a nation, the same help is due to it.16  
 
With the words ‘should’ and ‘due’, De Vattel refers to an obligation for states to 
assist or help other states that are ‘visited with famine’. The basis for this obligation 
lies within humanity and is therefore not an obligation coming forth from any law. 
De Vattel also gives the limits of this obligation. In the first place, states should not 
give more than can reasonably be expected of them, which is indicated by stating 
that offering assistance must be reconcilable with the duties towards ‘itself’ and that 
assistance must not lead to self-impoverishment. Another limit to the obligation lies 
with the receiving state. ‘Offices of humanities’ cannot be forced upon other states 
as the receiving state is an independent and sovereign state.17  
The novelty of De Vattel’s work lies in his moving away from the system of 
private initiatives and bilateral agreements between states by creating a basis for an 
obligation for states to provide humanitarian assistance when another state needs 
this. The limits that he described are formed by the obligations towards a state’s 
own population and by the willingness to accept the help of the receiving state. 
These limits found in the eighteenth Century can be still recognized in 
contemporary legal debates surrounding the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
as will be seen in this Chapter.  
During the remainder of the eighteenth and later during the nineteenth Century, 
private relief schemes remained the most important mechanism of generating and 
providing humanitarian assistance. Even in the twentieth and twenty-first Centuries, 
private relief continued to be one of the most important sources of humanitarian aid. 
When Tokyo was hit by an earthquake in 1923, it was the British Mansion House 
funds – a private organisation with the purpose to collect money for disaster relief – 
                                                        
13 De Vattel (n 11). 
14 De Vattel (n 11) 258, cited by Stéphane Beaulac, ‘Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of 
Sovereignty’ (2003) 5 Journal of the History of International Law 237, 263. 
15 De Vattel (n 11) 260-1, cited by Beaulac (n 14) 263. 
16  De Vattel (n 11) 5, cited by Peter Macalister-Smith, ‘The International Relief Union: 
Reflections on the Convention Establishing an International Relief Union of July 12, 1927 (1986) 
54 Legal History Review 363, 363. 
17 De Vattel (n 11) 262-3, cited by Beaulac (n 14) 264. 
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that managed to raise 6,600,000 gold francs to send to Japan.18 In response to the 
Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 the contribution of private donors to NGOs and 
international organisations exceeded that of states. Only when organisations were 
set up with the purpose of responding to disasters and providing humanitarian relief 
the role and duties of states returned to the centre of the legal stage. Ironically, this 
started with the establishment of a private organisation during the second half of the 
nineteenth Century when the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement was created.  
 
2.3 The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
 
The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement has its roots in (humanitarian) 
response to armed conflicts. Founder Henry Dunant witnessed the battle of 
Solferino in 1859 and was horrified by the treatment of wounded soldiers. He 
started advocating rules for the protection of victims of international armed conflict 
and for the establishment of a relief organization caring for those victims.19 As a 
result, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was founded in 
Geneva in 1863 and in 1864 the first Geneva Convention was adopted.20 In this 
Convention, humanitarian ideas were incorporated in an international legal 
document. Next to the establishment of the ICRC, national Red Cross (or in the 
case of some countries starting with Turkey: Red Crescent) Societies were founded 
aimed specifically to work within the borders of a state. Apart from looking at ways 
to make armed conflict more humane, Dunant also paid attention to peacetime relief 
activities.21 To a large extent, the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
took this role upon themselves. Early efforts of National Societies consisted of 
forwarding supplies and contributions to the National Society of the affected 
country.22 In 1919, after the First World War, the League of Red Cross Societies 
was established to promote the cooperation between the Societies and to respond to 
situations of natural disaster. 23  The League was renamed in 1991 into the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).24 
The ICRC (focusing on situations of armed conflict) and IFRC (focusing on 
humanitarian needs in peacetime) enjoy a special status as international actors. The 
Red Cross is a private organisation, and works closely together with governments. 
                                                        
18 John F. Hutchinson, ‘Disasters and the International Order – II: The International Relief Union’ 
(2001) 23 International History Review 253, 255. 
19  Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 9, see also Henry Dunant, 
Memory of Solferino (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1986, first published 1862). 
20 The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded in Armies in 
the Field. The Convention was revised (in 1906 and 1929) and formed the basis of the First 
Geneva Convention of 1949. 
21 Dunant (n 19). 
22 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 17. 
23 Macalister-Smith, ‘The International Relief Union’ (n 16) 365. 







After the Geneva Convention of 1864, the ICRC was the driving force behind a 
number of other Geneva Conventions, eventually leading to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. While the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement is in itself a private initiative, states became parties to 
the Geneva Conventions, binding themselves to these rules. Consequently, the role 
of states in humanitarian assistance received a legal basis. Apart from binding states, 
the Conventions also emphasize the special status of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, for example where it is provided that the ICRC should be granted 
humanitarian access where others, like states, would not be accepted. The Red 
Cross is also helped in this by the fact that in most states, in 186 to be precise, 
National Societies are present. The ICRC and IFRC work closely together with 
these National Societies whenever a humanitarian emergency occurs and therefore 
often have access to states (or particular areas within states) even if other actors are 
not granted access.  
Where the ICRC has a strong foundation in instruments like the Geneva 
Conventions and its Additional Protocols, the IFRC does not. Even so, the IFRC 
has produced or was involved in the creation of numerous instruments focusing on 
the provision of humanitarian assistance and otherwise responding to disasters. 
Some of these instruments will be discussed in section 3 below, like the Code of 
Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in 
Disaster Relief, the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of 
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, and the Humanitarian 
Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Response of the Sphere Handbook. 
The IFRC is also working on an ongoing project to prepare national legal systems 
for the possible future reception of international humanitarian assistance. This 
project, International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL) will also be discussed below.  
 
2.4 The International Relief Union 
 
Whereas the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is a private initiative closely 
involving states by promoting rules to bind them, the International Relief Union 
was an international organization. On 28 December 1908, the Sicilian city Messina 
was struck by an earthquake of a magnitude of 7.2 Mw.25 This earthquake was 
followed by a tsunami and fires, killing an estimated 72,000 to 110,000 people in 
Messina and in Reggio di Calabria. 26  Among the approximately 40% of the 
population of Messina who died were many friends and family members of 
                                                        
25  USGS <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1908_12_28.php> accessed 13 
November 2012. 
26 Ibid. The Italian government did not know how to relocate all the survivors, since many houses 
collapsed. While also relocating people within Italy, some survivors were sent to the US to ‘start a 
new life’ in New York. See the newspaper clipping describing how the survivors of the Messina 
earthquake almost perished at sea during the crossing: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/rescue/ 
peopleevents/pandeAMEX99.html> accessed 13 November 2012. 
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Giovanni Ciraolo, Italian senator and president of the Italian Red Cross Society. For 
the purpose of addressing the aftermath of disasters more effectively, Ciraolo made 
a plan to organise disaster relief. His idea was basically an insurance model that 
each state would establish for its citizens, together with the founding of an 
organization for mutual assistance based on the international Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement.27  
After proposing his plan to the international Red Cross conference in 1921 and 
to governments at the Genoa economic conference, Ciraolo was allowed to present 
his plan to the League of Nations in 1922.28 Within the framework of the League, 
the plan was further developed and negotiated. At an international conference held 
in Geneva in 1927, the Convention Establishing an International Relief Union (IRU 
Convention) was adopted along with the IRU’s Statutes.29 The IRU Convention 
entered into force in 1932 when the requirements of having sufficient ratifications 
contributing to the minimum amount of shares were fulfilled.30 
The IRU was the first international organisation exclusively set up for providing 
disaster relief in non-armed conflict situations. Nonetheless, and although the IRU 
has existed for many decades, its story is not one of great success. Already in the 
years leading up to the adoption of the IRU Convention, it was clear that the ideas 
behind the IRU were rather controversial. Especially in the US and Great Britain, 
the idea of an insurance-scheme was not very well received.31 The UK argued that 
according to the insurance-scheme it would have to contribute to the common fund 
of the IRU, but since hardly any major disasters occur in the UK, it would never get 
anything in return.32 The US and the UK rather believed in national (individual) 
responses to disasters, either through public funds or private donations, as such 
following the line that was until then the trend throughout the previous centuries. 
                                                        
27 Hutchinson (n 18) 253. 
28 Ibid. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was involved in the development 
and presentation at the forum of the League of Nations: David P. Fidler, ‘Disaster Relief and 
Governance After the Indian Ocean Tsunami: What Role for International Law?’ (2005) 6 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 458, 463. 
29 Macalister-Smith, ‘The International Relief Union’ (n 16) 363. 
30 According to article 18 of the IRU Convention a total of twelve ratifications was required 
before the Convention could enter into force and moreover that the contributions of these states 
must amount to 600 shares of the initial fund. From a discussion in the British parliament in 1928 
it follows that by that time only five states ratified and that the UK, despite its critical attitude, 
also decided to ratify. Nonetheless, in 1928 thirty states already signed the Convention. See the 
House of Commons debate of 28 November 1928 at: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ 
commons/1928/nov/28/international-relief-union> accessed 13 November 2012.  
31 Although the US never joined the League of Nations, it was involved in the League’s efforts on 
several issues. However ‘(c)onstant suspicion in Congress (…) that steady U.S. cooperation with 
the League would lead to de facto membership prevented a close relationship between 
Washington and Geneva.’ US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘Milestones: 1914-
1920 – The League of Nations, 1920’ <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league> 
accessed 4 November 2014. 






An affected state would respond to the disaster occurring on its territory, where 
necessary assisted by private initiatives, either national or foreign. That more states 
besides the US and UK were not too enthusiastic about the plans is also illustrated 
by the lapse of time between the adoption of the IRU Convention and the moment 
on which sufficient ratifications were deposited for the Convention to enter into 
force on 27 December 1932: five and a half years.33 
During the negotiations on the content of the Conventions, the original scheme 
of Ciraolo was altered almost beyond recognition. One of the major changes 
concerned the funding of the IRU. The idea of an annual donation to the IRU’s fund 
by all member states was changed into the requirement that states must make a 
small payment for an initial fund, which would then be further filled with voluntary 
public or private donations.34 This entailed a departure from the insurance model 
foreseen by Ciraolo, which generally prompted much criticism for its lack in 
feasibility and practical difficulties. Another important point was the focus on the 
persons who are in need of assistance. Ciraolo believed that affected people should 
have a right to receive international humanitarian assistance. The Preparatory 
Commission did not go so far, even though a legal foundation for an obligation to 
give and receive humanitarian assistance was established: ‘it is not a question of 
introducing into international relations a positive obligation that would entail 
sanctions, but rather of accepting the notion that assistance should neither be given 
nor received as charity but as a matter of justice’.35 By saying that giving and 
receiving assistance is a matter of ‘justice’, a first stone was laid in the foundation 
of perceiving humanitarian assistance as a right and/or obligation. This stone was, 
however, immediately hewed and chiselled by state representatives when 
negotiating the final texts. States were not ready to acknowledge anything that 
resembled the beginning of a right or obligation and in the final versions indeed no 
reference to such language can be found. 
Another element that was limited compared to the plans of Ciraolo was the 
scope of the IRU’s work. In the draft-statutes it was laid down that to be eligible for 
response by the IRU a disaster should meet four criteria: the disaster must be caused 
due to force majeur;36 it must affect an entire population; the consequences must 
                                                        
33 The states that ratified the Convention prior to the entry into force and who were accordingly 
responsible for a minimum of 600 shares of the initial fund are (the thirteen states that withdrew 
their ratification later on are in italics): Albania, Belgium, the UK (including Myanmar), New 
Zealand, India, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iran, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Sudan, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. China, Cuba and Iraq acceded after the entry into force in the 
1930s, and nine other states signed the Convention but never ratified. UN Treaty Database at: 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&id=564&lang=en> accessed 13 
November 2012. 
34 Hutchinson (n 18) 259. 
35 Notes du Sénateur Ciraolo, LN 12/34734/20947, box R659, 3, cited by Hutchinson (n 18) 262. 
36 The requirement of force majeur excludes armed conflicts from the IRU’s mandate. This does 
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exceed normal provisions of even a provident government; and the disaster must be 
of an exceptional character in the affected state.37  That these requirements are 
unworkably strict was illustrated by a disaster that took place while negotiations on 
the IRU were underway. In 1923, Japan was hit by an earthquake with a magnitude 
of 7.9 Mw.38 Followed by tsunamis and fires, the earthquake killed about 142,800 
people, mainly in the Kanto area (the region around Tokyo and Yokohama).39 Even 
though this earthquake can be considered one of the worst in history, applying the 
strict criteria of the IRU would make it doubtful whether this disaster would have 
been eligible for response by the IRU. Although an earthquake would be force 
majeur, this particular earthquake did not affect the entire population directly but hit 
Tokyo and Yokohama hardest. And while probably the normal provisions of Japan 
were exceeded by the earthquake, the occurrence of such a severe earthquake in 
itself is not exceptional in Japan.40  Consequently, only two of the four criteria 
would be met.  
Of all the plans and humanitarian intentions of Ciraolo not much remained. In 
the IRU Convention no reference is made to humanitarian motives, human misery, 
moral obligations to assist one another, mutual insurance, and the disastrous 
consequences of wars and revolutions. 41  Neither does it contain a right of an 
affected population to receive international assistance. What did remain was the 
objective of the IRU to provide first aid (and to assemble funds and other resources 
to this end) in the event of a disaster meeting the requirements as given above.42 
The IRU Convention further mentions other objectives of the IRU, like the 
coordination of efforts of organisations in case of a disaster, conducting research on 
prevention of disasters, and stimulating all peoples to render mutual international 
assistance.43 All these activities were further limited by another requirement: the 
IRU could only operate in a state that has granted permission for these operations, 
thus safeguarding state sovereignty.44 As a result, ever since its beginning, the IRU 
was rather handicapped. The operational scope was limited beyond recognition 
                                                        
Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 19. It must be noted, though, that 
the IRU was requested to come to the assistance of victims of the Spanish Civil War in 1936. The 
IRU decided not to do this because the ICRC already had an aid scheme in place and the members 
of the League of Nations did not want to take sides in the civil war. See Hutchinson (n 18) 292-5. 
37 In the IRU Convention the elements of force majeur, exceptional gravity, and exceeding the 
limits of the powers and resources of the stricken people are maintained in article 2(1), where the 
element of ‘affecting the entire population is arguably implied in ‘stricken people’. 
38  USGS <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1923_09_01.php> accessed 20 
July 2010. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Hutchinson (n 18) 264. 
41 Ibid, 286. 
42 Article 2(1) IRU Convention. 
43 Article 2(2) IRU Convention. 
44 See articles 3 and 4 IRU Convention. The requirement of consent and the lack of financial 







when compared to the initial ideas of Ciraolo, and the funding scheme of the IRU as 
established in the Convention was inadequate from the start. Due to these problems, 
the IRU was doomed to be a failure: 
 
Unless showered with contributions from philanthropists and the public, the IRU 
would have almost no money to put towards disaster relief, which was probably just 
as well, since it was restricted to acting only in the wake of disasters due to force 
majeure occurring in the territory of member states, where the affected state admitted 
that it was unable to cope with the consequences, and agreed to the intervention of 
the IRU.45 
 
During the first few years that the IRU was operational, there had been severe 
natural disasters in Poland, China, the US, Greece, Italy, and India, but in all cases 
states claimed that no international aid was required since the national capacity 
sufficed.46 The IRU did however act on two occasions. First, in 1934 it wanted to 
provide funding in the aftermath of an earthquake in India. 47  The Indian 
government refused the aid offered by the IRU, after which the IRU nonetheless 
assisted by channelling its aid through the Red Cross.48 In 1935, the IRU responded 
to an earthquake in Balochistan (Pakistan).49 Actually responding to disasters was 
not the main activity of the IRU. Most of its work consisted of conducting research 
on disasters.50  
After the Second World War, when the League of Nations did no longer exist 
and the United Nations was created, the IRU decided that becoming a part of the 
UN would be the most sensible thing to do. It also acknowledged that it should be 
confined to its scientific tasks. The Red Cross, which supported the IRU since its 
establishment by fulfilling administrative tasks, withdrew in 1948. It did, however, 
recommend that the need for an IRU remained and that the Convention should be 
revised. In 1950, the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) suggested to 
the IRU members states (those who were also a member of the UN) to disband the 
IRU. By 1957, only three states declared themselves in favour of maintaining the 
IRU, although the other remaining members did not yet withdraw from the 
organisation. Only in 1965 did the IRU Executive Committee recommend the 
transfer of the IRU’s assets and responsibilities to the UN.51 This transfer was fully 
                                                        
45 Hutchinson (n 18) 286. 
46 Ibid, 291. 
47 This earthquake in the Bihar area in India (also affecting Nepal) was of a magnitude of 8.1 Mw 
and killed around 10,700 people. USGS <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/ 
1934_01_15.php> accessed 15 November 2012. 
48  Of which the Red Cross made no mention in its publication on the relief undertakings. 
Hutchinson (n 18) 291. 
49 The Balochistan earthquake is also referred to as the Quetta earthquake. It had a magnitude of 
7.5 Mw and killed approximately 30,000 people. USGS <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/ 
earthquakes/world/ historical_country.php> accessed 15 November 2012.  
50 Macalister-Smith, ‘The International Relief Union’ (n 16) 370. 
51 Ibid, 372. 
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completed in 1967 after which only the scientific activities of the IRU remained, 
which were now placed at the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO). This put an end to the only international organisation set 
up for the sole purpose of providing peace-time humanitarian assistance.  
Clearly, the IRU is not an example of great success in the history of 
international disaster response. Even so, the fact that the IRU has existed provides 
some interesting insights. One is that there were states that did believe that the task 
of bringing relief to the victims of disasters should be placed in the hands of an 
international organisation. Also, the response to disasters was taken up by states 
rather than private parties, basing this on a more or less legal foundation and not 
merely departing from the idea of charity.52  Still, it was clear that states were 
careful at the same time to grant too much power to an international organisation so 
that the IRU received a mandate that was too cautious, making it unworkable. 
Nonetheless, the ideas behind the IRU keep coming back in the discussion on 
disaster response today.  
 
2.5 The United Nations’ activities within the field of disaster response 
 
Apart from imbedding the IRU in the UN framework, the UN has its own story of 
international disaster response and the provision of humanitarian assistance. At the 
beginning of this story, humanitarian response is closely interlaced with armed 
conflict. Although that is not the focus here, it is necessary to include to provide the 
full picture.  
Already before the UN Charter was signed, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) was created. The agreement establishing UNRRA of 9 
November 1943 was signed by forty-two states.53 Established during the Second 
World War, UNRRA’s active operations aimed at providing relief (food, fuel, 
clothing, shelter, etc.) to the survivors of this war and specifically in the areas under 
the control of UN member states.54 During the period in which UNRRA was active, 
which lasted less than five years, the organisation was working with a total budget 
of approximately 3,7 billion US dollars.55 This budget exceeded that of the IRU, 
making it more successful financially. Also when looking at the operations, it can 
be argued that UNRRA was doing better than the IRU. UNRRA operated in sixteen 
states even though it could only operate with the consent of the recipient nation, just 
                                                        
52 Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 21. 
53  Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1943, Australian 
Treaty Series, 2 cited by Andrej Zwitter, ‘United Nations’ Legal Framework of Humanitarian 
Assistance’ in Hans Joachim Heintze & Andrej Zwitter (eds), International Law and 
Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism 
(Springer, Heidelberg/Dordrecht/ London/ New York 2011) 52. 
54 Grace Fox, ‘The Origins of UNRRA’ (1950) 65 Political Science Quarterly 561, 570. 
55 Wilbur A. Sawyer, ‘Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization’ (1947) 






like IRU.56 The clear difference in operational success between UNRRA and IRU 
can be explained by looking at the support that the organisations received from 
states. While the IRU was focusing on an uncertain event to happen in the future 
(i.e. natural disasters), UNRRA was responding to a suffering as the result of a war, 
at that time clearly visible. For IRU, states were supposed to give a contribution to a 
general fund not knowing how it would be used, while the funds for UNRRA had a 
concrete destination. Because of the specific mandate of UNRRA, i.e. aiding the 
victims of the Second World War, this organisation was set up as a temporary 
organisation, making it easier for state contributors to oversee the extent of the costs 
and efforts.57 What is illustrated by the success of UNRRA is that a collective 
response to humanitarian emergencies (albeit in this case as a result of armed 
conflict) could indeed be successful and receive the support of states. Also working 
with the consent of the recipient state is not problematic per se.58 
Despite its relative success, UNRRA was not immediately succeeded by a new 
organisation focusing on the delivery of humanitarian assistance, yet was followed 
up by the International Refugee Organisation which later turned into the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).59 After the Second World War, 
many organisations were assisting survivors of the war and when this assistance 
was no longer required, attention shifted towards the process of decolonization and 
the provision of development aid. 60  Attention turned back to delivering 
humanitarian assistance at the end of the 1960’s due to a humanitarian disaster as 
the result of – again – armed conflict. 
In 1967, civil war broke out in Nigeria when Colonel Ojukwu unilaterally 
declared the independent republic of Biafra, which would be the country of the Ibo, 
an ethnic group. The armed forces of Biafra, fighting against Nigeria, were losing 
ground during almost the entire period of the war (1967-1970), and the people 
living in Biafra barely had access to food, water and health care. During most of the 
war, Biafrans were cut off by Nigerian forces from any incoming humanitarian aid. 
As a result, the people living in Biafra did not have access to basic needs, but they 
were at the same time unable to obtain these needs in Nigeria. Many people died of 
malnourishment, starvation, lack of water and related diseases. Photographs of this 
humanitarian disaster were published all over the world and also the upcoming 
                                                        
56 Agreement on the UNRRA, article 1 under 2(a); Fox (n 54) 582-3. 
57 Fox (n 54) 570. 
58 It is questionable whether the failure of the IRU can be completely attributed to ‘design flaws’ 
(e.g. no obligation to contribute financially and the requirement of state consent) or whether 
perhaps the interbellum was not the right time for success. Fidler (n 28) 464. 
59 Zwitter (n 53) 53. 
60 Ed Tsui and Thant Myint-U, ‘The Institutional Response: Creating a Framework in Response to 
New Challenges’ in OCHA, The Humanitarian Decade: Challenges for Humanitarian Assistance 
in the Last Decade and into the Future (Volume II: General Assembly Resolution 46/182: The 
Development of Practice, Principles and the Humanitarian Framework) United Nations, Geneva/ 
New York 2004, 2. One UN agency was, however, working on humanitarian assistance; the UN 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); Zwitter (n 53) 53. 
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medium of television made the effects on the Biafrans visible, leading to 
international reactions of outrage and shock. Organisations started to work on 
humanitarian assistance next to development assistance. Moreover, the working 
method of the main organisation already specialized in humanitarian assistance, the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, was critically reviewed. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, working in armed conflict) and International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC, working in peace-
time disasters) strongly promote the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality, independence (and characteristic for the IFRC the additional 
principles of voluntary service, unity, and universality). Consequently, the ICRC 
and IFRC are often not vocal on what is experienced in the field. In the case of 
Biafra, however, many were of the opinion that Nigeria, supported by the UK and 
US, was clearly causing the deaths and suffering of thousands of civilians by 
blockading aid. New organisations like Médecins Sans Frontières refused to 
understand principles like ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ as having to stay silent 
even when witnessing great misconduct.61 
Also the UN started to direct its attention to humanitarian crises, not only those 
as a result of armed conflict (e.g. the third Indo-Pakistani war in 1971), but also 
those following natural disaster (like the earthquake in Peru in 1970).62 Here, the 
activities started to take different roads: humanitarian response to natural disasters 
was separated from armed conflict. The Secretariat of the UN advised the 
organisation to leave humanitarian relief actions to specialized organisations such 
as the IFRC. Setting this advice aside, the UN General Assembly established the 
Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO) 63  in 1971 in order to organise and 
coordinate the UN’s emergency response capacity, ensuring that ‘relief was 
mobilized more rapidly and was better co-ordinated’.64 Up till the establishment of 
UNDRO, the UN relief initiatives were mainly on an ad hoc basis. UNDRO was 
supposed to organise and coordinate all UN’s relief activities, yet it is questionable 
whether it succeeded in doing this. Ad hoc operations kept taking place and seemed 
at times the most convenient solution to an emergency.65 
In 1976 and 1982, UNDRO – in cooperation with the Red Cross – conducted 
studies aimed at identifying the main problems in peacetime disaster relief which 
were subsequently addressed in the Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of 
                                                        
61 When discussing the extent to which states have a freedom to refuse humanitarian assistance, 
the fact that those offering the assistance hold a state accountable for its actions could be of 
importance. For more information on their way of working, see the website of MSF: 
<http://www.msf.org> accessed 15 November 2012. 
62 Tsui and Myint-U (n 60) 2. 
63 Established by Resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 December 1971. 
64 R. Wolfrum, ‘Art. 55’ in Bruno Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 
(Vol. I, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) 916 cited by Zwitter (n 53) 55; Tsui 
and Myint-U (n 60) 2-3. The UN was already involved in disaster preparedness through the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Zwitter (n 53) 54. 






Emergency Assistance. 66  As a consequence, the Draft Convention contains 
provisions on a wide range of practical issues, like the basic conditions for the 
delivery of assistance, the exchange of information and communication, protection 
of and facilities for personnel, quality of assistance and matters relating to 
transportation (including import, export, and liability). The Draft Convention was 
presented to ECOSOC in 1984, after which ECOSOC referred the instrument to 
UN’s Second Committee, but no further action was taken.67 The Draft Convention 
did not receive broad support, but the most notable opponents were the IFRC and 
the ICRC, which feared that the Draft Convention over-emphasized sovereignty and 
the primary (controlling) role of the receiving states.68  
Besides the not very successful Draft Convention, the General Assembly 
adopted a number of resolutions relating to humanitarian assistance and natural 
disasters dating back to 1965.69 In the next section where the legal framework will 
be discussed, more detail will be provided on the content of these resolutions. For 
now, it will suffice to mention the Resolution that forms the basis for the majority 
of today’s peacetime humanitarian relief operations. 70  This is UN General 
Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991. It is striking to see that 
according to Resolution 46/182 there apparently is a need for a central funding 
mechanism complementary to individual states’ responses, which reminds of the 
ideas behind the International Relief Union.71 Regardless of the lack of success in 
the IRU’s context, the idea apparently survived the decades between the creation of 
the IRU and the adoption of Resolution 46/182. Besides the new central emergency 
fund, the Resolution also appointed the new Emergency Relief Coordinator.72 The 
responsibility for the coordination of UN’s humanitarian response was in this way 
placed in the hands of one individual. The office of the Emergency Relief 
                                                        
66 UNGA and ECOSOC, ‘Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance’ 
(UN Doc. A/39/267/Add.2, E/1984/96/Add.2 of 18 June 1984). Victoria L. Bannon, 
‘Strengthening International Disaster Response Laws, Rules, and Principles’ in C. Raj Kumar & 
D.K. Srivastava (eds.), Tsunami and Disaster Management: Law and Governance  (Thomson 
Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong 2006) 12. 
67 Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 4) 27-8; Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance (n 3) 
222-30, Fidler (n 28) 464-5. 
68 The third article on ‘principles’ refers to respect for the sovereignty of the receiving state and 
non-interference in its internal affairs; cooperation with national authorities and respect for 
national laws; abstention from any commercial or political activity; and the responsibility of the 
receiving state for facilitating the coordination of operations. 
69  In 1965, UNGA Resolution on ‘Assistance in the Case of Natural Disaster’ (UN Doc. 
A/RES/2034 [XX] [195] of 7 December 1965) was adopted.  
70 See Heike Spieker, ‘The Right to Give and Receive Humanitarian Assistance’ in Hans-Joachim 
Heintze & Andrej Zwitter (eds.), International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut 
Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism (Springer, Heidelberg/Dordrecht/London/ 
New York 2011) 21. 
71 UNGA Resolution on ‘Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance 
of the United Nations’ (UN Doc. A/Res/46/182 of 19 December 1991) para 22. 
72 Ibid, paras 23 and 34. 
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Coordinator was based in UNDRO and UNDRO was renamed in the Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). In 1998, the DHA changed into the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The Emergency Relief Coordinator 
is also the Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and the head of 
OCHA. 73  Next to these UN agencies specifically focused on disasters and 
humanitarian assistance, other UN agencies fulfil a role in this field. Examples are 
the World Food Programme, the World Health Organisation, UNHCR, and 
UNICEF. Only where relevant, these other agencies will be discussed. 
 




In Chapter I it has been explained that the legal framework on disaster response and 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance is quite scattered. To give some structure to 
the discussion of the legal framework, a distinction is made between sources that 
are of a general nature but are nonetheless relevant for the present research and 
those sources created for the specific purpose of disaster response and humanitarian 
assistance. In the first category, the legal fields that will be included are 
international humanitarian law, human rights law, refugee law and the law on 
internally displaced persons. Other general sources will be mentioned briefly, as 
they are of less relevance for this particular study. In the second category, sources 
will be discussed varying from the UN General Assembly resolutions to current 
developments that are undertaken by the International Law Commission and the 
IFRC. It must be noted that the title of this section may lead to some 
disappointment since especially the second category of sources consists mainly of 
instruments of a nature that is commonly referred to as ‘soft law’. Many 
instruments are mere policy briefs or guidelines hardly constituting any obligations 
for states. They are nonetheless included as they illustrate the developments in the 
field of disaster response and humanitarian assistance and reflect the (legal) way of 
thinking about these topics.74   
 
3.2 International humanitarian law 
 
Even though situations of armed conflict are not the object of research, it is 
nonetheless useful to take a look at the field of international humanitarian law (IHL) 
because it contains a number of rules and principles on humanitarian assistance and 
is generally considered to be quite clear in this respect. What can be learned from 
                                                        
73  Arjun Katoch, ‘International Natural Disaster Response and the United Nations’ in IFRC, 
International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice: Reflections, Prospects and 
Challenges (IFRC, Geneva 2003) 47-56, 47. 
74 Only the instruments most relevant for this research will be discussed in this section. For a full 






IHL can be used to explain the meaning of the rules and principles identified for 
peace-time disasters.  
IHL consists of a number of instruments of which the most relevant here are the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977.75 The Geneva 
Conventions are developed under auspices of the ICRC and are clearly connected to 
the original intentions and goals of Henry Dunant. The first two Geneva 
Conventions deal with the treatment of wounded and sick combatants, and 
shipwrecked, wounded and sick combatants at sea. The Third and Fourth 
Convention seek to protect prisoners of war and civilians respectively. The Fourth 
Geneva Convention (GCIV) contains provisions on the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to the civilian population in situations of armed conflict. Also the First 
and Second Additional Protocols of 1977 (API and APII) – which deal with the 
protection of victims of international and non-international armed conflicts – 
contain rules and principles on humanitarian assistance.76  
The Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War contains a number of provisions on humanitarian assistance, starting with 
article 10 (which is part of the Convention’s General Provisions). This article states 
that  
 
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian 
activities which the (ICRC) or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, 
subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the 
protection of civilian persons and for their relief.  
 
In part II of GCIV (‘General Protection of Populations Against Certain 
Consequences of War’) it is stated that the parties to the Convention ‘shall allow the 
free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects 
necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another (…) Party’.77 
The same has also been determined for ‘consignments of essential foodstuffs, 
clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and 
maternity cases’. 78  Part III on the ‘Status and Treatment of Protected Persons’ 
contains in its section II on ‘Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict’ the 
rule that aliens ‘shall be enabled to receive the individual or collective relief that 
                                                        
75  The Conventions of 1949 are generally considered to have customary law status. For the 
Additional Protocols of 1977 this status is not widely assumed: only a couple of provisions of the 
Protocols would constitute customary law. The International Committee of the Red Cross has 
conducted an extensive study on the customary law status of the GCs and APs, concluding that 
some provisions of the APs can be considered customary law. Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise 
Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I: Rules (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2005). 
76 In 2005, a third Additional Protocol has been adopted introducing a third symbol next to the 
Red Cross and the Red Crescent (the Red Crystal).  
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may be sent to them’.79 The section on occupied territories (section III of Part III) 
goes further than these provisions on humanitarian assistance: ‘(i)f the whole or part 
of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying 
Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population’.80 According 
to the same article, such relief can be given by states or impartial humanitarian 
organizations (like the ICRC) and shall consist of consignments of foodstuffs, 
medical supplies and clothing. Although free passage of these goods must be 
guaranteed by state parties, they can be searched and checked upon passage.81 In 
addition to humanitarian aid delivered by third parties, it is emphasized in GCIV that 
the occupying power has the main responsibility to care for the civilian 
population.82 Finally, an occupying power is not allowed to terminate the activities 
of the ICRC or other humanitarian agencies except for urgent reasons of security.83 
Also the Additional Protocols contain references to humanitarian assistance. In 
the API on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts a rather 
extensive article is included containing a number of important rules and principles 
on humanitarian assistance. In this article it is determined that  
 
If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, 
other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided (…) relief actions which are 
humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse 
distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in 
such relief actions.84  
 
Moreover, offers of relief ‘shall not be regarded as interference in the armed 
conflict or as unfriendly acts’.85 All parties to a conflict must make sure that relief 
moves rapidly and unimpeded, no matter the nationality of the population for whom 
the relief is meant, although parties have a right to prescribe the arrangements under 
which passage of relief is permitted, may make its permission conditional on 
distribution under local supervision, and shall not ‘divert relief consignments from 
the purpose for which they are intended (…) except (…) in the interest of the 
civilian population concerned’.86 In the same line, the Second Additional Protocol 
provides that ‘if the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack 
of supplies essential for its survival, relief actions shall be undertaken subject to the 
consent of the High Contracting Party concerned’87 
                                                        
79 Article 38 GCIV. This could also include allowances from relief societies (article 39 GCIV). 
80 Article 59 GCIV. 
81 Ibid.  
82 According to articles 55, 56 and 59 as emphasized in article 60 GCIV.  
83 Article 63 GCIV. 
84 Article 70(1) API under section II on ‘Relief in the Favour of the Civilian Population’ (part of 
Chapter VI on Civil Defence). 
85 Article 70(1) API. 
86 Article 70(2) and (3) API. 






When looking at all these provisions, two conclusions can be drawn. In the first 
place, there is a strong indication that states – whether occupying powers or parties 
to an armed conflict – are under an obligation to accept relief when the civilian 
population is in need of humanitarian assistance. 88 The second conclusion departs 
from this ‘obligation to accept’: before humanitarian relief can be delivered, 
consent must be obtained from the state (‘subject to the consent’). Consequently, 
there are situations in which states must give their consent to humanitarian 
assistance. This can be explained by looking at the development of the Additional 
Protocols in the 1970s. When a duty to accept relief was discussed, there were some 
concerns for state sovereignty. To protect sovereignty, the requirement of consent 
was included with the remark that this requirement ‘did not imply that the Parties 
concerned had absolute and unlimited freedom to refuse their agreement to relief 
actions. A Party refusing its agreement must do so for valid reasons, not for 
arbitrary or capricious ones’.89 As a consequence, there is a clear rule that consent 
is required before aid can be delivered but this rule is not granting states unlimited 
discretionary freedom: consent may not be withheld arbitrarily.90 What exactly falls 
under ‘arbitrarily withholding consent’ is however not entirely clear.91 
Possibly, the requirement of consent and the rule not to withhold consent 
arbitrarily are rules of customary international law. 92  Under auspices of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, an extended study has 
been conducted into the status of various IHL provisions, resulting in an overview 
                                                        
88 There is some discussion on whether such a ‘duty’ exists for a state’s own nationals or only 
those of another party to the conflict, especially when considering the specific provision for 
occupying powers. See also Ruth A. Stoffels, ‘Legal Regulation of Humanitarian Assistance in 
Armed Conflict: Achievements and Gaps’ (2004) 86 International Review of the Red Cross 515, 
519. 
89 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949 (1987) para 2805. See also UN ILC Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, 
‘Fourth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/643 of 
11 May 2011) para 66. 
90 See, amongst others, Stoffels (n 88) 534. During the negotiations it was stated that giving 
consent could not be refused on arbitrary grounds OR/II/SR.87, para 27. 
91 Arguably this has something to do with the humanitarian principles. If humanitarian aid meets 
these principles (impartiality, neutrality, humanity, independence) there is less freedom for a state 
to withhold its consent. See Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) para 66 where this is 
indicated with reference to ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 12, 1949 (1973) 78-9. 
92  David Fisher, ‘Domestic Regulation of International Humanitarian Relief in Disasters and 
Armed Conflict: A Comparative Analysis’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 350; 
Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (n 75). For the argument that the duty to give consent in certain 
circumstances enjoys customary law status see the reasoning made by M. Bothe, ‘Relief Actions: 
The Position of Recipient State’ in Frits Kalshoven, Assisting the Victims of Armed Conflict and 
Other Disasters: Papers Delivered at the International Conference on Humanitarian Assistance 
in Armed Conflict, The Hague, 22-24 June 1988 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht/Boston/London 1989) 92-3. 
 
 
Disaster Response and International Humanitarian Assistance:  
Background and Legal Framework 
41 
of rules of customary international law.93 One of these rules dictates that ‘parties to 
the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian 
relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without 
any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control’.94 Even though consent is 
not mentioned in this rule, the study includes that it is ‘self-evident that a 
humanitarian organisation cannot operate without the consent of the party 
concerned’ and that ‘such consent must not be refused on arbitrary grounds’.95 
When a civilian population is threatened with starvation, and the relief offered can 
remedy the situation while being impartial and non-discriminatory, there would 
even be an obligation to give consent.96 The ICRC’s customary rules are however 
not uncontroversial.97 One question raised is whether ‘state practice and opinio iuris 
have abandoned the precondition of consent in case the receiving State refuses such 
agreement arbitrarily’. 98  This question is closely linked to issues around 
intervention, such as humanitarian intervention and action within the framework of 
the Responsibility to Protect, which will be addressed below.99 It is, however, a 
valid point to make when considering the words used in the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols compared to the ‘customary rule’ as identified by the 
ICRC: despite the far-reaching idea in the customary law study, practice shows that 
states refusing to give consent can block the delivery of aid, even when it refuses to 
give its consent on arbitrary grounds. In this line, it can be asked whether there is ‘a 
right to impose humanitarian assistance – under certain circumstances – regardless 
of considerations of national sovereignty’ or whether a right to access exists.100 
One final issue, following from article 70(1) API, must be addressed here 
because it will come back time and again throughout this research. As article 70(1) 
API explicitly states, the offers of aid which meet the requirements of that 
paragraph (i.e. humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without 
                                                        
93 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (n 75). 
94 Rule 55, Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (n 75) 193. 
95 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (n 75) 196-7. 
96 Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck (n 75) 196-7. This is also argued by Joakim Dungel who is of the 
opinion that offers that meet the criteria of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality cannot be 
refused without being arbitrary. Joakim Dungel, ‘A Right to Humanitarian Assistance in Internal 
Armed Conflicts Respecting Sovereignty, Neutrality and Legitimacy: Practical Proposals to 
Practical Problems’ (2004) Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, para 2.2, available at: 
<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a133.htm> accessed 14 October 2010. 
97  See for example the commentary written by Yoram Dinstein, ‘The ICRC Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Study (2006) 36 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 1-15. 
98 Spieker (n 70) 17. 
99  Spieker goes into this question from an IHL perspective and argues that ‘an apparent 
inadequacy of supply of the civilian population, a lack of success of alternative means including 
mechanisms of the United Nations, provision of the civilian population as a last resort and the 
proportionality of assistance’ are elements to be included when discussing intervention. Spieker 
(n 70) 17. 







adverse distinction) should not be regarded as interference in an armed conflict or 
as unfriendly acts.101 In other words, if (offers of) humanitarian assistance meets the 
humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity, it cannot be 
understood as unfriendly or as interference. This is in line with the case law of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua-case. In this case, the Court 
stated that ‘there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to 
persons or forces in another country (...) cannot be regarded as unlawful 
intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law’.102 The Court did 
put some conditions to this statement by saying that 
 
If the provision of humanitarian assistance is to escape condemnation as an 
intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the 
purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross, namely “to prevent and alleviate 
human suffering”, and “to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human 
being”; it must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to all in need in 
Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents.103 
 
Taking this argument one step further, it can also be argued that there is less ground 
to refuse (offers of) assistance if it adheres to the humanitarian principles of 
neutrality, impartiality and humanity. Whether or not this is true and what the 
implications are must become clear below. 
 
3.3 Human rights law  
 
Disasters have great impact on the enjoyment of human rights, most notably the 
rights to life, housing, food, water and health. Including human rights standards in 
discussions on disaster response it therefore self-evident: ‘the scale and impact of 
the economic and human damage done by natural disasters also helps experts 
connect disaster policy with international human rights law’.104 Human rights law is 
even included to rekindle the discussion on rights and obligations: ‘linkages 
between disaster policy and human rights emerged more strongly as international 
human rights law developed after World War II, and these linkages emphasized the 
duty of states to facilitate, and the right of individuals to have access to, disaster 
relief’. 105  In the light of the present research this sounds very promising, but 
                                                        
101 Spieker argues that even though this provision is addressed to states, ‘customary law has 
broadened this “right to offer” to all humanitarian actors’. This ‘right’ is argued to be part of the 
‘humanitarian mandate’ of relief organisations.  Spieker (n 70) 17. 
102 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States 
of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 242. 
103 Ibid, para 243. 
104 Fidler (n 28) 468. See also Ronan Hardcastle & Adrian Chua, ‘Victims of Natural Disasters: 
The Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance’ (1997) 4 The International Journal of Human 
Rights 35. 
105 Fidler (n 28) 468 (footnotes omitted). 
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expectations must be tempered: using human rights in this way proves more 
complex than it appears and is in need of more careful consideration. 
The rights-based approach to humanitarian assistance has received the necessary 
attention. The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights describes such an 
approach in relation to humanitarian assistance as follows: ‘(t)he rights-based 
approach to assistance uses the human rights framework to redefine the relationship 
between stakeholders in society as rights-holders with entitlements and duty bearers 
with correlative obligations’.106 In disaster contexts, the right holders would be the 
survivors of a disaster and the duty-bearers would be the affected states. 107 
Following this description of the rights-based approach, disaster survivors would 
have certain entitlements and affected states would have correlative obligations. If 
human rights indeed have this effect, it can be wondered whether a claim to a 
certain human right leads to a corresponding obligation for the affected state to 
provide, and if necessary, to accept humanitarian assistance. Turning the question 
around: if an obligation to accept assistance is found, can it result in human rights 
terms in a right for individuals to receive humanitarian assistance? These questions 
will be explored here. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contain a broad basis of 
fundamental human rights that are often affected in disaster situations.108 Some of 
the rights in the UDHR have the status of customary law, yet this goes mainly for 
the civil and political rights of the UDHR.109 The economic, social and cultural 
rights of the Declaration, like article 25 providing the rights to an adequate standard 
of living including food, housing and medical care, do not have this customary law 
status nor does the elaboration of these rights within the ICESCR. Still, arguably 
there is a certain core of (some of the) economic, social and cultural rights which 
are of such importance that they can achieve – if not already have achieved – the 
status of customary law.110 For this core it would mean that states have a duty to 
                                                        
106 OHCHR, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development 
Cooperation’ (United Nations, New York/Geneva 2006) 15 (available at <http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf> accessed 7 June 2012. See also Brian Concannon Jr., & 
Beatrice Lindstrom. ‘Cheaper, Better, Longer-Lasting: A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster 
Response in Haiti’ (25) 2011 Emory International Law Review 1145, 1149. The Sphere Minimum 
Standards, a much used soft-law framework for providing assistance, subscribe using a rights-
based approach; ibid, 1157.  
107 See also Concannon & Lindstrom (n 106) 1151. 
108 Article 6 of the ICCPR contains the right to life, which is closely connected to the rights to 
housing, food, water and health of articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR. 
109 See inter alia Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2003) 34.  
110 The ‘customary core approach’; Malcolm Langford, Fons Coomans & Felipe Gómez Isa, 
‘Extraterritorial Duties in International Law’ in Malcolm Langford, Wouter Vandenhole, Martin 







‘ensure that the rights are protected against interference and that a minimum 
essential level of the right is positively realised’.111  
The rights that are of special importance in disaster settings (the rights to life, 
housing, food, water and health) are repeated in a number of other human rights 
instruments targeting special groups, like the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC, for example article 6 on the right to life), Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW, for example article 12 on access to 
health care), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 
for example article 28 on the adequate standard of living). State parties to these 
human rights instruments are responsible for realizing the human rights for the 
people under their jurisdiction. It appears therefore that those people can claim their 
rights to life, housing, food, et cetera when these rights are affected by the 
occurrence of a disaster. However, it must first be considered to what extent the 
exceptional circumstance of a disaster influences human rights obligations of states.  
One way in which a disaster potentially influences state party obligations is 
through the state of emergency, explicitly laid down in the ICCPR and a few other 
human rights instruments. In cases of emergency a state can, according to article 4 
ICCPR, derogate from its obligations stemming from that instrument: in ‘times of 
emergency the state parties may take measures derogating from some of the specific 
obligations contained therein’. 112  Derogation becomes possible when a state 
officially proclaims the ‘state of emergency’, which is often done in case of disaster. 
Apart from official proclamation, there are a number of other requirements to which 
a state must comply. Moreover, some rights are excluded from the option to 
derogate, as is for example provided in article 4(2) ICCPR. In this paragraph the 
right to life (amongst other rights) is excluded from derogation. Whether the rights 
of the ICESCR are open to derogation during a disaster is subject to debate. The 
Covenant does not contain a derogation clause like the one of the ICCPR, and 
common sense dictates that even if derogation is possible, this cannot be unlimited: 
it is unimaginable to allow people to starve to death because the right to food is 
                                                        
Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 2013) 68. An example of the development of a certain core of ESC-rights into 
customary law can be found in the context of the ILO where the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 recognizes the special importance of the cores of four 
social rights (i.e. the freedom of association, elimination of forced labour, effective abolition of 
child labour and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation). ILO 
‘Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ (adopted by the International Labour 
Conference at its 86th session, Geneva 1998) para 2. 
111 Langford, Coomans & Gomes Isa (n 110) 68. 
112 Rebecca J. Barber, ‘Protecting the Right to Housing in the Aftermath of Natural Disaster: 
Standards in International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 
432, 434. The following instruments also contain such a ‘derogation-clause’: European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) (article 15), 
European Social Charter (article 30), and the American Convention on Human Rights (article 27). 
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temporarily inoperative.113 Generally speaking, it is safe to say that human rights 
cannot be set aside solely by the occurrence of a disaster. It is nonetheless clear that 
in some situations it is more difficult to respect, protect and fulfil human rights than 
in other situations. Especially fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights is often 
linked to the availability of resources.114 At times of disaster, having sufficient 
resources available for the realisation of human rights may prove challenging, 
which is for example acknowledged in the case of Haiti:  
 
A successful disaster response must place human rights at the centre. Under 
international law, the Haitian government has the primary obligation to realize the 
human rights of its people, but natural disasters make it difficult for states, already 
lacking capacity due to resource constraints, to assert full control over policies that 
are central to their ability to fulfil their human rights obligations.115  
 
Consequently, the state of emergency-clause does not have the effect of eliminating 
all human rights obligations during disasters and although human rights 
achievements are linked to the availability of resources, the obligations remain valid 
in principle. Claims to certain human rights during disasters therefore still require 
corresponding state obligations.  
Another question posed above was whether corresponding obligations for 
affected states lead to an obligation to accept humanitarian assistance, for example 
when the affected state lacks the capacity to fulfil its obligations by itself. The 
ICESCR contains an interesting provision that appears to touch upon this question. 
In its general obligations, the ICESCR provides that state parties must ‘undertake to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, to the 
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights’, 116  apparently telling state parties to make use of 
international assistance to realize the rights to housing, food, water, health and other 
rights of the Covenant. Comparable references can be found in articles 23 and 28 of 
the CRC (although in this context linked to particular rights and not formulated as a 
general obligation) and article 4(2) of the CRPD, but no clear understanding exist 
on whether or to what extent this entails an obligation to accept humanitarian 
assistance after a disaster.  
Although various human rights bodies have made the link between human rights 
obligations and disasters, an answer to this question is not given. The Committee on 
the Rights of the Child for example provided that states should develop and make 
                                                        
113 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 156, 201 & 219. 
114 See for instance Jonathan Todres, ‘Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in Post-Disaster Settings’ 
(2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 1233, 1243, stressing that although there might be 
resource constraints, this does not mean that a disaster sets human rights obligations aside. 
115 Concannon & Lindstrom (n 106) 1147. 






available ‘strategic budgetary lines’ in disaster situations for the protection of 
vulnerable children.117 The Human Rights Council (HRC) ‘expressed its concern 
over the effective denial of assistance to undocumented migrants in Thailand during 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The HRC held that humanitarian assistance should 
be provided effectively to all victims of the tsunami without discrimination, and 
thus regardless of their legal status’.118 The CRPD refers in its article 11 explicitly 
to humanitarian emergencies and disasters and under this provision a special 
working group was set up on the protection of human rights in a number of specific 
disaster settings (i.e. China, Haiti and Chile).119 Moreover, the CRPD’s Committee 
urged those involved in disaster response after the 2010 Haiti earthquake to include 
‘a disability perspective in all humanitarian relief efforts’ and to make sure that 
‘disabled, elderly and other vulnerable groups such as women and children in the 
community be given preferential access to food distribution, and proper sanitation 
facilities’. 120  It further urged that ‘rescue efforts must include the provision of 
medical support, and related assistance to meet the basic needs of those in distress 
with food, water, clothing, temporary shelter and basic sanitation’ in ensuring that 
victims of disaster would not become persons with disabilities.121 Continuing the 
line of attention to disaster-specific duties, it would be interesting to see whether the 
general obligations of the ICESCR being considered in disaster-settings could 
constitute an obligation to accept international humanitarian assistance in any way. 
The final question posed at the beginning of this section concerned the possible 
existence of a right to humanitarian assistance. Such a right would imply ‘the right 
of the victims of armed conflicts and other disasters to receive assistance and 
protection with the purpose of satisfying their immediate needs’.122 The right to 
receive humanitarian assistance gained attention during the 1990s, which was the 
‘International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’ and during which it was 
acknowledged that the international legal framework did not have an answer to 
situations in which people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.123 Some 
                                                        
117 CRC, ‘Concluding Observations Madagascar’ UN Doc. CRC/C/MDG/CO/3-4 of 8 March 
2012, para 18, cited by Marlies M.E. Hesselman, ‘Establishing a Full ‘Cycle of Protection’ for 
Disaster Victims: Preparedness, Response and Recovery according to Regional and International 
Human Rights Supervisory Bodies’ (2013) 18 Tilburg Law Review 106, 122. 
118 HRC, ‘Concluding Observations Thailand’ UN Doc. CCPR/CO/84/THA of 8 July 2005, para 
23, cited by Hesselman (n 117) para 123. 
119 See the CPRD, ‘Report of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to the 
General Assembly’ UN Doc. A/66/55 of 2011 para 31; Hesselman (n 117) 123. 
120 CRPD, ‘Statement of the CteeRPD on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the Situation 
in Haiti’ (8 February 2010) cited by Hesselman (n 117) 124. 
121 CRPD, ‘Statement of the CtRPD in Connection with the Earthquake in Qinghai China’ of 23 
April 2010, cited by Hesselman (n 117) 124. 
122 Joana Abrisketa, ‘The Right to Humanitarian Aid: Basis and Limitations’ in Humanitarian 
Studies Unit (ed), Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics and Contradictions 
(Pluto Press, London/Sterling 2001) 55. 
123 The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction was proclaimed by the UN General 
Assembly: GA Resolution 44/236 of 22 December 1989. Hardcastle & Chua (n 104) 35. 
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argue that a right to receive humanitarian assistance is (emerging) customary law 
under IHL,124 yet under human rights law such a customary rule does not exist.125 
Even though humanitarian assistance is quite commonly delivered in disaster 
situations, it is questionable whether there is an opinio iuris supporting this and it is 
especially doubtful whether such an opinio can be found for a right to receive 
assistance.126 Consequently, a right to receive (or as some call it: demand) relief is 
deemed not to exist at this point.127 This does not take away the fact that human 
rights law can provide a basis for a duty to accept international humanitarian 
assistance in order to fulfil human rights obligations, not being a right to receive 
assistance necessarily.128   
The importance and relevance of human rights law in disaster settings is 
recognized, but it is not yet used to its full potential. Human rights standards could 
be helpful in disaster response and disaster policy, although what this would entail 
in terms of obligations for state parties cannot be said without more research. 
Standards under the rights to housing, food, water and health must give affected 
states indications of what is expected from them after a disaster. Read in 
conjunction with the ICESCR’s general obligations to make use of international 
cooperation and assistance and to use the maximum of available resources, it is 
possible that the ICESCR can fill the gaps that remain in the legal framework on 
accepting humanitarian assistance after the occurrence of a disaster (as will become 
clear in Chapter III). For this reason, it will be considered in Chapters IV and V in 
detail what the ICESCR can contribute to concretizing norms and setting standards. 
 
3.4 Refugees and internally displaced persons 
 
The occurrence of a disaster often displaces the affected population. When fleeing 
the consequences of a disaster, people could stay within their state’s borders 
(making them internally displaced persons or IDPs) or they could cross the border 
and seek refuge in another state. Although this latter group does not meet the 
definition of ‘refugee’ as provided by the Refugee Convention and can therefore 
strictly speaking not be called ‘refugees’, this group is nonetheless assisted by the 
                                                        
124 Abrisketa (n 122); Dungel (n 96); Stoffels (n 88). 
125 Hardcastle & Chua (n 104) 35. 
126 Basing the existence of customary law on the requirements of ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf 
Case, where it has been determined that there must be a state practice supported by opinio iuris 
sive necessitatis. That the opinio iuris is missing with regard to providing humanitarian assistance 
and with regard to a right to receive humanitarian assistance is also concluded by Hardcastle & 
Chua (n 104) 39.  
127  Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (2000) 53 Naval War College 
Review 77. Even so, among sceptics it is usually understood that such a right might sooner exist 
in situations of armed conflicts than in peace-time because of the basis in IHL.  
128 See for a more extended review of the right to humanitarian assistance: Emilie E. Kuijt, 
Humanitarian Assistance and Sovereignty in International Law: Towards a Comprehensive 






UNHCR and are for purposes of protection standards considered as refugees in this 
research. 129  In either case, the people who became displaced are in need of 
assistance, putting a strain on resources available at the location of displacement. 
Through the creation of (legal) instruments on the treatment of refugees and IDPs it 
has been attempted to grant certain rights and safeguards to those who had to leave 
their lives and possessions behind.  
 Based on the Refugee Convention, refugees are granted a certain level of 
protection from the state on which territory the refugee finds himself through the 
recognition of certain rights and entitlements. These rights vary from the right of 
association (article 15) and access to courts (article 16) to those rights which are 
generally closer connected to humanitarian assistance, like equal treatment as 
nationals with regard to rationing, housing, and public relief (articles 20, 21 and 23).  
No specific legally binding international instrument of law exists with regard to 
IDPs,130 something which can easily be explained with reference to a variety of 
sources and principles of public international law, like sovereignty and human 
rights law, dictating states that they must protect the people living on their territory 
or the people that are under the state’s jurisdiction. IDPs do not leave their own 
state and must therefore (in theory) be protected by their government.  Nonetheless, 
IDPs find themselves in a vulnerable position and often require special protection. 
In 1998 the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were adopted containing 
specific guidelines on how to protect IDPs. Although not a ‘hard’ legal instrument, 
the Guiding Principles at least acknowledge that displacement can be caused by a 
natural disaster. In the introduction to the Principles, under (2), it is said that IDPs 
are persons (or groups of persons) who had been forced to flee as a result of, 
amongst other causes, natural or human-made disasters. It is further emphasized 
that IDPs should be treated the same as other persons in the country, but the 
Principles go further than that.  
An explicit right to request and receive protection and humanitarian assistance 
from national authorities can be found in Principle 3(2). These national authorities 
have the primary responsibility and duty to provide assistance, which is in line with 
the human rights obligations that many states have.131 Indeed, in Principle 18 a set 
of socio-economic rights can be found. In its first paragraph, it is established that 
IDPs have a right to an adequate standard of living. The minimum content of this 
right is described as supplying IDPs with and ensuring access to essential food and 
                                                        
129 According to the Refugee Convention, a refugee is a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality’ (article 1 under A(2) Refugee 
Convention). Originally, the Refugee Convention only relates to those situations in which the 
refugee status is caused by events starting prior to 1 January 1951. With the adoption of the 
protocol of 1967 this scope has been broadened to those situations taking place after 1 January 
1951. 
130 Since December 2012, a regional legal instrument on IDPs exists within the framework of the 
African Union. This Kampala Convention will be discussed further below in the present section. 
131 Guiding Principle 3(1). 
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potable water; basic shelter and housing; appropriate clothing; and essential medical 
services and sanitation, all regardless of the circumstances and without 
discrimination.132 Section IV of the Principles deals specifically with humanitarian 
assistance, starting with Principle 24 which determines that humanitarian assistance 
must meet the (humanitarian) principles of humanity, impartiality and non-
discrimination. The primary duty of national authorities is reiterated in Principle 
25(1), where a right to offer services is granted to ‘international humanitarian 
organisations and other appropriate actors’.133 In line with the Nicaragua-Case, it is 
provided that such offers cannot be regarded as an unfriendly act or interference in 
a state’s internal affairs. Moreover, it is determined that ‘consent thereto shall not 
be arbitrarily withheld, particularly when authorities concerned are unable or 
unwilling to provide the required humanitarian assistance’. 134  As such, these 
Guiding Principles contain a quite clear structure for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.  
On a regional level, an instrument on IDPs in the form of a convention exists. In 
October 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and 
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) 
which is the only international (although regional) legally binding instrument on 
IDPs.135 With regard to preventing displacement, article 4(3) provides that states 
‘may seek the cooperation of international organizations or humanitarian agencies 
(...)’, as such stimulating inclusion of international assistance. In the obligations 
relating to protection and assistance it is determined that states ‘shall bear the 
primary duty and responsibility for providing protection of and humanitarian 
assistance to internally displaced persons within their territory or jurisdiction’.136 
Moreover, it is determined that states ‘shall cooperate with each other upon the 
request of the concerned State Party’ and that the states ‘shall respect the mandates 
of the AU and the UN as well as the roles of international humanitarian 
organizations in providing protection and assistance to IDPs, in accordance with 
international law’.137 The other paragraphs of article 5 contain rules and principles 
that are also found in international humanitarian law: state parties are required to 
‘take necessary steps’ to organize humanitarian relief (humanitarian and impartial 
                                                        
132 Guiding Principle 18(2). 
133 Guiding Principle 25(2). 
134 Ibid. 
135 The Kampala Convention entered into force on 6 December 2012 after the fifteenth instrument 
of ratification was deposited by Swaziland. The other fourteen states are Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. Over thirty states signed the Convention. ——, ‘IDPs: African 
IDP Convention Comes into Force’ IRIN (6 December 2012) <http://www.irinnews.org/Report/ 
96984/IDPs-African-IDP-Convention-comes-into-force> accessed 7 December 2012. 
136 Article 5(1) Kampala Convention. Article 5 explicitly explains that measures shall be taken to 
protect those who became displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate 
change; article 5(4) Kampala Convention. 






in character; respect for the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, 
impartiality and independence is provided in article 5(8)), including its unimpeded 
passage but with a right to ‘prescribe the technical arrangements under which such 
passage is permitted’.138 Also, the role of local and international organizations shall 
be enabled and facilitated by the state.139 IDPs have, according to the Kampala 
Convention, a right to peacefully request or seek protection and assistance. 140 
Article 5 further puts strong emphasis on international cooperation: (facilitation of) 
the assessment of needs is done in cooperation with international organizations or 
agencies; sufficient protection must be provided by the state and where available 
resources are inadequate, states shall cooperate in seeking assistance of 
international organisations and humanitarian agencies, who may offer their services 
to all those in need.141 Finally, article 5(12) determines that ‘nothing in this Article 
shall prejudice the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states’, as 
such stressing that although international cooperation is important, the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of states trumps such cooperation. 
 
3.5 Other fields of international law 
 
Besides IHL, human rights law and the protection framework for refugees and IDPs, 
other fields exist that can be useful in disaster response and for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Delivering humanitarian assistance usually meets all kinds 
of practical barriers. Instruments have been created that can take away these barriers, 
although the instruments do not always aim at doing this but take away a barrier as 
a side-effect. Below, the main problems encountered when delivering relief and 
corresponding instruments are mentioned to illustrate difficulties that must be 
overcome in delivering humanitarian assistance. 
In 1967, the first Food Aid Convention was adopted which has since then been 
replaced by updated versions.142 This Convention ‘sets out minimum commitments 
of annual food aid of certain types to be provided by each member’ where 
emergency food aid is also included.143 In the Conventions, standards are laid down 
for food aid, like – as a recurring theme in the legal framework – adhering to the 
humanitarian principles, taking into account dietary needs and habits of the 
recipient community, and long-term planning for rehabilitation and self-
sustainability.  
                                                        
138 Article 5(7) Kampala Convention. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Article 5(9) Kampala Convention. This provision adds ‘in accordance with relevant national 
and international laws, a right for which they shall not be persecuted, prosecuted or punished’. 
141 Article 5(5) and (6) Kampala Convention. 
142 The latest version dating from 1999, but which is regularly updated. David Fisher, ‘Fast Food: 
Regulating Emergency Food Aid in Sudden-Impact Disasters’ (2007) 40 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1127, 1142. See also the website of the Food Aid Convention: 
<http://www.foodaidconvention.org/en/Default.aspx> accessed 17 December 2012. 
143 Ibid, 1143. 
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Also instruments that arrange practical issues are relevant for the legal 
framework, like rules and regulations on customs through the ‘Recommendation of 
the Customs Co-Operation Council to Expedite the Forwarding of Relief 
Consignments in the Event of Disasters’, 144  on telecommunication through the 
Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for 
Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations of 1998,145 on the environment through 
instruments like the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification of 1994, 146  and on the 
prevention and mitigation of industrial and nuclear accidents through the Nuclear 
Accident Convention or the Oil Pollution Convention. 147  In the same line, 
instruments exist on granting visa and work permits to humanitarian personnel, 
transportation,148 flight zones, privileges and immunities,149 and even space law.150 
The topics that are covered by these instruments are usually of practical relevance 
in disaster response and determine the effectiveness of international humanitarian 
assistance. Having for example strict rules on custom clearance of relief goods or 
asking high import taxes could delay or prevent relief goods from entering a state. 
In the same line, limited use of airspace, territorial waters or overland infrastructure 
could also negatively affect the provision of humanitarian assistance. The examples 
of conventions mentioned here are created for functional coexistence of sovereign 
states, yet prove to create barriers when it comes to quickly responding to disasters. 
Having such national (legal) barriers proved to be problematic in disaster response 
in the USA and Pakistan, while the legal systems of Fiji and Guatemala are 
considered to be ‘best practices’.151 When considering the emphasis which is placed 
on the primary role of the affected state in responding to a disaster or a 
humanitarian emergency, it is quite important that the state’s legal system is 
prepared. The IFRC project on International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL), 
                                                        
144 Adopted in 1970 by the forerunner of the World Customs Organization. Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ 
(n 4) 40. See also OCHA, ‘Customs Facilitation in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance’, the 
Kyoto Customs Convention, the Convention on Temporary Admission, and the Customs 
Convention on the Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment. 
145 The Tampere Convention was also mentioned in Chapter I for its widely cited definition of 
disaster. It is not, however, widely ratified: as of January 2015 only 48 states are a party to the 
Convention. UN Treaty Collection, <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXV-4&chapter=25&lang=en> accessed 6 January 2015. 
146 Here also instruments on climate change can be mentioned, along with instruments to prevent 
hazardous waste to spread. Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 4) 48. 
147 Or the Industrial Accidents Convention. Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 4).  
148 For example the Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles 
of 1954 or the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic of 1965. 
149 For example the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 
1947. 
150 UNGA Resolution on ‘Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space’ 
(UN Doc. A/41/65 of 3 December 1986) of which principle 11 states that ‘remote sensing shall 
promote the protection of mankind from natural disasters’. Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 4) 51. 






which will be discussed in section 3.8.1 below, aims to take these potential legal 
barriers away, at least at national levels. 
 
3.6 Regional cooperation in disaster response 
 
Moving now into the realm of instruments specifically designed for disaster 
response, the regional systems set up for this purpose will be discussed first. Many 
regional systems contain arrangements for disaster situations and many 
neighbouring states have created bilateral treaties for mutual assistance. Examples 
of regional arrangements are the 2005 ‘Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response’ by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)152 
and the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response 
Agency (CDERA) by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), both aiming at 
facilitating disaster relief and assistance in (legal) preparation and coordination, and 
the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), which provides 
humanitarian assistance and is responsible for 30% of the global total for 
humanitarian funding.153 In African context, the Economic Community of West-
African States (ECOWAS) is worth mentioning, which has established a 
‘Mechanism for Disaster Reduction’ to coordinate disaster response. Next to 
ECOWAS, the African Union may also take decisions on common policies, which 
include humanitarian action and disaster response.154 In the Americas, the Inter-
American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance adopted by the Organization 
of American States (OAS) could potentially arrange many issues of international 
disaster response, but it only has three parties. Finally, NATO has included disaster 
assistance in its activities since 1953. While originally only focussing on assistance 
between member states, the NATO policy changed to providing assistance to non-
NATO states as well. 
Bilateral agreements between states generally aim at setting procedures for 
initiation and termination of assistance, and more practically at exchanging 
information and sending relief goods across the border. While bilateral agreements 
have a limited scope, they could potentially help in lifting some of the national legal 
barriers in the provision of humanitarian assistance.  
 
3.7 Resolutions, guidelines and other instruments on humanitarian assistance 
and disaster response  
 
Currently, no legal instrument exists that is created solely for the purpose of 
delivering humanitarian assistance in response to disasters. There are, however, 
quite a number of instruments with a ‘soft law’ character (dictating behaviour but 
not in a legally binding and/or enforceable way). Here, only the most relevant 
                                                        
152 ASEAN has played an important role in negotiating disaster relief after cyclone Nargis. 
153 Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 4) 71. 
154 Article 13(1) under (e) AU Constitutive Act. 
 
 
Disaster Response and International Humanitarian Assistance:  
Background and Legal Framework 
53 
instruments for the purpose of identifying a set of rules and principles on accepting 
humanitarian assistance in response to a disaster will be discussed.  
Due to their setting, formulations, and wide level of acceptance, the General 
Assembly (GA) Resolutions on disaster response and humanitarian assistance are 
perhaps resembling a legal instrument closest. In the Resolutions the starting point 
is that the affected state is first and foremost responsible for relief, which is 
expressed with the words ‘primary role of each State in caring for the victims of 
disasters occurring in its territory’.155 Acknowledging state sovereignty in such a 
way is a line followed since Resolution 36/225 of 1981. The attention for state 
sovereignty remained in Resolutions adopted throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and 
was further emphasized with references to ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘national unity’, 
and the requirement that assistance should be provided ‘with the consent’ of the 
affected country and based upon an ‘appeal’ by that country.156 
The Resolution that currently forms the basis for most humanitarian assistance-
operations in natural disaster contexts is GA Resolution 46/182. In this Resolution 
too, there is much emphasis on state sovereignty. It is stressed that the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and the national unity of states must be fully respected, that 
assistance should only be provided with the consent of the affected country and on 
the basis of an appeal by the affected state. 157  Also, each state ‘has the 
responsibility first and foremost to take care of the victims of natural disasters and 
other emergencies occurring on its territory’ which also includes the initiation of 
humanitarian assistance.158 The Resolution further recognizes that the ‘magnitude 
and duration of many emergencies may be beyond the response capacity’ of the 
affected state, emphasizing the role of international cooperation. 159  Resolution 
46/182 also dictates that humanitarian assistance ‘must be provided in accordance 
with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality’.160 
Another three Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are worth 
mentioning here for their contributions to the general development of norms and 
principles. Resolution 43/131 of 1988 has been described as a ‘monument to 
qualification and prudence’.161 The reason for this is that while the Resolution is on 
the one hand created with the rationale to protect people from the effects of 
disasters, it strongly confirms, on the other hand, the principle of state 
                                                        
155 UNGA Resolution on ‘Strengthening the capacity of the United Nations system to respond to 
natural disasters and other disaster situations’ (UN Doc. A/Res/36/225 of 17 December 1981), 
para 2. 
156 UNGA Resolution on ‘Strengthening the effectiveness and coordination of international urban 
search and rescue assistance’ (UN Doc. A/Res/57/150 of 27 February 2003). 
157 UNGA Resolution 46/182 (n 71) para 3. 
158 Ibid, under 4. 
159 Ibid, para 5. 
160 Ibid, para 2. 
161 O. Russbach, ONU contre ONU. Le droit international confisqué (La Découverte, Paris 1994) 






sovereignty. 162  In Resolution 45/100 of 1990, the line of earlier Resolutions is 
maintained, although it ‘strongly emphasizes the need to be able to gain access to 
affected zones.163 Finally, another important Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly is Resolution 57/150 of 2003, which ‘called on States to facilitate the 
entry and operation of international urban search and rescue teams in disaster 
settings (...)’.164 The trend that these Resolutions show is that the General Assembly 
seems to understand the problems around humanitarian access, but is still struggling 
to combine this with ideas of sovereignty. 
Apart from the General Assembly Resolutions, other instruments on disaster 
response and humanitarian assistance has been created of which those most relevant 
for the current legal framework will be discussed. The ‘Hyogo Framework for 
Action’ was adopted at the UN World Disaster Reduction Conference in 2005.165 
The Hyogo Framework aims to reduce disaster losses in lives and in social, 
economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries substantially.166 
To this end, five priorities for action have been identified along with cross cutting 
issues that must diminish disaster vulnerability.167 This framework constitutes a 
plan specifically for the years 2005 to 2015. 168  While this instrument focuses 
strongly on preparedness, one of the priorities clearly makes the link between 
preparedness and an effective response. 
Another example of a soft law instrument on disaster response is the 1994 ‘Code 
of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs 
in Disaster Relief’ (Code of Conduct). This instrument provides ten principles that 
relief agencies and NGOs may – voluntarily – adhere to. With over 450 signatories, 
the Code of Conduct is a standard-setting document on how humanitarian response 
should be delivered, mentioning amongst others neutrality, non-discrimination, 
                                                        
162 J. Oraá, ‘Derecho international y posibilidades de intervención en situationes de emergencia’ 
in Convulsión y violencia en el mundo, Seminario de investigación para la paz (Centro Pignatelli, 
Zaragoza 1995) 100-14 cited by Abrisketa (n 122) 67 
163 Abrisketa (n 122) 67. 
164 David Fisher, ‘The Law of International Disaster Response: Overview and Ramifications for 
Military Actors’ in M.D. Carsten (ed) Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications and 
Natural Disasters (International Law Studies, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 2007)  
300. 
165 The Hyogo Framework was adopted by 168 states: <http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa> 
accessed 4 December 2012. 
166  Hyogo Framework for Action, summary of the framework: <http://www.unisdr.org/files/ 
8720_summaryHFP20052015.pdf> accessed 4 December 2012. 
167 The priorities are making disaster risk reduction a national and local priority; identifying, 
assessing and monitoring disaster risks and enhancing early warning; using knowledge and 
education to build a culture of safety and resilience; reducing underlying risk factors; and 
strengthening disaster preparedness for effective response. 
168 The Hyogo Framework for Action can be found at: <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm> 
accessed 13 October 2010. 
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independence, and respect for local custom and culture as values.169 In the first 
Appendix to the Code of Conduct, governments are recommended to grant access to 
victims so that aid can be provided.170  Here again, the problem of access that 
humanitarian organizations encounter is acknowledged. A different instrument 
developed by the IFRC helps national governments in preparing for the possibility 
that they may at a certain time need international assistance. These ‘Guidelines for 
the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial 
Recovery Assistance’ explains how (legal) barriers can be removed for the 
provision of international aid.171 One last example of a non-binding instrument is 
the ‘Sphere Handbook’ made in the context of the ‘Sphere Project’. A group of 
NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent started the Sphere Project in 1997 in 
order to improve aid delivery. In this project, humanitarian principles have been 
identified that govern humanitarian action. These principles have been established 
in the Humanitarian Charter, which forms the ‘cornerstone’ of the Sphere 
Handbook. 172  The Handbook contains very practical indicators for making 
humanitarian responses most efficient and effective as possible, going in depth into 
water supplies, food security, shelter, and health services. The Handbook is updated 
regularly to include (new) ‘best practices’.173 
 
3.8 Recent standard-setting initiatives 
 
In Red Cross- as well as UN-context there are ongoing projects which attempt to 
establish general norms and rules for peacetime disaster response. These projects, 
the ‘International Disaster Response Laws’-project of the IFRC and the ‘Protection 
of Persons in the Event of Disasters’ of the International Law Commission will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.8.1 International Disaster Response Laws 
The IFRC started its International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles 
(IDRL) programme in 2001 to explore the role of law in the response to disasters, 
                                                        
169 See also Dorothea Hilhorst, ‘Dead Letter or Living Document? Ten Years of the Code of 
Conduct for Disaster Relief’ (2005) 29 Disasters 351, 354 ff. 
170 The Code of Conduct can be found at <http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/> 13 October 
2010. 
171  IFRC, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of 
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’ (IFRC, Geneva 2008) 3-6. The 
‘IDRL Guidelines’ are a part of the International Disaster Response Law project of the IFRC (see 
section 3.8.1 below). 
172 Sphere Project, ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response’ (Oxfam 
Publishing, Oxford 2004) 5.  
173 The first Handbook in trial edition was published in 1998, the first final edition in 2000. 






particularly in international disaster relief.174 It is considering a number of different 
approaches for strengthening and developing supportive laws and policies at all 
levels and is conducting consultations with governments and the humanitarian 
sector to identify the best ways forward.175 IDRL describes the body of rules and 
principles for international humanitarian assistance in the wake of peacetime 
disasters. 176  In other words, IDRL applies when states and organisations offer, 
request, provide or accept cross-border disaster assistance.177 Domestic legislation 
must be prepared for large scale disasters and the offerings of international aid, in 
order to ensure the speed and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Local Red 
Cross Societies conduct research on the status of the national laws and advice the 
government on the results. The idea is that states must be prepared before disaster 
strikes, instead of trying to solve difficulties in an emergency situation:  
 
Currently, most states figure that they will sort out their mechanisms for dealing with 
international assistance when the time comes. Unfortunately, this ad hoc approach is 
increasingly inadequate to deal with the very real complications of international 
assistance.178  
 
The aforementioned ‘Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of 
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’ was adopted by the 
parties to the Geneva Conventions at the 30th International Conference of the Red 
Cross in 2007.179 These Guidelines will help states in strengthening their laws and 
bilateral agreements. In its strategy until 2020, the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
movement will keep the IDRL programme on the agenda.  
IDRL does not provide a solution to the problem of a state refusing international 
aid. The IDRL Guidelines depart from the idea that the process of international 
humanitarian assistance must be initiated by the affected state with a request (and 
not by unsolicited offers).180 The initiative therefore lies with the affected state and 
IDRL therefore departs from the notion of a willing state, and aims at making the 
delivery of international aid run smoothly. IDRL does, however, help to diminish 
the problem of underhandedly refusing aid. When states say that they are willing to 
                                                        
174  See the IFRC <http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/idrl/programme/intro.asp> accessed 21 
September 2010. 
175 Bannon, ‘Strengthening International Disaster Response Laws’ (n 66) 29. 
176 Michael H. Hoffman, ‘What is the Scope of International Disaster Response Law?’ in IFRC, 
International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice: Reflections, Prospects and 
Challenges (IFRC, Geneva 2003) 13. 
177 Hoffman (n 176) 15. 
178  IFRC Secretary-General Bekele Geleta to the Overseas Development Association 
(Westminster, London, March 2009), cited by IFRC, ‘IDRL Programme: Plan 2010-2011’ (IFRC, 
Geneva 2010) 2. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Horst Fischer, ‘International Disaster Response Law Treaties: Trends, Patterns and Lacunae’ 
in IFRC, International Disaster Response Laws, Principles and Practice: Reflections, Prospects 
and Challenges (IFRC, Geneva 2003) 34. 
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accept foreign aid but delay the entry of goods or persons through requirements of 
national laws (customs, visa, etc.), IDRL could potentially take this option away. 
Rules derived from IDRL are that the affected state has the primary responsibility to 
ensure humanitarian assistance in its territory, that the affected state is required to 
‘seek international and/or regional assistance in case the affected State determines 
that a disaster situation exceeds national coping capabilities’.181 Finally, IDRL also 
confirms that international relief and assistance can only be delivered with consent 
of the affected state.182 
 
3.8.2 Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 
In 2006, the Planning Group of the UN’s International Law Commission (ILC) 
recommended to include ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’ in its 
long-term programme of work.183 During the fifty-ninth session of the ILC, in 2007, 
a Special Rapporteur was appointed and the topic was included in the ILC’s 
programme of work.184 In a background study, the Codification Division of the ILC 
provided an extensive overview of issues, concepts, legal norms and other 
considerations somehow linked to the topic of ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of 
Disasters’. 185  In addition, the Special Rapporteur traced the evolution of the 
protection of persons in the event of disasters in his preliminary report of 2008.186 
Using this background as a point of departure, the Special Rapporteur developed 
draft articles on this topic taking the whole spectrum of disaster response into 
account. In 2014 the Drafting Committee collected the draft articles adopted thus 
far with their full titles and texts in one document, providing an overview of what 
has been achieved up to that point.187 
The draft articles are aimed at situations where ‘a calamitous event or series of 
events (result) in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or 
large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society’ and which is not a situation in which international 
                                                        
181 Spieker (n 70) 24, deriving this from IDRL Guidelines (n 171) Guideline 3.2. 
182 Spieker (n 70) 26; IDRL Guidelines (n 171) Guideline 10.1. 
183 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-eight session (1 May-9 June and 3 
July-11 August 2006) (UN Doc A/61/10 of 2006), para 256ff. 
184 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-ninth session (7 May-5 June and 9 
July-10 August 2007) (UN Doc. A/62/10 of 2007), para 375. Mr. Eduardo Valencia Ospina was 
appointed as Special Rapporteur. 
185 ILC, ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (UN 
Doc A/CN.4/590 of 11 December 2007). 
186 ILC ‘Preliminary Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Mr. Eduardo 
Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 of 5 May 2008). 
187  ILC Drafting Committee, ‘Texts and titles of the draft articles adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on first reading’ UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.831 of 15 May 2014. The numbering used in the 
Drafting Committee’s overview is not entirely the same as the numbering of the Draft Articles in 
the reports by the Special Rapporteur. The references to Draft Articles in the present study refer to 
the original numbering of the Special Rapporteur’s reports since the reports are taken into 






humanitarian law is applicable.188 In the situations thus described the draft articles 
must ‘facilitate an adequate and effective response to disasters that meets the 
essential needs of the persons concerned, with full respect for their rights’.189 This 
emphasis on the needs and rights of the people for whom these draft articles are 
most relevant returns in draft articles 6 to 8. In article 6 it is determined that disaster 
response must meet the humanitarian principles ‘while taking into account the 
needs of the particularly vulnerable’. Articles 7 and 8 provide that actors bringing 
humanitarian assistance must respect and protect the ‘inherent dignity of the human 
person’ and that ‘persons affected by disasters are entitled to respect for their 
human rights’.190 Here again, the relevance of human rights law in disaster response 
is stressed, yet without specifying how human rights fulfil a role and what they 
mean for obligations of affected states. The challenge is, however, taken up in Part 
II of this research. 
Besides the attention for the interests of disaster victims, the draft articles 
provide some clear rules for affected states. In the first place, the affected state has 
the ‘duty to ensure the protection of persons and provision of disaster relief and 
assistance on its territory’ and has the ‘primary role in the direction, control, 
coordination and supervision of such relief and assistance’.191 This primary role is 
granted to the affected state ‘by virtue of its sovereignty’, from which more rules 
are derived. Immediately linked to the primary role in response is the duty of the 
affected state to seek international assistance when a disaster exceeds the national 
response capacity, a formulation that was also seen in other sources.192 Another rule 
laid down in the draft articles that has been discussed above is that external 
assistance can only be provided with the consent of the affected state, which may 
not be withheld arbitrarily. 193  Further, external actors like states, the UN and 
‘competent’ international organizations have a right to offer assistance, and relevant 
NGOs ‘may’ also offer assistance.194 The affected state may place conditions on the 
provision of external assistance (in accordance with international and national law 
                                                        
188 ILC Drafting Committee, ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Texts of draft articles 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.758 of 
24 July 2009), draft articles 3 and 4. 
189 Ibid, draft article 2. 
190 ILC Drafting Committee ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Text and titles of 
draft articles 6, 7, 8, and 9 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee’ (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.776 of 14 July 2010), draft articles 6, 7, and 8. 
191 Ibid, draft article 9. 
192 ILC Drafting Committee ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Text and titles of 
draft articles 10 and 11 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on 19 July 2011’ (UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.794 of 20 July 2011), draft article 10. The formulation was also used in inter alia 
GA Res. 46/182 (n 71). 
193 Ibid, draft article 11 paras 1 and 2. 
194 ILC Drafting Committee ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Text and titles of 
draft articles 5 bis, 12, 13, 14 and 15, provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee from 5 to 
11 July 2012’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.812 of 12 July 2012), draft article 12. 
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and while considering the needs of the affected persons), the affected states must 
take national measures to facilitate prompt and effective provision of external 
assistance, and this assistance shall be terminated based on consultations with the 
parties involved.195 These rules are in line with the idea of a duty to international 
cooperation as provided in draft article 5 and 5bis. Draft article 5 tells states to 
cooperate among themselves and with the UN, IFRC, ICRC, other international 
organisations and NGOs.196 This article has been specified at a later stage where 
international cooperation is understood as ‘humanitarian assistance, coordination of 
international relief actions and communications, and making available relief 
personnel, relief equipment and supplies, and scientific, medical and technical 
resources’.197 
The draft articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters are not 
without controversy. There is a clear recognition of state sovereignty, yet at the 
same time it is emphasized that this sovereignty comes with duties towards disaster 
victims. States are granted the freedom to give or withhold consent, but with the 
condition that this consent may not be withheld for arbitrary reasons. Since states 
are not given a carte blanche to withhold consent, and considering the emphasis on 
the rights of disaster victims and the duty to international cooperation included in 
the draft articles, it is questionable how many states are willing to ratify the treaty – 
if the treaty will ever be opened for ratification.198 
The ILC’s work on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters has again 
made clear that sovereignty is of great influence on the rules and principles of 
accepting humanitarian assistance after a disaster. Before arriving at the conclusion 
on what the rules and principles are, the concept of sovereignty and its effect on the 
legal framework will therefore be considered here.  
 
4 SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION 
 
4.1 Traditional reading of state sovereignty 
 
The way in which the concept of state sovereignty has influenced the legal 
framework of disaster response so far is an expression of a rather traditional reading 
                                                        
195 Ibid, draft articles 13, 14, and 15. 
196 ILC Drafting Committee, ‘Protection of persons in the event of disasters: Texts of draft articles 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.758 of 
24 July 2009), draft article 5. 
197 ILC Drafting Committee ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Text and titles of 
draft articles 5 bis, 12, 13, 14 and 15, provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee from 5 to 
11 July 2012’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.812 of 12 July 2012), draft article 5bis. 
198  At the time of writing, the work of the Special Rapporteur is not yet completed. The 
Preliminary Report of the Special Rapporteur explains the form that the work must take and here 
it is acknowledged that the final decision must be taken by the General Assembly when the work 
is completed. Various options are open here ranging from a treaty to principles or guidelines. 






of the concept. A strong emphasis of the role of the affected state trumps the 
assistance offered by international humanitarian actors; only with consent are these 
actors allowed to conduct their activities. As such, sovereignty protects the interests 
of the affected state by allowing that state to decide which actor is permitted to 
enter its territory and under which conditions, being in line with the related 
concepts of territorial integrity and non-intervention. This function of sovereignty is 
a therefore a welcome practical tool preventing chaos in international aid delivery 
but the problem at the same time is that the affected state is not always willing to 
give its consent to international humanitarian assistance, even when the civilian 
population is in need of such relief. Questions therefore arise at this point on where 
the traditional reading of sovereignty comes from, what the developments are in this 
field and, accordingly, how to move forward in answering the research question 
while not disregarding the reality that sovereignty still fulfils a prominent role. To 
answer the first question it is necessary to look at the development of the concept of 
sovereignty. Over the years, the role and meaning of sovereignty has continuously 
been reinvented and adjusted. Only those parts of the story of sovereignty important 
for answering the questions posed above will be told.  
The origins of sovereignty are regularly linked to the Treaty of Westphalia, 
which brought a temporary end to the wars raging over Europe in the seventeenth 
century. With the peace of Westphalia of 1648, the creation of the nation state as 
still known today is understood to be the basis of state sovereignty.199 Through its 
meaning (‘being the highest power’) sovereignty indicates that all states are equal 
and that no higher power exists that can bind states. In other words:  
 
States are independent entities that can exercise supreme political authority over their 
territory. (...) Under the traditional view of sovereignty, States may shape and 
determine their own policies with respect to the treatment of their citizens and 
control over their domestic affairs without interference from other States.200  
 
This reading of sovereignty has for a long time dominated – and often still 
dominates – international law and resulted in sometimes hidden situations of 
mistreatment of a domestic population. 
Within the UN Charter, sovereignty can be recognized in, inter alia, article 2, 
which states that ‘(t)he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members’;201 ‘(a)ll Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state’;202 and ‘(n)othing contained in the present Charter shall 
                                                        
199 See for example Lloyd Axworthy, ‘RtoP and the Evolution of State Sovereignty’ in Jared 
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authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter’. 203  The UN Charter also contains a very 
important mechanism to limit sovereignty. The Security Council received the power 
to take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security and these 
measures can be taken against (the will of) a state.204 Since the establishment of the 
UN, situations have been seen in which a state’s regime or non-state actors 
committed gross atrocities against its own population and where it proved difficult 
– if not impossible – to respond.  
A gradual change occurred which became most visible after the end of the Cold 
War. It was recognized that  
 
Old notions of national security predicated on the defence of borders made little 
sense when the threat posed by violence and conflict, international networks of 
predators and criminals, global pandemics, and massive natural disasters required a 
new approach to the protection of peoples.205 
  
While originally meant to maintain or restore international peace and security 
exclusively, it has been gradually accepted that the Security Council also uses its 
powers to react on gross and systematic human rights violations since also non-
military causes of instability can form a threat against peace and security.206 The 
new (non-legal) concept of ‘Human Security’ captured this and placed the 
protection of civilians and respect for human rights as priorities on the international 
agenda, arguing that gross human rights violations could also constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, and thus qualify for Security Council 
intervention.207 With this focus on the protection of civilians a method of action in 
case of gross human rights violations was created. In addition, there have been 
situations in which the Security Council did not give its authorization and where a 
group of states nonetheless intervened to respond to situations of human suffering. 
Such an intervention for humanitarian purposes without prior Security Council 
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4.2 Non-Authorised humanitarian intervention 
 
Looking at the UN Charter, and especially aforementioned article 2(4), it is clear 
that the military intervention of states apart from the case of self-defence (not 
relevant in the present context) and on the territory of another state without prior 
Security Council authorization is in violation of international law and therefore 
illegal.208 However, examples in which the concept of humanitarian intervention 
was used as a legal basis for an intervention show that in cases of extreme atrocities 
against a civilian population the intervention was considered to be a necessity and 
apparently the only option. An early case in which a civilian population was 
protected with the means of a humanitarian intervention was the assistance to the 
Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991.209 Over a hundred thousand Iraqi Kurds fled the 
repression by the Iraqi regime after the Gulf war. Many of the refugees attempted to 
reach the Turkish border but got stranded in the mountains where they were living 
in extreme conditions. The Security Council did not come to a decision to intervene 
with forceful means for the assistance of the Kurds, after which the US, UK and 
France unilaterally decided to create a safe zone, enforced by military means and 
supported by thirteen states.210 Another example where a humanitarian emergency 
prompted the unauthorized intervention by states is that of Kosovo in 1999. The 
Security Council did not come to a resolution yet according to member states of 
NATO action was required to come to the aid of civilians. 211 
Returning to situations of disaster, it is possible that a civilian population is 
suffering undue hardship after a disaster as a consequence of their state’s decision 
to not come to their aid and at the same time not accepting international 
humanitarian assistance. In extreme situations, this may prompt the international 
community to discuss the option of undertaking action to come to the assistance of 
the civilian population. Being such an extreme situation, in the case of cyclone 
Nargis in Myanmar it was debated whether a humanitarian intervention (if the other 
option under discussion, an intervention with Security Council authorization, would 
not be realized) should take place.212 It was argued that a large-scale natural disaster 
and subsequent lack of response can be considered a factor that can cause instability 
and therefore a threat to peace and security, yet it has so far (not in the case of 
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cyclone Nargis, nor in any disaster situation) never been an actual ground for a 
humanitarian intervention (or authorized intervention).213 
Although used for humanitarian purposes, a humanitarian intervention is in 
violation of international law and this controversy in combination with a sometimes 
indecisive Security Council made former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
wonder ‘(i)f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?’.214 This question is also relevant for disaster situations in which the 
affected state refuses to accept assistance and does not adequately respond itself. 
Kofi Annan’s challenge was taken up by the Canadian government, which funded 
the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The 
ICISS issued a report in 2001 describing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP).215 
 
4.3 The Responsibility to Protect 
 
The term RtoP is best known for its usage since the issuance of the ICISS-report, 
but is originally introduced by Frances Deng in his work on IDPs.216 The ICISS was 
asked to respond to the question ‘when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take 
coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose 
of protecting people at risk in that other state’.217 In answering this question, the 
ICISS came with an understanding of sovereignty that is at times described as new 
or novel, but appears at closer scrutiny a logical interpretation of the traditional 
view of state sovereignty. Due to being the highest power, a state always has a duty 
to take care of its citizens as no other entity is capable to do this. The novelty lies in 
the recognition of a right to intervene.218 Based on the concept of sovereignty, states 
have a responsibility to protect their own citizens. This means that the primary 
responsibility to protect a civilian population lies with the territorial state itself. If 
that state fails to protect its population against gross human rights violations and 
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other security threats, ‘the obligation to protect passes from the territorial state to 
the international community’.219 According to the ICISS the first step is taking 
preventive measures against the occurrence of mass atrocities like genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility to prevent turns into a 
responsibility to react ‘when preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the 
situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then 
interventionary measures by other members of the broader community of states may 
be required’.220 This may also include forceful (military) measures, but constitute 
all kinds of less intrusive measures first.  
Recognizing the difficulties around Security Council authorization in case of 
forceful measures, the ICISS advises the Security Council’s permanent members 
not to use their veto unless their vital interests are at stake, and when the Council 
reaches a deadlock, there must be recourse to the General Assembly.221 Moreover, a 
number of criteria are established in the ICISS report to determine whether action is 
allowed. According to one of these criteria, there must be a ‘just cause’ and when 
describing which situations can fall under ‘just cause’ the Commission states that 
this would at least include ‘overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, 
where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, 
and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened’.222 In theory, the concept of 
RtoP would in extreme cases provide a way to bypass the requirement of state 
consent in the view of the ICISS to deliver international humanitarian assistance. In 
practice, however, the concept of RtoP changed course.  
It took a few years before the concept of RtoP was taken up on a global level.223 
At the World Summit of 2005, states endorsed the concept and it was laid down in 
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. 224  However, the two paragraphs 
dealing with RtoP in the Outcome Document cannot be compared with the extended 
report of the ICISS. Being a political compromise, this is not utterly surprising, yet 
for the purposes of this research the World Summit Outcome poses a problem: the 
ICISS’s reference to application of RtoP in disaster situations has disappeared 
completely. According to paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document, RtoP can be 
invoked in situations of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. The first two phases as designed by the ICISS (responsibility to prevent 
and react) are still distinguished: the primary obligation lies with the territorial state. 
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That state must prevent the occurrence of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity and is ‘encouraged and helped’ in this by the 
international community. The international community further has the responsibility 
to use ‘appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in 
accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter’ and is ‘prepared’ to use more 
forceful measures (of Chapter VII of the UN Charter) to protect populations from 
the aforementioned crimes.225 The responsibility to rebuild is largely ignored in the 
Outcome Document. 226  Although adopted with broad support from states, the 
Outcome Document cannot be considered as a legally binding document (nor can 
the ICISS report, for that matter) leaving the legal status of RtoP rather 
ambiguous.227  The way in which the Security Council has used the concept in 
recent years has not proved too helpful either.228 
The question remains whether RtoP can still be invoked in disaster situations 
even though that option is not explicitly recognized in the Outcome Document. In 
the aftermath of cyclone Nargis, this question has been extensively debated.229 
Frustrated by the response of the government of Myanmar, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner argued that RtoP should be applied in this 
situation to impose aid upon the state.230 However, before RtoP can be invoked, one 
of the four crimes mentioned in the Outcome Document should take place, leaving 
the debate circling around the question whether in a concrete case refusal of 
humanitarian assistance can be considered as genocide, a war crime, a crime against 
humanity, or ethnic cleansing, given the facts of that case.231 This question will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter III in relation to Myanmar, but it can already be said 
that the application of RtoP in such situations is not helped by a statement by Ban 
Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the UN that RtoP should not be applied in situations 
of natural disasters until member states decide otherwise. He followed the stance of 
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a number of scholars232  in arguing that application in situations like Myanmar 
would ‘undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition 
or operational utility’.233  
Leaving this debate for now, it must be emphasized what the adoption of RtoP 
has meant for the understanding of sovereignty. Instead of regarding sovereignty as 
a shield against interference in the internal affairs of a state – recall in this line of 
thought also the ICJ Nicaragua Case in which it was decided that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance cannot be considered as unlawful interference in the 
internal affairs of a state – there is now a notion of ‘responsible sovereignty’.234 As 
explained by Kofi Annan in relation to the ethnic cleansing taking place in Kosovo:  
 
Human life and basic security were being threatened, in an increasingly visible 
fashion, by conflicts that were internal to states, and this meant that we needed to 
reframe the relations between citizens and governments. We needed to convince the 
broader global community that sovereignty had to be understood as contingent and 
conditional on states’ taking responsibility for the security of their own people’s 
human rights – and for this to be taken as seriously as the states’ expectations of non-
interference in their internal affairs.235 
 
It is clear however that a traditional reading of state sovereignty has left a mark on 
the legal framework of disaster response. Also, there is  
 
Little prospect for the development of rules of international law designed to limit 
state sovereignty with respect to disaster relief. Put another way, states typically craft 
international law where their interests converge on the need to regulate sovereignty. 
With natural disasters, the interests of both the victim and assisting states converge 
on maintaining as much sovereignty as possible – a convergence that does not 
stimulate the robust development of international law.236  
 
While a change is becoming visible in the work of the ILC on the Protection of 
Persons in the Event of Disasters (where it is included that the affected state is 
under an ‘obligation’ due to state sovereignty to ensure ‘protection and assistance in 
the event of a disaster’, aiming at ‘preserving the life and dignity of the victims of 
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the disaster and guaranteeing the access of persons in need to humanitarian 
assistance’)237 there is no guarantee that the ILC’s draft articles on this topic will 
become customary international law or turn into a treaty (and will be ratified 
widely).238 To place these developments with regard to peace-time disasters into 
perspective, a short side-step is made here to the ongoing developments in 
situations of armed conflict. In this context, a way is found to bypass state 
sovereignty in extreme humanitarian emergencies. Although armed conflict is 
excluded from the definition of disaster and – therefore – from the scope of this 
research, it (again) provides an interesting angle.  
After having adopted a number of resolutions on the duties of the parties in the 
Syrian conflict with regard to humanitarian access, the Security Council decided in 
2014 that  
 
United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners are authorized 
to use routes across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, Bab al-
Hawa, Al Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in order to 
ensure that humanitarian assistance, including medical and surgical supplies, reaches 
people in need throughout Syria through the most direct routes, with notification to 
the Syrian authorities (...).239 
 
Through this resolution, the Security Council is bypassing the requirement of 
consent from the affected state, yet it only comes to this decision after stressing the 
special circumstances of the case. These consist of references to earlier resolutions 
demanding humanitarian access, to the massive scale of suffering of civilians, to the 
duties of the parties to the conflict under IHL and to the impact of humanitarian 
operations so far.240 In addition, the Security Council has built in an automatic 
ending of the mandate for humanitarian operations by providing that the mandate is 
valid for 180 days after which it will be reconsidered (which has been done in 
December 2014 for a period of twelve months). 241  Considering the special 
circumstances of the case this decision is exceptional even in armed conflict 
situations and it is questionable whether disasters occurring in peace-time could 
ever accumulate to such circumstances prompting the Security Council to make a 
comparable decision.  
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In peace-time disasters, therefore, the legal situation of the 21st century does not 
differ much from Vattel’s time due to the lack of clear rules of international law on 
the obligations of states to accept humanitarian assistance: ‘both assisting and 
victim states retain virtually unfettered sovereignty in the context of natural disaster 
policy’.242 Nevertheless, when looking at the developments around the concept of 
state sovereignty, a change is becoming visible. The outlook on sovereignty is 
gradually shifting from granting states freedom within national borders to do as 
they please, states are now increasingly considered to be accountable for their 
internal acts, even to such an extent that there is a responsibility to protect the 
population against gross human rights violations. Moreover, this responsibility to 
protect can under specific circumstances transfer to the international community so 
that others can take action in situations of gross human rights violations; ‘the rights 
of sovereign states to non-interference in their internal affairs could not override the 
rights of individuals to freedom from gross and systematic abuses of their human 
rights’.243 This idea, embedded inter alia in the Responsibility to Protect, is still 
relatively young, with the consequence that its exact scope and legal value is still 
subject to debate and its practical application proves complicated. It would 
therefore probably be too soon to speak of a paradigm shift, yet it cannot be denied 
that strong developments are taking place. In the words of the Special Rapporteur of 
the ILC: ‘(s)ince consent to assistance is sanctioned by international law, rather than 
disregarding it, a limitation on its exercise also grounded in international law may 
be justified.’ 244  It is now time to see what the new chapter in the story of 
sovereignty means for rules and principles on accepting humanitarian assistance. 
 





Based on the legal framework described here, it is possible to identify some 
common rules as generally applicable when delivering humanitarian assistance in 
response to a disaster. First, it is clear that the primary role to respond to a disaster 
lies with the affected state. If the state is in need of assistance, it can initiate the 
process of delivery of such assistance. Common rules exist on the way that this 
process is triggered. Finally, after considering the offers of assistance made to the 
affected state, that state is granted the right to give or withhold consent to 
international humanitarian assistance. The legal framework further gives indicators 
when the affected state must move from its primary response to initiating the 
process of international humanitarian assistance or when the state must accept 
humanitarian assistance. These topics will be summarized and discussed here. 
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5.2 Primary role of the affected state 
 
Quite a number of the instruments discussed in the foregoing depart from the 
assumption that the primary role in responding to a disaster lies with the affected 
state. 245  This primary role entails ‘the direction, control, coordination and 
supervision of (...) relief and assistance’. 246 Moreover, the affected state must also 
‘ensure disaster risk reduction (...) in their territory’ next to providing relief and 
recovery assistance. The concept of state sovereignty lies at the basis of the primary 
role of affected states, as for example expressed by the ILC with the words ‘by 
virtue of its sovereignty’.247 Also the IDRL Guidelines base the primary role of the 
affected state on the concept of state sovereignty when providing that ‘(a)ffected 
States have the sovereign right to coordinate, regulate and monitor disaster relief 
and recovery assistance (…)’.248  
Connecting the primary role of the affected state to sovereignty means, as was 
seen above, that the affected state is responsible for protection of the persons living 
in that state. As a consequence, ‘if an affected State determines that a disaster 
situation exceeds national coping capacities, it should seek international and/or 
regional assistance to address the needs of affected persons’.249 In the ILC draft 
articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, this rule is even 
formulated as a duty: ‘(t)o the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response 
capacity, the affected State has the duty to seek assistance (...)’. 250  Resolution 
46/182 refers to the importance of international cooperation in the context of 
insufficient capacity, being less direct on indicating a duty to accept assistance.251  
The affected state must know what its capacity is and it must also know ‘timely’ 
what is needed from international actors: ‘(t)he affected State should decide in a 
timely manner whether or not to request disaster relief (...) and communicate its 
decision promptly. In order to make this decision, the affected State should 
promptly assess needs’. 252  It is not specifically determined what ‘timely’ and 
‘promptly’ mean, but the first seventy-two hours in disaster response are considered 
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most critical. It is during this phase that certain legal effects are set in motion: the 
affected state’s primary role means making a needs-assessment, judging whether 
the affected state’s response will be adequate, and, when necessary, triggering the 
process of international assistance.253  
Another consequence of the primary role of the affected state and of state 
sovereignty is that consent is required before an international actor can deliver 
humanitarian assistance to or in the affected state. The initiation of international 
humanitarian assistance and the role of consent are therefore necessary nuances to 
the primary role of the affected state. 
 
5.3 The triggering and initiation of international humanitarian assistance   
 
With regard to offers made by humanitarian actors, many instruments require an 
appeal or request by the affected state before an offer can be made.254 UNGA 
Resolution 46/182 determines that ‘humanitarian assistance should be provided (…) 
in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country’.255 Also the IDRL 
Guidelines provide that ‘(d)isaster relief or initial recovery assistance should be 
initiated (…) in principle, on the basis of an appeal’.256  After such an appeal, 
international actors can make offers of assistance, which the affected state then 
accepts or declines (i.e. giving consent or not).257  
While some legal instruments explicitly require a prior request by the affected 
state as initiation of international assistance, other instruments give room to start 
with an offer.258 Consequently, an ‘unsolicited’ offer of assistance ‘should not be 
construed as an unfriendly act or interference in the affected State’s internal affairs’, 
which used to be the way unsolicited offers were perceived. 259  Even so, the 
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‘assistance can only be deployed at the request, and with the consent, of the Requesting Party, or 
when offered by another Party or Parties, with the consent of the Receiving Party’. Article 11(2) 
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (26 July 2005). Also the 
IDRL Guidelines provide that the initiation of international assistance is ‘in principle’ based on an 
appeal, so other forms of initiation are also possible. IDRL Guidelines (n 171) Guideline 10(1). 
259 ILC Memorandum (n 185) para 64. See also the Council of the International Institute of 
Humanitarian Law, ‘Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance’ (1993) 33 
International Review of the Red Cross [297] principle 5 and, stemming from much earlier ILA 
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existence of an actual right to offer or provide relief may be a bridge too far, 
although it can be found in some soft law instruments: ‘(w)here the government or 
other authority is unable or manifestly unwilling to provide life-sustaining aid, the 
international community has the right and obligation to protect and provide relief 
(…)’.260  
 
5.4 The affected state’s right to withhold consent and limitations of this right 
 
Based on the primary role of the affected state (as a result of state sovereignty) there 
is a widespread understanding that consent of the affected state is required before 
aid can be delivered.261 In the words of UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182:  
 
The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully 
respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, 
humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country 
and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country.262 
 
The affected state can also choose to withhold its consent: ‘(a)s a matter of 
international law, the affected State has a right to refuse an offer. However, this 
right is not unlimited’.263 When looking closely at what has been discussed at the 
foregoing, three rules can be identified in the legal framework that direct a state in 
its choice to give or withhold consent.  
First, some sources within the legal framework argue that there is an ‘obligation 
of the affected State to request international assistance where its domestic response 
capacity is overwhelmed’.264 It cannot be said with full certainty to what extent this 
duty is actually considered to be a legal obligation in practice. In the words of some 
of the instruments, states should make use of international cooperation when their 
own resources are insufficient, although the link between capacity and an obligation 
to make use of international cooperation is not explained clearly in the legal 
instruments. Another difficulty here lies in the fact that it is up to the affected state 
to determine that its capacity is overwhelmed. 
                                                        
foreign emergency relief shall in no way whatsoever be considered an unlawful intervention in 
the domestic affairs of a State nor shall it be deemed under any circumstances to constitute an 
unfriendly action’. 
260 Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies (1995), section II.4. 
See also the Guiding Principles on the Right to Humanitarian Assistance (n 259) principle 5; 
‘(n)ational authorities (…) have the right to offer such assistance (…)’. More on the implications 
of the right to offer assistance is said in section 3.3 of the next Chapter. 
261 ILC Drafting Committee ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Text and titles of 
draft articles 10 and 11 provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on 19 July 2011’ (UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.794 of 20 July 2011), draft Article 11(1). 
262 UNGA Resolution 46/182 (n 71) under 3. 
263 Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) para 52. 






Second, ‘consent should not be withheld arbitrarily’, a formulation seen in, inter 
alia, international humanitarian law limits the freedom of a state to withhold 
consent.265 What ‘arbitrarily’ means does not become immediately clear. In the 
context of international humanitarian law some indications on the meaning can be 
found when it was argued that the requirement of consent ‘did not imply that the 
Parties concerned had absolute and unlimited freedom to refuse their agreement to 
relief actions. A Party refusing its agreement must do so for valid reasons, not for 
arbitrary or capricious ones’.266 A further argument was found that there is less 
ground to refuse an offer that meets the humanitarian principles (humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence) than an offer that is somehow tied or 
conditional. 267  This is further clarified by stating that ‘if the survival of the 
population is threatened and a humanitarian organization fulfilling the required 
conditions of impartiality and non-discrimination is able to remedy this situation, 
relief actions must take place. (...) The authorities cannot refuse such relief without 
good grounds’.268 In the work of the ILC, the same line on ‘arbitrarily withholding 
consent’ can be found. According to the ILC’s Special Rapporteur, offers of aid 
must meet the humanitarian principles as laid down in draft article 6,269 and ‘if an 
offer does indeed meet those criteria, the affected State must possess very strong 
and valid reasons for choosing not to give its consent. If it withholds its consent 
without such reasons being present, a State may be considered to have done so 
“arbitrarily”.’ 270  In coming to this conclusion, the Special Rapporteur made an 
                                                        
265  This phrase is also used in other instruments. See ILC Memorandum (n 185) para 65 ; 
Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) paras 52 and 68; Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement Principle 25; Institute of International Law, ‘Duty of Affected States not Arbitrarily 
to Reject a Bona Fide Offer of Humanitarian Assistance’ (2003). 
266 ICRC Commentary (n 89) paras. 2795 and 2805. In the context of IHL the question what can 
be understood with ‘arbitrary’ was asked to Professor Yoram Dinstein (who has been closely 
involved in the development of IHL) at the Conference ‘International Humanitarian Assistance 
and International Law: A Legal Approach to Practical Problems’, held in Leiden on 24 and 25 
January 2013 by the University of Leiden and Tilburg University. Prof. Dinstein replied by 
stressing that “arbitrary is arbitrary, it means that there is no good reason”. 
267 ICRC, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (1973) 78-9; 
Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) para 66. 
268 ICRC Commentary (n 89) para 4885 cited by Federica Donati & Margret Vidar, ‘International 
Legal Dimensions of the Right to Food’ in George Kent (ed), Global Obligations for the Right to 
Food (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham 2008) 39. 
269  Relief must not only be provided in accordance with the humanitarian principles, the 
Guidelines also provide a list with further requirements, including the requirement that aid must 
be delivered without discrimination, responsive to the needs of vulnerable groups, sensitive to 
culture and religious customs, provided by competent personnel, minimizing the negative impact 
on the local community’s economy, development and environment. IDRL Guidelines (n 171) 
Guideline 4(2) a through d and 4(3) a through j. 
270 Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) paras 68 and 73. Also the Institute of International 
Law provides that ‘(a)ffected States are under the obligation not arbitrarily and unjustifiably to 
reject a bona fide offer exclusively intended to provide humanitarian assistance or to refuse access 
to the victims’. Institute of International Law (n 265). 
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analysis of existing legal norms and interpreting what elements can be used to 
determine ‘arbitrariness’. In the first place, being ‘unable or unwilling to protect 
and assist persons on its territory affected by a disaster, a provision to reasonably 
limit the general rule on consent may be justified’.271 This will also be discussed 
further below as the third potential limitation. Second, if there is no clear need for 
humanitarian assistance, refusal of aid would not be arbitrary. In any case, the 
Special Rapporteur comes to the conclusion that  
 
The determination of when a State’s conduct amounts to that State being unable or 
unwilling is to be arrived at in light of the specific circumstances of each case and 
cannot be exhaustively dealt with. The objective element of inability may be satisfied 
if the affected State clearly lacks the required goods or services. A State can be 
considered to be unwilling to provide assistance when it does possess the necessary 
resources and capacity for adequate relief, but has indicated that it does not wish to 
use those resources or capacity.272  
 
Consequently, ‘whether or not a decision not to accept assistance is arbitrary 
depends on the circumstances of the case and should be determined on a case-by-
case basis’.273 He further acknowledges that ‘the operational aspects involved may 
benefit from more clarity and transparency to enhance the response system, 
requiring the affected State to explain its conduct, in particular in case of refusal of 
humanitarian assistance.’274  
The third limitation is – as pointed out above – closely linked to the 
arbitrariness-rule. This limitation can be found in the obligations stemming from the 
more general part of the legal framework, like human rights law and refugee law.275 
Based on such more general instruments, it can be argued that consent may not be 
withheld when ‘authorities concerned are unable or unwilling to provide the 
required humanitarian assistance’;276 ‘if the whole or part of the population of an 
occupied territory is inadequately supplied’;277 ‘if the civilian population of any 
territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is 
not adequately provided with (…) supplies (…)’;278 or when ‘the affected State is a 
party to the Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and is not capable 
of addressing the consequences of a disaster to a sufficient extent’.279  In other 
words, when there is a general risk that not giving consent to humanitarian 
                                                        
271 Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) para 70. 
272 Ibid, para 71. 
273 Ibid, para 72. 
274 Ibid, para 76. 
275 Ibid, para 58.  
276  ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’ 
(Annex) (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/Add.2 of 11 February 1998) principle 25(2). 
277 Geneva Convention IV, article 59. 
278 Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I, article 70(1). 
279 Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 89) para 60. Here, the potential violation of the ICESCR 






assistance would result in a violation of international law – like human rights law – 
an affected state should not be free to withhold consent.280  
Some argue that in this case, the refusal to give consent could possibly constitute 
an international wrongful act.281 Article 12 of the Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provides: ‘There is a breach of an 
international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity 
with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character’. 
Before state responsibility can be invoked, however, it must first be determined 
which international obligation has been breached exactly, whether the breach is 
attributable to the state, and whether the breach can be justified.282 Since there are 
no clear obligations on the acceptance of international humanitarian assistance, it is 
difficult to determine exactly which obligation a state violates by not giving consent 
to humanitarian assistance. When a legal obligation is found that is violated by not 
giving consent to assistance, the framework of state responsibility would make it 
possible to claim the immediate ending of the wrongful act. In addition, the state 
committing the wrongful act can be held liable for damages.283 When withholding 
consent could result in violation of obligations under international law, it can be 
argued that the refusal is based on arbitrary reasons and that a strong justification is 
required to base the refusal on valid reasons. In the same line, it can also be argued 
that refusing to give consent when the national capacity is overwhelmed is arbitrary. 
The idea that states may not withhold their consent for arbitrary reasons can 
therefore be a limitation in itself, but it can also be considered to be the general rule 




When considering the entire legal framework, common rules are identified that 
direct states’ behaviour on accepting humanitarian assistance in response to a 
disaster. State sovereignty fulfils an important role in these rules, making the 
primary role of the affected state the point of departure. The primary role of the 
affected state is the basis for the steps the affected state must take in the aftermath 
                                                        
280 Donati & Vidar (n 268) 40. 
281  This possibility was discussed within the ILC; ILC Report of the International Law 
Commission, sixty-second session (3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2010) (UN Doc. A/65/10 
of 2010) para 318, cited by Dabiru S. Patnaik, ‘Issues of State Consent and International 
Humanitarian Assistance in Disasters: The Work of the International Law Commission’ in Andrej 
Zwitter et al (eds), Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014) 111.  
282 Nathalie Horbach & René Lefeber, ‘Staatsaansprakelijkheid’ in Horbach, Lefeber & Ribbelink 
(n 206) 313 and 322-3. 
283 Zwitter and Lamont base the occurrence of an international wrongful act on a violation of an 
erga omnes obligation that could exist within human rights law. Their reasoning can be found in 
Andrej Zwitter & Christopher K. Lamont, ‘Enforcing Aid in Myanmar: State Responsibility & 
Aid’ in Zwitter et al (eds) (n 281) 349ff. 
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of a disaster to obtain international humanitarian assistance. The affected state must 
make a needs-assessment and trigger or initiate international humanitarian 
assistance accordingly. The primary role further entails that consent is required 
before assistance can be delivered. The freedom of affected states to withhold 
consent is however limited in various ways, determining when the state must accept 
humanitarian assistance. Consent may not be withheld when the national capacity to 
respond is overwhelmed, when refusing consent would result in a violation of a rule 
of international (human rights) law or when the refusal is based on arbitrary reasons.  
Although the rules identified here return in various instruments and documents, 
it cannot be said that these are rule of customary international law. 284 There are no 
indications that the requirements of article 38(1)(b) ICJ Statute of general practice 
accepted as law are met in practice, although this must be further confirmed (or 
refuted) in the next Chapter.285  At the most, it seems that a ‘dotted pattern of 
behaviour’ can be identified, which may or may not be the beginnings of customary 
international law.286  
The goal of the legal analysis was to identify possible rules and principles 
applicable in natural disasters, and not in armed conflict. International humanitarian 
law was nonetheless included because it is generally understood to contain rather 
developed rules on humanitarian assistance and this could help in identifying and 
understanding the rules derived from the rest of the legal framework. Nevertheless, 
the common rules found on humanitarian assistance in disaster response are not that 
different from the rules that were described in the section on international 
humanitarian law. In IHL the requirement of consent is also clearly established, and 
as a limitation mainly the argument that consent may not be withheld for arbitrary 
reasons can be found. Within IHL, no clear description of what ‘arbitrary’ is can be 
found, as is the case within the broader legal framework. The other two limitations 
found for disaster-contexts are not explicitly present within IHL, although it is 
possible to argue that the phrase ‘when a civilian population is in need of assistance’ 
                                                        
284 See also Saechao (n 200) 698. 
285  In case law described as practice and conviction of legal necessity. Gerald J. Postema, 
‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’ in Amanda Perreau-Saussine & 
James B. Murphy, The Nature of Customary Law: Legal Historical and Philosophical 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) 279. PCIJ Lotus (Turkey v. France), 
Series A, No. 10, 1927; North Sea Continental Shelf-case; ICJ Libya/Malta, ICJ Reports 1995, pp. 
13, 29; 81 ILR, p. 239; ‘the substance of customary law must be looked for primarily in the actual 
practice and opinio iuris of states’. See also the ICJ Nuclear Weapons case, ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 
226, 253; 110 ILR, p. 163. Opinio juris is supposed to distinguish a practice out of legal 
conviction from a practice out of social or moral belief: Shaw (n 208) 75. 
286 The phrase ‘dotted pattern of behaviour’ is ascribed to Em. Prof. Bert van Roermund, who, as 
a Professor in Legal Philosophy at Tilburg University, explained through this phrase the very 
beginnings of the process that may or may not result in rules of customary international law. 
While a dotted pattern of behaviour is not the same as consistent state practice, there may be clues 
that certain developments are underway. This explanation was given during an informal lecture 






refers to a situation in which providing these needs is beyond a state’s capacity (or 
perhaps willingness) to address. Despite its reputation, IHL is not that much clearer 
or more developed than the rules for peacetime humanitarian assistance. 287 
Nonetheless, looking at the developments in Syria, the Security Council has found a 
way to bypass the requirement of consent in extreme situations. It is unlikely that 
such a decision to grant access to humanitarian organisations in the stead of the 
affected state will ever be taken in the context of peace-time disasters since such an 
accumulation of special circumstances would hardly ever occur in peace-time 
settings. 
At this point it can be concluded, as a preliminary answer to the main research 
question, that within international law rules can be found which determine whether 
an affected state should accept international humanitarian assistance after a disaster 
occurred. Still, immediately a number of questions arise on the practical application 
of these rules. For example, how can it be determined that the capacity of the 
affected state is overwhelmed? Which supposedly breached rules of international 
law are invoked when a state refuses to give consent? What are arbitrary reasons for 
refusing to give consent and what are valid reasons? And what if a state should give 
its consent but does not do so? The next Chapter will look at the way that the rules 
are used in practice and what the consequences thereof might be for the legal 
framework. 
 
                                                        
287  This also follows from the question asked by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands to the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law in 2014 on 
humanitarian access in times of armed conflict. In the advice the conclusion is reached that much 
uncertainty exist with regard to the requirement of consent in armed conflict situations. CAVV, 
‘Advisory Report on Humanitarian Assistance’ (Advisory report no 25, The Hague, August 2014) 
<http://cms.webbeat.net/ContentSuite/upload/cav/doc/Report_nr._25_-_Humanitarian_assistance% 
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The goal of this Chapter is to illustrate the practical application of the rules that 
determine when an affected state moves from responding individually towards 
initiating the process of international humanitarian assistance and to giving consent 
to such assistance. As established in the previous Chapter, the legal framework on 
accepting humanitarian assistance in response to a disaster consists of three steps or 
layers. Underlying these three steps is the primary role of the affected state in 
responding to a disaster as a consequence of the sovereignty of the state. Due to this 
role, the affected state must in the first place make a needs-assessment (1). Based 
on this needs-assessment, the affected state must decide whether international 
humanitarian assistance is required and if so, the process of obtaining such 
assistance must be triggered (2). After valuing the offers of assistance available, the 
affected state must accept or decline these offers (3). At this stage, consent to offers 
of international humanitarian assistance may not be withheld for arbitrary reasons, 
when it would result in the violation of rules of international (human rights) law, or 
when the national capacity is overwhelmed. 
The legal framework is established based on an analysis of the main (legal) 
sources on humanitarian assistance and disaster response. It is based on a theoretical 
understanding of what is expected of states. By looking at the way the legal 
framework is applied in practice, it is possible to further identify any problems and 
gaps that may exist. This way, it can be established whether the set of rules found in 
the previous Chapter is specific enough to speak of clear obligations for states to 
accept international humanitarian assistance. If not, it can be determined where the 
difficulties lie.  
First, the individual response by the affected state will be discussed. The 
affected state is responsible for reacting to the occurrence of a disaster and must 
decide whether international aid is needed. If an affected state decides to accept 
international assistance, such assistance can be initiated through a request by the 
affected state or through an offer by another actor. The processes of initiation will 
be discussed in section 3. Accepting international humanitarian assistance is the 
point where the requirement of consent becomes visible. The role of consent will be 
explained in the fourth section. Less relevant for answering the main research 






assistance and termination of operations. These aspects will be discussed in section 
5 before ending this Chapter by looking at situations in which consent of the 
affected state cannot be obtained yet where international humanitarian assistance is 
necessary (or even essential) for the survival of the civilian population.  
 
2 THE FIRST RESPONSE BY THE AFFECTED STATE: MAKING A NEEDS-ASSESSMENT 
 
That the affected state has the primary responsibility to respond to a disaster 
occurring in its territory means that it has the primary role in directing, controlling, 
coordinating, distributing and supervising relief.1 The primary role of the affected 
state originates in the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference 
and national unity.2 The role of the affected state can even be seen as an obligation 
‘to ensure such protection and assistance in the event of a disaster’ which ‘aims at 
preserving the life and dignity of the victims of the disaster and guaranteeing the 
access of persons in need to humanitarian assistance’.3 In practice, this means that 
the affected state will initiate the response to a disaster before any other party does. 
Moreover, due to the primary role any other party has to coordinate its response 
with the affected state. This is translated in the legal framework as the prerequisite 
that consent from the affected state is required before humanitarian assistance can 
be delivered. 
In principle, the response by the affected state (including the activities of 
organisations that were already on the ground prior to the disaster, like national Red 
Cross or Red Crescent Societies) remains the only response until the affected state 
gives its consent to relief coming in from outside the territory. To prevent problems 
relating to capacity deficits, the legal framework indicates – in a number of 
instruments – that the affected state should give its consent in situations where the 
national response capacity is overwhelmed or where not giving consent would 
result in the violation of international law. Even so, external humanitarian 
assistance can only be brought in after consent is obtained and the only standards 
explaining when the state should give its consent are not very concrete. Looking at 
the standards set in various guidelines and handbooks, it becomes clear that the 
affected state should decide in a ‘timely’ manner whether or not to request relief 
and ‘communicate its decision promptly’.4 This means that when a disaster occurs, 
the affected state must make a needs-assessment and decide what it can deliver 
itself and what it would need from others, and it must do so as soon as possible. If 
                                                        
1 See ILC, ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Memorandum by the Secretariat’ (UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/590 of 11 December 2007), paras 67 and 69; IFRC, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines 
for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery 
Assistance’ (IFRC, Geneva 2008) Guidelines no 3(3) and no 4(1). 
2 ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 51. 
3 ILC ‘Fourth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Eduardo Valencia-
Ospina, Special Rapporteur’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/643 of 11 May 2011) para 57. 
4 IDRL Guidelines (n 1) Guideline 10(1). 
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an affected state can, with or without the assistance of organisations already present 
on its territory, supply for example sufficient food to disaster victims but does not 
have tents and field hospitals, it can very accurately request those items it still needs. 
Indeed, ‘(w)eaknessess in domestic administrative clarity and capacity to undertake 
valid needs assessments can be a major cause for problems in both the request and 
the provision of international assistance’. 5  Delays in the needs-assessment (for 
example as a result of communication problems between central and regional 
authorities) can hamper the relief operations, and although some organisations are 
capable of assisting the affecting state in making a needs-assessment, not all 
affected states are willing to let go (parts of) their control.6 Also, if multiple parties 
are involved in the needs-assessment, it is more difficult to coordinate the various 
findings.7 To date, there is no universally applicable set of standards that must assist 
in making a needs-assessment. Yet, being prepared for a disaster is a major factor 
for being able to make concrete requests for assistance and to start relief operations 
swiftly, as is illustrated by the example of Japan. 
Japan is a disaster-prone country due to its geographical position. Based on 
experience, Japan is well-prepared for disasters and is trained in disaster response. 
On 11 March 2011, the country was hit by an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 
Mw, its epicentre lying close to the coast of Honsu.8  As the infrastructure was 
constructed in such a fashion that it could withstand the severe earthquake, the main 
disaster was the tsunami caused by the earthquake. Approximately 16,000 people 
lost their lives when waves as high as 37 metres flooded parts of Japan.9 In the 
response to the disaster, Japan started with a needs-assessment: ‘(t)he first thing the 
government did right was to recognize the coordination challenge in the first place. 
They were very clear on what was needed, what wasn’t needed, what could be 
accepted’.10 As a consequence, Japan was clear which part of the response it would 
do by itself and for which part its capacity was not sufficient. On the other hand, 
this preparedness did not extend to the response to the subsequent nuclear disaster. 
According to an independent investigation panel, Japan failed in its disaster 
                                                        
5 David Fisher, ‘Law and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study’ (IFRC, 
Geneva 2007) 94. 
6 Ibid. 
7 This was experienced in the aftermath of hurricanes George and Mitch and after opening Aceh 
to aid organisations. See Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 5) 94. 
8  US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/recenteqsww/Quakes/usc0001 
xgp.php> accessed 26 June 2012. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Oliver Lacey-Hall, Head of OCHA in the Asia Pacific, ——, ‘Disasters: Learning from Japan’s 
Tsunami’ IRIN 9 March 2012. This does not mean that the entire Japanese response was without 
errors. Eventually, the Prime Minister stepped down taking his responsibility for the flaws in the 
response. See for example Justin McCurry, ‘Naoto Kan resigns as Japan’s Prime Minister’ The 
Guardian 26 August 2011 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/26/naoto-kan-resigns-






planning and crisis management for a possible nuclear disaster as the result of a 
tsunami, an event that should have been anticipated.11 
Although the international community of states, international organisations, 
NGOs and civil society can have an opinion on whether there is a need for an 
affected state to give its consent, it is ultimately the affected state only that can give 
its consent. Sometimes, an affected state’s response is deemed ‘sufficient’ or 
‘effective’ so that no discussion exists on whether the state should have accepted 
international aid.12 To a larger extent, cases are part of a grey area where there is 
discussion on the quality of the affected state’s response (as is the case in Japan). In 
the following, two examples will be discussed in which the affected state’s response 
is considered by some to be sufficient, but is criticized by others. The purpose of 
these examples is to highlight the difficulty in determining when a state ‘should’ 
accept international assistance or not. The examples described here are not strictly 
speaking ‘disasters’ in the understanding of this research because the definition of 
‘disaster’ in Chapter I refers to of events that overwhelm the capacity of the 
affected state. Situations in which no external aid is apparently required do not fall 
under the scope of the definition. However, as will be explained here, whether an 
event was beyond the affected state’s capacity to address is subject to debate which 
makes the dividing line vague. The cases described here are considered to be 
‘disasters’ in the understanding of the present research.13  
The first example is the earthquake in L’Aquila (Italy). On 6 April 2009, the 
region around the Italian city of L’Aquila was hit by a 6.3 Mw earthquake, killing at 
least 287 people and leaving over 40,000 people homeless. 14  In response, no 
international assistance was deemed necessary. According to – at that time – Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, Italians are ‘proud people’ and had sufficient resources 
to deal with the crisis. 15  Only for the reconstruction of historical buildings, 
Berlusconi would consider accepting funds from Washington.16  
The individual response by Italy was praised by some. In a report of a company 
assessing construction damage it was said that ‘the civil emergency response 
presented little challenge to Italian authorities. International support was not 
                                                        
11 See ——, ‘Fukushima One Year On: Poor Planning Hampered Fukushima Response’ SAGE 
Publications, February 2012. An analysis of the report is available here: 
<http://www.alphagalileo.org/ViewItem.aspx?ItemId=117974&CultureCode=en> accessed 29 
July 2013. 
12 The German response to the floods in the first half of June 2013, which affected thousands, can 
be mentioned as an example. See the status update at Deutsche Welle: Martin Koch, ‘After the 
Floods: Relief Work and Cleanup’ DW 21 June 2013 <http://www.dw.de/after-the-floods-relief-
work-and-cleanup/a-16897279> accessed 29 July 2013. 
13 Therefore implying that the consequences were beyond the state’s capacity to address. 
14 US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2009/us2009fcaf/ 
#summary> accessed 27 June 2012. 
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necessary.’17 The government constructed apartment buildings for the people who 
lost their homes, and succeeded in providing shelter before the winter. According to 
an inhabitant of L’Aquila who witnessed the earthquake and its aftermath, the first 
response by the Italian government was ‘fast and feverish,’ referring to the 
construction of temporary homes on the outskirts of L’Aquila.18 However, around 
the earthquake’s first anniversary, some criticism could be found on Italy’s 
individual response. Indeed, the government was able to resettle 17,000 people 
from tents to more adequate housing before winter, but one year after the 
earthquake it was rumoured that 4,000 people still lived in Red Cross 
accommodations and that around 7,000 people still lived in hotels.19 In addition, 
work had not started to clear the historic centre of L’Aquila of rubble and to rebuild, 
making it impossible for businesses to return. Instead, the ‘Aquilani’ decided to do 
the work themselves, coming to the city centre on Sundays to clear out rubble using 
shovels and wheelbarrows.20 Criticism on the response is probably best depicted by 
Italian filmmaker and satirist Sabina Guzzanti who made the documentary 
‘Draquila’, arguing that the response by the government of Berlusconi was flawed, 
showing cases of corruption and claiming that resources earmarked for relief 
disappeared.21   
It is very difficult to determine whether the Italian response to the earthquake 
met the standard of ‘having sufficient capacity’ to deal with the consequences and 
whether Italy’s claim that no international assistance was needed was justified. 
When looking at the instruments available, many explain in general terms what 
needs to be done during disasters, and the Sphere Standards are most explicit on this. 
There is not, however, a set of principles that clearly explain what is expected from 
the affected state and how it can be measured if its national response capacity is 
overwhelmed. The achievements of affected states are often debated some time 
after the disaster occurred. Even then, it is up to interpretation and opinion what 
constitutes a response by the affected state that is sufficiently adequate and effective 
and whether the capacity of the affected state was overwhelmed or not. The second 
example illustrates this difficulty further. 
On 12 May 2008, the Chinese province Sichuan was hit by an earthquake with a 
magnitude of 7.9Mw. At least 69,195 people were killed, but another 18,392 people 
                                                        
17  Global Risk Miyamoto, ‘L’Aquila Italy Earthquake Field Investigation Report’ (2009) 26 
<http://www.grmcat.com/images/Italy-EQ-Report.pdf> accessed 20 April 2015. 
18 Laura Benedetti, ‘After a Quake, Reclaiming their City’ The Washington Post 11 April 2010.  
19 John Hooper, ‘L’Aquila Earthquake Survivors Seek Answers from Government’ The Guardian 
5 April 2010. 
20 Benedetti (n 18). 
21 ‘Draquila’ was selected for the 2010 Cannes Film Festival. The Italian Minister of Culture at 
the time, Sandro Bondi, refused to visit the festival out of protest against this documentary. See 
Fiona Winward, ‘Italy Snubs Cannes after Row Over Berlusconi Documentary’ The Guardian 10 






went missing and were presumed dead.22  More than 45.5 million people were 
affected.23 China is a country that has experience with natural disasters and does in 
most cases not seek international assistance. Moreover, China is known for not 
being easily accessible for foreigners and information flows are checked by the 
government. Due to these factors, it is challenging to find information on China’s 
response to the Sichuan earthquake that is reliable and which gives a realistic 
understanding of the processes. What on first face is available, are operation reports 
of a few international organisations that happened to be on the ground, for example 
the DREF Operation Reports by the IFRC.24 These organisations want to safeguard 
their access to China and can therefore not afford to be overtly critical. Other 
information can be found in international newspapers, which have extensively 
reported on the Chinese people’s outrage on the easy collapse of school buildings in 
the affected region.25 A large number of schools and dorms collapsed during the 
earthquake while China has building regulations to make structures withstand 
earthquakes. According to many articles, parents were very angry with the Chinese 
government because the construction of schools conceivably did not meet building 
prescriptions due to corruption. To silence the protests, parents were supposedly 
bought off or put in prison.26 One person who posted criticism on the government’s 
response to the earthquake on his website, along with notes on the children who 
died in the collapsed schools and the treatment of the parents, was allegedly 
sentenced to three years imprisonment.27 
Apart from these stories, other sounds can be heard. One independent consultant 
who worked in the disaster zone after the earthquake explains that China invited 
international assistance, but that few organisations could easily deploy and had 
knowledge on China, and that many organisations were already focusing on 
Myanmar which had just been hit by cyclone Nargis.28 According to this consultant 
the response to the earthquake was described as efficient and comprehensive, 
                                                        
22US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2008/us2008ryan/# 
summary> accessed 26 July 2013. 
23 Ibid. 
24  These reports are available on ReliefWeb: <http://www.reliefweb.int>. See for example 
operation update 2: <http://reliefweb.int/report/china/china-sichuan-earthquake-dref-operation-
n%C2%B0-mdrcn005-operation-update-n%C2%B02> accessed 26 July 2013. 
25  See for example ——, ‘Sichuan Earthquake’ New York Times update of 6 May 2009 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/earthquakes/sichuan_province_china/index.ht> 
accessed 26 July 2013. 
26 See for example David Eimer, ‘Sichuan Earthquake Anniversary: Parents of Victims Told Not 
to Hold Memorials’ The Telegraph 8 May 2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
asia/china/5294397/Sichuan-earthquake-anniversary-Parents-of-victims-told-not-to-hold-
memorials.html> accessed 26 July 2013. 
27  ——, ‘China Jails Earthquake Activist’ The Guardian 23 November 2009 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/23/huang-qi-jailed-sichuan-quake> accessed 26 July 
2013. 




Practical Application of the Rules on International Humanitarian Assistance in 
Response to Disasters 
83 
mainly due to the prevention of disease outbreak and prevention of an increase in 
victims as a result of subsequent flooding and landslides, yet he acknowledges that 
it is difficult to value the response by the government as information is not readily 
available.29  
Apart from the outrage at the government reported by Chinese and international 
press, people were positive about the government’s aid and ‘(a)ffected populations 
worked to reconstruct markets and establish a home in their government-issued 
tents, while awaiting further instructions from the local authorities’.30 The Chinese-
led response was not conventional in terms of holding ‘cluster meetings, and the 
Sphere Standards and other guidelines common in the humanitarian community 
were not in evidence’.31 Moreover, while the government succeeded in preventing 
the outbreak of diseases, provided food and shelter and prevented further deaths due 
to subsequent flooding and landslides, the response was not perfect: 
 
In order to get food to everyone who needed it nutritionally deficient instant 
noodles were provided for days on end in some locations. Shelter could not be 
manufactured quickly enough (despite temporary state seizure of suitable textile 
factories), resulting in up to 12 individuals sharing one family-size tent. The 
absence of water borne diseases may actually be attributed to a culture of boiling 
water, rather than the government’s pervasive disinfection campaign.32 
 
What becomes clear from this example is that there are many variables based on 
which it can be argued that an affected state’s response was effective or not. China 
was successful in preventing further victims resulting from common post-disaster 
problems and people had access to basic facilities. However, the food was not 
completely sufficient nutrition-wise, for which for example the Sphere Handbook 
contains quite detailed indicators. 33  The same goes for shelter: the Sphere 
Handbook calculates a required living space of 3.5m2 floor space which is difficult 
to achieve when living with twelve persons in one tent.34 Consequently, although 
the first step in the affected state’s response to a disaster appears quite 
straightforward (determining through a needs-assessment what it can do by itself 
and whether international assistance is required), it is difficult to pinpoint if and 
when the affected state should start the process of international humanitarian 
assistance. It is left to de discretion of the affected state to determine whether it 
                                                        
29 Ibid, 15. 
30 Ibid, 16. 
31 Ibid, 16. The Sphere Standards were discussed in Chapter II and are created in the context of 
the Sphere Project. The standards are laid down in the Sphere Handbook which is used by relief 
workers to determine what detailed standards should be adhered to during post-disaster phases. 
32 Ibid, 16-7. 
33 See Sphere Project, ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response’ 
(Oxfam Publishing, Oxford 2011) (‘Sphere Handbook’) on Food, section 3: Minimum Standards 
in Nutrition, 135. 






needs such external assistance. At the final stage, the affected state must give its 
consent to assistance in a number of situations and these three limitation to the 
freedom to withhold consent can potentially be used as indicators in the needs-
assessment. If a state fears that it will reach one of these three points, it must at least 
seek international humanitarian assistance. Still, it is up to the affected state to 
determine whether its capacity is overwhelmed and in practice no clear standards on 
this are used, no reference is made in practice to violation of a rule of international 
(human rights) law by withholding consent, and there is no practical reference to 
‘arbitrary reasons’ for withholding consent. Possibly, more will become clear when 
looking at the next step: the initiation of international humanitarian assistance. 
 




If the affected state decides that its response capacity is insufficient or that there is a 
risk that the response capacity may turn out to be insufficient or that it will possibly 
violate a norm of international law by not giving consent, it can initiate 
international humanitarian assistance. There are two ways in which the process of 
delivering international assistance can be started: the affected state can make a 
request for assistance (in general or for certain (specified) relief items), or 
international actors can make an offer to which an affected state can react. In this 
section these two ways of initiating international assistance will be discussed based 
on their use in practice and legal implications. As quite a number of instruments 
discussed in Chapter II provide that ‘humanitarian assistance should be provided 
with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal 
by the affected country’, the initiation of international assistance based on request 
will be discussed first.35   
 
3.2 Requesting assistance 
 
The request for international humanitarian assistance is an initiation to ‘enter into a 
specific legal relationship’. 36  Depending on the particular circumstances of the 
disaster, certain legal consequences are triggered with the request for assistance. A 
disaster taking place, for instance, in a situation of armed conflict means that IHL 
must be taken into account. Requests made in the case of nuclear accidents must 
take into account the specific instruments made for such disasters. Bilateral 
agreements between states may also influence the legal implications of a request.37 
In general, it can be argued that as a result of the request, an international actor will 
                                                        
35 UNGA Resolution on ‘Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance 
of the United Nations’ (UN Doc. A/Res/46/182 of 19 December 1991) para 3. 
36 ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 52. 
37 Ibid, para 52 and 56. 
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become allowed to deliver humanitarian assistance without – in principle – 
breaching the affected state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The delivery of 
the assistance, as will be explained further below, will still be subject to the affected 
state’s control.38 
The request made by the affected state must be specific and targeted. First, the 
state must decide whether a request will be made and its decision must be 
‘communicated promptly’.39 In order to do this, the needs-assessment as mentioned 
above forms the basis for the decision to request aid and, in case of a request, what 
the content would be. It is not defined what is understood with ‘promptly’, but the 
first seventy-two hours after a disaster are commonly identified as the most critical, 
meaning that a needs-assessment and a request for assistance must be made within 
this time.40 In addition, to make the delivery of humanitarian assistance as efficient 
and speedy as possible, the request must contain the necessary detail on what is 
required from international actors: ‘(r)equests (…) for assistance should be as 
specific as possible as to the types and amounts of goods as well as the services and 
expertise available or required, respectively’. 41  This can also be in a reversed 
manner by indicating in the request what goods and services are not needed.42 Quite 
often, states have national mechanisms and legal frameworks in place to organise 
the needs-assessment and to formulate the request if necessary. Such mechanisms 
and rules can for example indicate which government body is responsible for (or 
authorized to) making a request. Moreover, it is possible that specific requirements 
are in place for a valid request.43  
While rather straightforward in theory, in practice requests are surrounded by 
potential problems that could hamper relief efforts.44  Sometimes, states use the 
option to communicate a ‘willingness to accept’ offers of assistance, which can be 
understood as a very general, unspecified request.45  This option does not help 
speeding up the provision of aid, as it results in having to go through offers of relief 
to see what can be used.46 A second problem relates to the way in which a request is 
                                                        
38 See inter alia IDRL Guidelines (n 1) Guideline 4(1): ‘Assisting actors and their personnel 
should abide by the laws of the affected State (...), coordinate with domestic authorities (...)’. 
39 IDRL Guidelines (n 1) Guideline 10(1). 
40 Tyra R. Saechao, ’Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to Clarity’ 
(2006-7) 32 Brookings Journal of International Law 663, 699. 
41 IDRL Guidelines (n 1) Guideline no 10(2). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Some states require the declaration of the state of emergency before a request for relief can be 
made. This could be problematic for the application of human rights, as will be explained in 
Chapter V below. See also Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 5) 90-1. 
44 The question whether or not a request functions as giving consent to humanitarian assistance is 
addressed in section 4 where the role of consent is discussed in more detail. 
45 Victoria L. Bannon, ‘International Disaster Response Law and the Commonwealth: Answering 
the Call to Action’ (2008) 34 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 843, 850. This option was for 
example used in the US after mixed messages were send out first. 
46 Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 5) 91. This practice of requesting assistance without being specific will 






communicated. If a request is not communicated in a clear and unequivocal way, it 
could delay the response by potential donors. This problem can be illustrated with 
an example that at the same time shows that difficulties do not merely arise in 
countries with limited resources or weak government structures. The US was 
overwhelmed when hurricane Katrina made landfall in a number of states in the 
south. On 29 August 2005, Katrina caused the flooding of New Orleans, which is 
probably the best-known affected area in Katrina’s path, yet before arriving in New 
Orleans it destroyed parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.47 After 
Katrina demolished parts of New Orleans’ levee system, around eighty percent of 
the city flooded during an eighteen hour period, where water depths varied between 
six and twenty feet (1.80 to 6 metres).48 Even though Katrina was an exceptionally 
large disaster,49 the response by the US Government was highly criticized, mainly 
because of the weak response, the lack of preparedness and the many days it took 
for relief and personnel to reach New Orleans and other hurricane-devastated 
areas. 50  Former President George W. Bush acknowledged the United States’ 
inadequate response to the hurricane by saying “Katrina exposed serious problems 
in our response capability at all levels of government and to the extent the federal 
government didn’t fully do its job right, I take full responsibility”.51 One of the 
problems related to the US’ request for assistance. While President Bush was 
quoted saying “I'm not expecting much from foreign nations because we haven't 
asked for it (...) I do expect a lot of sympathy, and perhaps some will send cash 
dollars. But this country is going to rise up and take care of it”,52 US Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice stated: “no offers of assistance will be refused”.53 Such a 
mixed-message can potentially delay the delivery of much needed humanitarian 
assistance. Besides sending out an ambiguous message, other problems around 
communication occur for example illustrated after the Indian Ocean tsunami. On 
Boxing Day in 2004, a massive earthquake (9.1 Mw) in the Indian Ocean caused a 
tsunami which hit fourteen countries, killed around 228,000 people and affected 1.7 
                                                        
47 The White House, ‘The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned’ (February 
2006) 1 <http://www.disastersrus.org/katrina/White%20House%20Katrina%20report.pdf> 
accessed 3 July 2012. 
48 Ibid, 1-2. 
49 Based on the damage caused by the hurricane, not necessarily by the number of casualties 
(1882 people died according to EM-DAT). 
50 Saechao (n 40) 691. 
51  John King & Suzanne Malveaux, ‘Bush: ‘I take responsibility’ for Federal Failures after 
Katrina’ CNN.com 13 September 2005, cited by Saechao (n 40) 691. 
52  ——, ‘Why Does the US Need Our Money?’ BBC News Magazine, 6 September 2013 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4215336.stm> accessed 29 July 2013. 
53 Ibid. See also Anne Richard, ‘Role Reversal: Offers of Help from Other Countries in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina’ (Center for Transatlantic Relations 2006) cited by Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 5) 
89-90. A number of offers of aid were nonetheless declined or were left unused.  
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million others.54 The areas mostly affected were Sumatra, Thailand’s west coast, 
Myanmar, Sri Lanka, India’s east coast, the Maldives and parts of Africa. After 
Indonesia decided to allow relief workers into Aceh to assist the victims of the 
Indian Ocean tsunami, it took two days before this decision was made widely 
known, during which time many lives could have been saved or suffering 
relieved.55 Such problems can be prevented by creating clear policies and plans on 
post-disaster action and communication. 
A third problem that can be encountered when a request is issued is determining 
whether the sender of the request is indeed an authorised representative of the 
government. 56  The danger can arise that a request – and possibly the implied 
consent – is not made by a rightful representative of the government and that the 
response to the request as a result poses a threat to the affected state’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Especially in contexts where no effective government is 
present, difficulties can arise. This problem is illustrated by the case of Somalia, 
which was affected by a drought during some years. 57  In 2011 various relief 
organisations along with the UN warned for the effects of the drought in the Horn 
of Africa. In two Somali regions where the existence of a famine was declared, it 
was not the Somali government that held effective control, but instead the group Al-
Shabab was the de facto controlling power. Al-Shabab expelled a number of aid 
agencies from the regions under its control during the period in which relief 
operations were necessary, cutting thousands off from humanitarian aid.58 In that 
situation it would prove extremely difficult for the official government to 
coordinate a needs-assessment and to request assistance. Even when the 
government of Somalia would request assistance, it is questionable whether this 
would be the right authority: de jure it probably would, but de facto it would lack 
effect.  
Although requests generally have an important status in the legal framework, it 
would go too far to argue the existence of a duty to request assistance. However, an 
evolution is going on ‘towards greater recognition of a positive duty on affected 
States to request assistance, at least where the domestic response capacity is 
                                                        
54 US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2004/us2004slav/ 
#summary> accessed 27 June 2012. 
55 Fisher, ‘Desk Study’ (n 5) 89-90. Other examples mentioned in the Desk Study are various 
storms in Fiji and the 1999 earthquake in Turkey. 
56 ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 53. The Memorandum mentions a few exceptions to this rule. In 
Fiji it is for example determined in national law that a request can also be made by a ‘recognized 
NGO’. Some frameworks have decided that for example an international organization can make a 
request. It can be questioned whether other states are willing to answer to such requests in fear of 
breaching the affected state’s sovereignty. 
57 The problems underlying the famine and difficulties in delivering aid will be discussed in 
slightly more detail in section 4.2. 






overwhelmed by a disaster’.59 Due to the potentially implied consent in a specific, 
targeted request, it forms an essential part in this research. 
 
3.3 Offers of assistance 
 
After the affected state has made its request for assistance, international actors can 
make corresponding offers, which the affected state in its turn can refuse or accept. 
It is also possible that the affected state did not make any requests and that an 
unsolicited offer of assistance is made by an international actor (or that the affected 
state did not direct its request to that particular offering party). In these latter cases, 
the debate used to arise whether such an offer can be considered as an unlawful 
interference in the affected state’s internal affairs. In the following, this issue will 
be addressed first because the discussion gives insight into the meaning of 
‘arbitrariness’, after which it will be considered in more detail what conditions 
offers must meet and what their practical function is.  
One of the fundamental principles of international law and of the UN is non-
intervention, which includes non-interference.60 An interpretation of this rule can be 
found within the UN General Assembly’s Declaration of Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation between States. According to 
this interpretation, 
 
no State or group of States has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of another State. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against 
the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements, 
are in violation of international law.61  
 
In the light of this interpretation, the unsolicited offer of humanitarian assistance 
was at times considered as interference in domestic affairs. The ICJ addressed the 
issue in the Nicaragua-case where it was determined that ‘there can be no doubt that 
the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, 
whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful 
intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law’.62 The Court also 
specified what can be understood with ‘humanitarian aid’: ‘the provision of food, 
clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the 
provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, 
                                                        
59 ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 57. 
60 See article 2(7) UN Charter. 
61 UNGA, ‘Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation between States’ (GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970) under para 1 of the 
annex. 
62 ICJ, Nicaragua v. the United States of America, Military and Paramilitary activities in and 
Against Nicaragua, Merits, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, para 242. 
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or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death’.63 If the actual 
provision of humanitarian assistance cannot be considered as unlawful (although 
prior consent is at all times required), the mere offer of assistance that is truly 
humanitarian can certainly not be considered as an unfriendly act. Especially when 
the offer is made exclusively on humanitarian grounds and in accordance with the 
humanitarian principles, it cannot be considered as unlawful intervention, giving an 
affected state less ground to refuse the offer.64 Consequently, when international 
actors respect the principles of humanity, impartiality and non-discrimination, 
offers of relief cannot be considered as intervening in the receiving state’s affairs.65 
This is further acknowledged in inter alia the work of the ILC,66 the Framework 
Convention on Civil Defence Assistance, which provides that ‘(offers of) assistance 
should not be viewed as interference in the internal affairs of the Beneficiary 
State’,67 and in the ILA Resolution on international medical and humanitarian law, 
which reads ‘the offer of foreign emergency relief shall in no way whatsoever be 
considered an unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of a State nor shall it be 
deemed under any circumstances to constitute an unfriendly action’.68 
Even so, some instruments depart from the idea that no unsolicited offers should 
be made, like UNGA Resolution 46/182 or the Tampere Convention on the 
Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief 
Operations. Despite these references it is quite common in today’s practice that 
international actors make offers of assistance even without prior request.69 Usually, 
such offers do not lead to accusations of interference, but other problems arise when 
an affected state receives many offers of assistance. If an offer is made without 
prior request, the offering party is not sure whether the affected state actually needs 
whatever is being offered. The consequence is that the affected state must consider 
each separate offer to see whether it can be used or not, which may take valuable 
capacity away from the needs-assessment and from the preparation of targeted 
requests. 
Now that it is established that an unsolicited offer is not an unlawful interference 
in the domestic affairs of a state (a state still has the right to withhold consent, so to 
                                                        
63 Ibid, para 97. 
64 This is also clearly established in UNGA Resolution 46/182 (n 35), which was discussed in the 
previous Chapter. 
65 Which can also be read into some provisions of the Geneva Conventions, like common Article 
3, Article 10 GCIV, and Article 70(1) of API. 
66 Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 3) paras 107-109. 
67  Framework Convention on Civil Defence Assistance (22 May 2000) Article 3 under b) 
<http://www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I319EN.pdf> accessed 4 December 2013. 
68  ILA, ‘Resolution on international medical and humanitarian law’ adopted at the 54th ILA 
Convention (The Hague, 1970) Part I, para 2. See further ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 64, fn. 226. 
69  As explicitly acknowledged in a number of instruments, like the ASEAN Agreement on 
Disaster Management and Emergency Response of 2005, which states that ‘external assistance or 
offers of assistance shall only be provided upon the request or with the consent of the affected 






refuse the offer), it can be wondered whether this means that there is a ‘right to 
offer assistance’, or even a ‘duty to offer assistance’?70 As explained in the General 
Introduction, the offering-side is in principle excluded from the research, yet some 
remarks on the right or duty to offer assistance are in place for understanding the 
discretionary space a state has for valuing and refusing offers. If there is a right to 
offer assistance, there must also be those who can claim it and there must be duty 
bearers. The legal framework on humanitarian assistance does not seem to go this 
far, although there are exceptions within the frameworks provided by specific 
treaties. The Tampere Convention, for example, requires states to respond to 
requests directed to it.71 Also, some treaties oblige parties ‘to take action’, like the 
1999 Food Aid Convention. Yet it is probably safer to argue that offering assistance 
is based on moral convictions and charity, especially when acting outside the 
framework of a particular treaty. In most cases the discussion is not of particular 
practical importance, yet where not enough international assistance is available, the 
discussion becomes more significant.  
In the situation of the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, not enough aid was available. 
The northern mountainous part of Pakistan was struck by an earthquake with a 
magnitude of 7.6 Mw on 8 October 2005.72 At least 86,000 people died as a result, 
69,000 people were injured and around 4 million people were left homeless.73 The 
northern part of Pakistan is logistically a difficult area to reach, but with damaged 
infrastructure due to the earthquake and with winter setting in, it was very difficult 
to come to the aid of the victims. While it was clear that the individual response of 
Pakistan could not be sufficient, it proved difficult to obtain enough international 
resources to address the situation. At a certain point, Kofi Annan made an appeal on 
the international community to give more donations, but at no point were states 
reminded of an obligation to offer.74 When only a few offers are available to the 
                                                        
70 See the discussion on a right to offer in Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 3) paras 78-109 
and ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 64. In the context of the ILC it is argued that a right to offer 
would implicitly exist in the absence of a specific prohibition to offering assistance. See for a 
more detailed discussion Dabiru S. Patnaik, ‘Issues of State Consent and International 
Humanitarian Assistance in Disasters: The Work of the International Law Commission’ in Andrej 
Zwitter et al (eds), Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014) 113. A duty to offer assistance would be of 
particular importance if a right to receive assistance is recognized. As said, however, such a right 
is deemed not to exist in the context of this research. 
71 Article 4(3) Tampere Convention; example derived from the ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 61. 
72  US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2005/usdyae/> 
accessed 4 July 2012. 
73 US Geological Survey <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2005/usdyae/# 
summary> accessed 4 July 2012. 
74 ——, ‘Urging Greater Generosity: Annan Arrives in Pakistan for Quake Donor Conference’, 
UN News Centre <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?/NewsID=16592&CR=Pakistan& 
CR1=quake#> cited by Saechao (n 40) 696. The appeal by Kofi Annan did not lead to fully 
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affected state, the state has less room to refuse offers if its own capacity is 
insufficient and this stresses the importance of quality standards for offers of 
assistance. 
Offers of assistance must meet the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
impartiality, neutrality, and independence. In the Red Cross’ Guidelines from the 
International Disaster Response Laws-programme, this has been articulated as 
follows in Guideline 4:  
 
2. Assisting actors should ensure that their disaster relief and initial recovery 
assistance is provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality, and in particular: (...)  
c. It is provided without seeking to further a particular political or religious 
standpoint, intervene in the internal affairs of the affected state, or obtain commercial 
gain from charitable assistance;  
d. It is not used as a means to gather sensitive information of a political, economic or 
military nature that is irrelevant to disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.75 
 
Not meeting such standards gives the affected state ground to refuse an offer of 
assistance. Although in approximately 25% of disaster situations aid is being 
refused to a certain extent, in some of these situations there is a legitimate ground to 
refuse assistance; not only because it is not needed, but also when the offer is not 
‘purely humanitarian’.76 This leads to a new problem of determination: when can an 
offer be considered as purely humanitarian and when are there ‘valid’ grounds for 
refusing an offer? 
To illustrate this issue, the case of hurricane Katrina can again be used. The US 
received various offers of assistance, a number of which were turned down. A 
shipment of ready-to-eat meals sent by the UK was not allowed to enter the US due 
to the ban on British beef. Offers of assistance by Cuba and Venezuela were refused 
because of the political relation between the US and these countries.77  Iran offered 
oil in exchange for lifting the sanctions imposed on Iran.78 For each offer the US 
had different reasons to refuse, but it is clear that some of the reasons are less 
controversial than others. The offer by Iran does not meet the humanitarian 
principles (being conditional to lifting sanctions), and does therefore not meet the 
international standards that exist on offering aid. Whether or not the US was 
rightfully refusing the other offers is already a more difficult question. The answer 
is further determined by other circumstances. Were there for example other relief 
items or offers available? If there already is plenty of food present or if there are 
alternative offers of food, refusing beef from a certain country is more easily 
acceptable.  
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Taking the context of the affected state into account helps to determine whether 
a state can rightfully refuse certain offers. After the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, 
canned pork was offered to the population of Aceh, which is predominantly 
Muslim. 79  Indonesian customs officials recorded expired foodstuffs by the 
truckload. 80  In Thailand there were ‘claims that some Christian charities were 
conditioning aid on religious conversion or participation in religious activities’.81 
After the Pakistan earthquake of 2005, clothes sent to survivors were mainly 
summer clothes, and survivors could do nothing but burn these clothes to stay warm. 
Similarly, powdered food items should not be sent to situations in which water is 
sparsely available. Offers which are clearly unsuitable clog the distribution of 
suitable items and states are generally excused for refusing such offers.  
What becomes clear from these examples is that the legal framework grants the 
right to states to withhold consent to offers of assistance, and that in some cases a 
state makes use of this right for reasons that can be considered legitimate. However, 
there are no clear standards that decide which offers can be rightfully refused or not, 
apart from the ‘arbitrariness-rule’. One argument that does follow from the analysis 
so far is that offers which meet the humanitarian principles should be accepted 
sooner than offers that are somehow tied. Even so, assistance that is purely 
humanitarian can also be unsuitable, giving legitimate ground for refusal. 
Arbitrariness therefore contains two components: the context in which the offer is 
made (political or tied) and the content of the offer. This will be more closely 
analysed in the next section on accepting assistance. 
 




After determining at what point and how international humanitarian assistance is 
initiated, the third step is the acceptance of assistance by giving consent. As this is a 
key-element in the distribution of international humanitarian assistance, a number 
of issues surrounding consent will be highlighted here. Giving consent to (offers of) 
international humanitarian aid means accepting that aid. Questions that arise relate 
to the situations in which consent should be given, the way (method) in which 
consent must be given, by whom it must be given and how fast it must be 
communicated. Linked to these questions are issues encountered in the practice of 
aid delivery, like giving blanket consent, delaying consent or not having the right 
authority to give consent.  
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4.2 General features of consent 
 
According to the Special Rapporteur of the ILC, consent is ‘the expression of the 
will of the sovereign who, thereby, permits activities on its territory that may 
otherwise constitute violations of the principle of non-intervention.’82 Even though 
consent is as such crucial in the process of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
few instruments or documents provide any detail or rules on consent. Given the 
nature of consent, it can be argued that it is ‘by definition (...) discretionary and may 
be withdrawn or be subjected to conditions’. 83  Yet it is practically nowhere 
explained in detail what the rules on giving, withdrawing and conditioning consent 
are. 
What was already seen in the previous Chapter is that the freedom to give or 
withhold consent of states is limited. ‘Restrictions on the right to refuse 
humanitarian assistance can be found in various legal regimes aimed at the 
protection of persons, such as international human rights law, the law concerning 
internally displaced persons and international humanitarian law.’84 The restrictions 
found in the legal framework were not withholding consent arbitrarily; not 
withholding consent when the national capacity is overwhelmed; and not 
withholding consent when this would result in violation of a norm of international 
law. What also became clear in Chapter II – and also in the present Chapter – is that 
these restrictions do not seem concrete enough to be of use in practice. In this 
section, it will be analysed what the role is of consent in practice and which features 
it therefore must contain in order to construct more clarity on consent.  
Given the role of consent to make activities on a state’s territory permissible 
instead of constituting a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, consent 
must cover a number of issues. It must be clear which party (and which 
representatives of that party) receives the consent. It must also explain to which 
area(s) access is granted, for example only to the affected area, to designated areas 
around the affected area (as is for example the case in Blue Nile State in Sudan), or 
to the entire territory. Consent must also make clear during what time the consent 
remains valid. Humanitarian assistance offered after a disaster is a reaction to an 
extraordinary event, and must be temporary.85 The nature of consent when it comes 
to disaster response is by definition temporary and must either be changed into 
development assistance or activities must be ended.  
It is further possible to set conditions and restrictions to consent. One very 
important condition which is also recognized as a general precondition in many 
instruments is that the national authorities retain control over operations.86 This may 
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lead to difficult situations, especially when the authority in control is controversial, 
as was the case during the drought in Southern Somalia.  
Despite many warnings issued months before severe problems existed, the 
drought in the Horn of Africa caused a famine when it reached its peak in 2011.87 
As a result of the drought and subsequent famine, between 50,000 and 100,000 
people in the Horn of Africa lost their lives.88 The region that was hit hardest was 
Southern Somalia, also being the region where many other problems already existed. 
By July 2011, according to the UN, tens of thousands died as a consequence of the 
drought in South Somalia. The UN declared the existence of a famine in two South 
Somali regions.89 As already explained, most parts of South Somalia were at the 
time under control of Al-Shabab, and not of the official government of Somalia. 
This group was very reluctant to allow international assistance into the affected 
regions, causing delays in the delivery of aid.90 In response to the attitude of Al-
Shabab, the UN tried to reach parts of the affected population through an airlift.91 
Towards the end of July 2011, Al-Shabab started to grant access to some aid 
agencies, supporting the few agencies already working in the hardest hit areas.92 
According to Al-Shabab, the situation was not as bad as was being reported.93 Even 
so, the humanitarian emergency proved incredibly difficult to address. When Al-
Shabab started to allow some aid into the affected regions, it prevented victims at 
the same time to flee towards regions where aid could be obtained.94 On top of this, 
fighting between Al-Shabab and troops of the Somali government and the African 
Union Mission AMISOM continued throughout the drought.95 By August 2011, 
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famine was declared for five Somali regions and although more aid agencies were 
by that time operating in these regions, the response remained insufficient due to 
the difficult circumstances.96 This situation continued to exist during the following 
months. In October 2011, the conflict with Kenya flared up and Al-Shabab banned 
sixteen aid agencies, among which many UN agencies, by November 2011. 97 
Further escalation took place until one of the final aid agencies which still had 
access to South Somalia, the ICRC, suspended its aid deliveries because of the 
blocks of aid by Al-Shabab.98  Al-Shabab wished to control the aid operations, 
which was unacceptable to many organisations working on the ground. 
Humanitarian organisations aim to operate based on the humanitarian principles, 
and independence and neutrality do not seem to stroke with the condition of control 
over the operations by national ‘authorities’. As a result, these organisations were 
denied access.  
 
4.3 Practical issues relating to consent 
 
Not only is consent of essential importance for starting international operations in 
an affected state, it also has the function to lay down the terms for such an operation. 
During operations, those working in the affected state must comply with national 
and international law.99 This is acknowledged in many legal or soft-law documents 
and is often included separately in agreements. Additionally, many practical 
conditions can be included in the consent given by the affected state. Examples are 
quantitative restrictions (like the proportionality requirement of the IDRL 
Guidelines);100 that aid is delivered without distinction or discrimination;101 that aid 
is delivered by competent and adequately trained, experienced and equipped 
personnel; 102  that there is sufficient cooperation and coordination with local 
authorities; that assistance is not used for other purposes than relief; and to provide 
only necessary goods and not inappropriate goods. Apart from this, agreements may 
contain rules on immunities, liabilities and settlement of disputes. 103  In the 
following, a number of common practical issues will be addressed, including 
blanket consent, delayed consent, not having or knowing the right authority to give 
consent, and the situation in which consent is being withheld for valid reasons. 
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4.3.1 Blanket consent 
In principle, consent is given in response to an offer of assistance (which did or did 
not follow a request). As seen, the consent is not merely a ‘yes’ but usually 
indicates the conditions and terms under which the consent is given. A request for 
assistance can therefore not be considered as giving consent: it does not contain the 
necessary details for the operation. Moreover, the affected state must receive the 
room to value the offers given in reaction to the request to determine whether the 
offer is acceptable. Giving consent is an additional subsequent act by the affected 
state. It can be imagined that it is quite a task to keep track of offers, to consent or 
not to these offers, and to set terms and conditions. If the affected state made a 
needs-assessment and requested assistance accordingly, it can more easily 
determine which assistance is needed and which can be refused. In some cases, the 
affected state is not able (or willing) to make specific requests based on a needs-
assessment or does not have the capacity to respond to each individual offer of 
assistance. A state could then make a statement that it ‘welcomes assistance’ or 
‘welcomes offers of assistance’. It can be questioned whether such a remark can be 
considered as a form of ‘blanket consent’ or ‘advance consent’.  
Giving ‘blanket consent’ to unspecified offers of assistance can be considered as 
a ‘practical device’ in difficult situations and on this basis seems to gain support.104 
It remains however questionable whether such a general remark can be considered 
to contain the legal content of actually allowing foreign entities on a state’s territory 
without that entity violating norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
According to the ILC,  
 
Such a practice reveals the fact that, while the offer and request dynamic is the 
traditional approach, as a matter of treaty law and the practice of humanitarian 
agencies, other considerations may intercede in particular cases allowing for the 
lawful circumvention of the established mode for determining consent.105  
 
The ILC does not exclude the legal option of giving blanket consent instead of 
concrete or targeted consent. Nonetheless, in more practical terms, in such cases the 
affected state is not concrete about its needs and the lack of details may hamper 
relief operations.106 It does not solve the problem that the affected state still needs to 
decide which items are needed and which items need to be refused.107 If a state does 
not do this, an excess of relief goods can clog distribution channels and 
consequently hamper relief operations. 
If a state is not able or willing to make a needs-assessment and to give consent 
accordingly, a solution would be to call in the assistance of specialized agencies 
like the IFRC or OCHA. When Haiti was struck by the earthquake in 2010, the 
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government was assisted by OCHA (and the US) in coordinating relief, although 
President Préval later claimed that he was bypassed. 108  Haiti’s governmental 
structure was so weak that Haiti could possibly be considered a failed state.109 Yet 
even failed states are sovereign states and consent of the national authorities is 
required. Making use of organisations like OCHA helps to make targeted requests 
and to give consent to assistance which is actually needed, but such organisations or 
other states cannot give consent in the affected state’s stead.110 
The related phenomenon of having obtained consent to start general operations 
prior to a disaster and using that consent to target operation in response of a disaster 
will be discussed here in short. Some NGOs or organisations already have activities 
within a certain state, like the national Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies in most 
states. When a disaster occurs, assistance can be given by the IFRC through these 
national societies, in principle without further consent of the state. This system is 
based on rules in Statutes of the Movement and Principles and Rules of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Disaster Relief to which states have unanimously agreed. There 
can be other NGOs and humanitarian organisations already operating within a state 
and which can combine efforts with others to bring assistance into that state. 
Whether or not consent is required separately for these operations is not entirely 
certain; it is assumed that the state should have the opportunity to consent to these 
additional operations (which indirectly also occurs through custom regulations).111 
 
4.3.2 Underhandedly refusing assistance and delayed consent 
It has already been explained in the foregoing that the speed with which 
humanitarian assistance is delivered after a disaster is essential. Affected states 
should therefore not delay their decision on giving consent too long. According to 
the Special Rapporteur of the ILC, ‘the time to decide on an offer of humanitarian 
assistance cannot be extended unjustifiably. The expediency with which relief is 
provided is crucial. It is in the interest of all parties involved to know as soon as 
possible what the affected State decides regarding the external assistance or the 
offer thereof.’112 
The rapid developments in means of transportation and communication 
techniques make that many responders are usually ready to act; sovereignty might 
then become a ‘bottleneck’ for aid, which must not necessarily be seen as a negative 
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effect because in this way it can be prevented that too much aid flows in.113 Yet, 
having to wait for consent means that the providing-side has to wait for something 
to happen, and this can be abused by the accepting-side.114 The problems resulting 
from delays in giving consent became visible in the context of the Indian Ocean 
tsunami. Because of the scale of the disaster, many international actors responded in 
bringing relief and this massive response laid some problems bare. Due to delays in 
accepting relief goods, ‘perishable items rotted, medicines expired, and emergency 
relief items like clothes, tents, blankets and surgical equipment, which were 
essential at the start of the relief effort, were redundant by the time they were 
cleared months later’.115 Indonesia, for example, claimed to accept aid, but a year 
after the tsunami much relief goods were still not cleared to enter Indonesia: ‘an 
estimated 217 containers of tsunami relief aid were reportedly still with customs 
authorities in Tanjung Priok Port outside Jakarta and a further 232 containers and 
58 vehicles were in a similar predicament in Belawan Port, Medan’.116  
Delays in consent can be manifested through all kinds of practical barriers (like 
tax and import requirements). In Eritrea, for example, ‘hundreds of tonnes of UN 
food aid was held up as a result of governance tax demands and were not released 
to drought victims for over a month’.117 In the context of Hurricane Katrina, import 
barriers formed the delay: ‘nearly 400,000 ‘meals ready to eat’ flown to Little Rock 
by the UK in response to Hurricane Katrina were quarantined in a warehouse 
because they contained British beef, banned by American health regulations’.118 
These delays can in part be solved by implementing the IDRL Guidelines, making 
national legal systems ready for accepting international assistance when necessary. 
Still, not all states are willing to remove barriers for all situations, especially when 
considering that not all international actors provide the same quality as such 
‘suggesting that the issue of initiation, access, and facilitation are in fact 
inextricably linked to the quality and accountability of humanitarian assistance’.119 
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4.3.3 No authority to give consent 
It was already pointed out in the foregoing that there is not always an authority 
present that is capable to give its consent. One example addressed above is that of 
South Somalia when the drought hit its peak in 2011, but already during the 
humanitarian crisis of 1992 and 1993 this was a problem. At this time, ‘(c)ivil order 
there had collapsed to such a degree that there was no government in place to either 
grant or deny consent’.120 Another example already mentioned is that of Haiti. After 
the earthquake of 2010, the government’s capacity to respond and coordinate was 
limited and making a needs-assessment took time. In these situations, it may be 
wondered how long the UN and international community have to await consent 
from a state unable to respond.121 A partial solution can be found in making use of 
the assistance from organisations like OCHA and the IFRC, and the UN Emergency 
Relief Coordinator has been given the task of negotiating humanitarian access.122 
However, tensions remain between time consuming negotiations and immediate 
needs of disaster survivors and especially when there is a lack of authority the 
question remains whether and how long international actors must await consent. 
 
4.3.4 Not giving consent for valid reasons 
Refusal of aid (not giving consent to assistance) can occur based on valid reasons. 
Such reasons are for example the necessity of goods, quality of aid or of those 
providing it, motives with which aid is provided, and political ties between the 
offering state and accepting state. If a state made a needs-assessment, it can clearly 
indicate what items it needs and refuse those items which are not required. Also, 
some goods are not necessary in certain situations, like the summer clothes 
delivered to survivors of the 2005 Pakistan earthquake or pork delivered in Muslim 
populations. 123  It also happens that aid providers do not meet certain quality 
standards and are in need of assistance themselves, or provide poor-quality aid, for 
example demand religious conversion in exchange for assistance.124 The standards 
of the humanitarian principles help in determining whether humanitarian assistance 
and actors are providing sufficient quality or whether a state has a valid reason to 
refuse.125  When assistance meets the humanitarian principles, there is also less 
chance that the offer is a form of ‘tied aid’ or in another way conditional. It is 
generally recognized that  
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Humanitarian assistance could be a way of achieving other foreign policy or national 
security objectives. The prospect that assistance could be a cover for ulterior, power-
political objectives highlighted the importance for the victim state to retain sovereign 
control over whether and how such assistance would be accepted.126  
 
Nevertheless, the difficulty remains to determine when a state is ‘rightfully’ 
refusing an offer of assistance and when the withholding of consent is arbitrary. 
This difficulty is not helped by the lack of clear legal definition of ‘arbitrariness’ 
apart from the indications that ‘valid’ reasons are required, not ‘capricious ones’ 
and that offers meeting the humanitarian principles should be sooner accepted than 
offers that are not meeting these principles. In practice, no solution can be found to 




What follows from practice is that consent is indeed awaited before international 
assistance is delivered and that there is clearly room for affected states to withhold 
their consent to international humanitarian assistance. Given the importance of 
consent for the terms and conditions of humanitarian operations, the requirement of 
consent is a valuable practical feature yet which can at the same time stand in the 
way of essential relief operations. What has become clear is that especially when 
offers do not meet the humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality 
and independence), the affected state has a valid reason for refusing to give consent. 
On the other hand, the limits of the state’s freedom to withhold consent cannot be 
clearly or explicitly found in practice. Although the reasons for withholding consent 
are in some cases valid, it is not clear what ‘arbitrary’ reasons are and there is no 
reference to the violation of any rules of international (human rights) law by not 
giving consent. In some situations however the refusal to give consent is not 
accepted by international actors. In these – rather rare – cases, discussions take 
place on ways to move forward without obtaining consent of the affected state. In 
section 6 below such situations will be addressed in more detail. First, to complete 
the cycle, the provision of assistance and termination of operations will be 
discussed. 
 
5 PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE AND TERMINATION OF OPERATIONS 
 
The issues relating to the actual provision of international assistance are less 
relevant for this research than the questions surrounding requests, offers, and 
acceptance, since at the stage of provision the affected state already accepted aid. 
Nonetheless, problems arising when aid is being provided by international actors 
could cause reluctance to accept international assistance in the first place and help 
to gain insight in affected states’ decisions to refuse. Therefore, provision of aid and 
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termination of operations will be discussed in short. First, it must be noted that as is 
the case with offering aid, it is very doubtful whether a duty to provide aid exists.127 
Only in specific agreements, like bilateral agreements on disaster response, it is 
possible to find somewhat obligatory language encouraging states to provide 
assistance when requested to do so. 128  International organisations specifically 
mandated to respond in emergencies have different types of obligations, as the 
requirement to respond forms part of the organisations’ constitution.129  
In their operations, those supplying humanitarian assistance must adhere to the 
humanitarian principles and other standards as laid down in various instruments. 
When not complying, the assistance can even be counterproductive and can make it 
more difficult in the future to obtain consent for operations. When Indonesia for 
example decided to grant access to the usually closed area of Aceh, many aid 
organisations started working there, not always keeping to agreements on 
coordination. The organisation Médecins du Monde arrived at a village near Banda 
Aceh and ‘found that an unknown NGO had vaccinated some of the children there 
leaving no records and no sure way to determine who had and had not already been 
served’.130 Often the content of the consent given in terms of conditions already 
tries to prevent such situations. In addition, national laws may contain requirements 
and restrictions for relief providers. Personnel may require visa, certain diplomas or 
certificates of, for example, doctors must be recognized in the national system, 
relief organisations may need to be registered in the affected state, etcetera. These 
special requirements are addressed in the IFRC IDRL Guidelines in order to make 
the provision of relief more effective.131 
The phase in which humanitarian assistance is provided is always temporary and 
must be followed by a state of ‘normality’ or must be transferred into a 
development assistance-operation. For those delivering assistance, this means that 
‘(a)t a certain point, international disaster responders must either go home or the 
nature of their status must change (or revert) to that of a development actor. The 
management of this transition is not always as smooth as might be hoped’.132 In 
some cases, the affected state sets a date by which the humanitarian assistance 
mandate expires. In other cases, aid agencies terminate their own operations, for 
example when funds are depleted. Some do this without any coordination or 
consultation.  
Upon the change of nature of operations, some practical issues arise. Where 
emergency relief can be based on less strict visa and tax requirements, the recovery 
                                                        
127 ILC Memorandum (n 1) para 61. 
128 See the examples provided by the ILC, ILC Memorandum (n 1) paras 61 and 62. 
129 For example the International Atomic Energy Agency which ‘shall respond (…) to a (…) 
request for assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency’; ILC 
Memorandum (n 1) para 63. 
130 Bannon & Fisher (n 115). 
131 IDRL Guidelines (n 1) Part V on Legal Facilities for Entry and Operations. 






or development assistance may again be bound by ‘normal’ requirements to which 
workers must adapt. The transition from one phase to another is not always easy to 
make.  
 




The rule that consent is required before international assistance can be delivered to 
an affected state leads to complicated situations in practice. It is not only possible 
that a state takes a long time to give its consent, there are also situations in which a 
state chooses not to give consent or where consent cannot be obtained because there 
is no right authority to give it. Since the affected state has the principal 
responsibility to respond to a disaster, there is no problem with refusing to give 
consent as long as the individual response is adequate and sufficient. However, 
when the affected state’s ‘individual response is inadequate for whatever reason and, 
as a consequence, the duty falls upon a state to seek international assistance, the 
failure to obtain consent becomes a problem. Especially in large-scale humanitarian 
emergencies with much media attention, the international community wonders 
whether consent should be awaited or whether it should undertake action without 
consent.  
In one disaster in particular it was extensively debated whether humanitarian 
assistance should be forced upon the affected state. The state in question, Myanmar, 
did not respond effectively after cyclone Nargis hit the country in 2008. However, 
the military regime of Myanmar also refused to give its consent to offers of foreign 
assistance. In response, the international community started to debate whether an 
intervention in the framework of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) should be 
undertaken here. This debate is essential for understanding the difficulties that still 
exist when a state refuses to accept aid in the aftermath of a natural disaster and will 
therefore be rather extensively discussed in section 6.2. As will become clear, there 
is no genuine solution for situations in which a state is uncooperative while a 
humanitarian emergency is occurring on its territory. The gaps that persist will be 
analysed in section 6.3. 
 
6.2 Action when consent cannot be obtained 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Myanmar knows a history of single party politics, suppression and has generally a 
poor reputation when it comes to human rights.133 In 2003 the leading military 
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powers presented a ‘roadmap to democracy’, according to which a constitution was 
to be drafted and a referendum was to be held to approve a new constitution. This 
referendum was scheduled for 10 May 2008. 134 However, on 8 May 2008 a 
devastating cyclone hit Myanmar, killing 138,366 people and affecting almost 2.5 
million people.135 
Cyclone Nargis made landfall in the Irrawaddy Delta causing devastation with 
strong winds and floods, wiping away entire villages. 136  Even though the 
government of Myanmar was aware of the approaching cyclone, it did not warn its 
people, nor did it respond in the immediate aftermath by providing food, water and 
shelter. 137  Moreover, the military regime did initially not accept any foreign 
assistance and it was further delaying the provision of aid:  
 
Humanitarian organizations that were already present in the country were able to get 
small numbers of aid workers into the region but reported tightening restrictions, 
while other NGOs, UN agencies and states that offered assistance were hindered by 
slow visa approvals as the junta rejected offers of aid personnel and insisted on 
distributing the aid itself.138 
 
The regime did not, however, do a good job doing this. In distributing the little aid 
that they did, the military discriminated against ethnic and religious minority Karen, 
it forcibly displaced refugees from camps to military shelters and even to the 
devastated villages, without means for reconstruction. The military also used 
survivors, including children as forced labour for reconstruction.139 
According to OCHA and Oxfam, ten days after Nargis struck only a quarter of 
the required aid was being allowed into the country. 140  Even when after long 
waiting times permission was granted to enter the country, access was not granted 
                                                        
research, the country is referred to as Myanmar, not Burma. There is no particular intention 
behind this choice. 
134Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Disasters and ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Should Nations Force Aid on 
Others? A Cyclone is Not Enough’ (2010) 34 Natural Hazards Observer [3] 1, 9. The scheduled 
referendum has played a major role in the debate on Myanmar’s decision to refuse humanitarian 
assistance after cyclone Nargis hit. It was claimed that the government was afraid that 
interference from outside would affect the outcome of the referendum and influence the elections 
planned for 2010. Also, the government was criticised for proceeding with the referendum 
(although in the hardest-hit areas the voting was postponed until 24 May) while so many people 
died or were not in a position or mind-set to vote. 
135 EM-DAT <http://www.emdat.be/> accessed 16 July 2012. 
136 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Center for Public Health and Human 
Rights, ‘After the Storm: Voices from the Delta’ (2nd ed., 2009) (‘After the Storm’) 24-26. 
137 Pinheiro & Barron (n 133) 266. 
138 Mely Caballero-Anthony & Belinda Chng, ‘Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises: Pushing the 
Limits of R2P in Southeast Asia’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 135, 139 referring to 
——, ‘World Fears for Plight of Myanmar Cyclone Victims’, New York Times 13 May 2008. 
139 Pinheiro & Barron (n 133) 267; ‘After the Storm’ (n 136) 40-7. 






to the hardest-hit areas.141 Moreover, aid which was being distributed was at a large 
scale limited and confiscated by government representatives, and some relief 
workers were obstructed and arrested. Information was being distorted, collecting 
data was forbidden, and coordination between groups as such became impossible.142 
The question raised on the international level was whether the actions of 
Myanmar’s government constitute a situation in which the international community 
should intervene according the framework of the concept of RtoP.143 The surviving 
disaster victims ‘faced severe threats to life as a result of injury, hunger, and 
diseases, among other things’144 and the military regime did not come to the aid of 
these victims and was moreover ‘refusing the entry of humanitarian assistance 
during the crucial period when relief was most needed resulting in a humanitarian 
crisis of massive proportions’. 145 
As explained in Chapter II, the concept of RtoP departs from the idea that a state 
is responsible for the well-being of its population. If the state fails to protect its 
people, the responsibility is transferred to the wider international community:  
 
It is foremost the responsibility of the Government of Myanmar to address the 
problem of gross and systematic human-rights violations by all parties, and to end 
impunity (…). If the Government fails to assume this responsibility, then the 
responsibility falls to the international community.146  
 
It has also been explained above that RtoP can be invoked when gross human rights 
violations amount to one of four predetermined crimes: genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Some argue that ‘the refusal to allow 
humanitarian assistance where it was most needed and neglecting the plight of 
helpless victims whose lives were threatened essentially constituted a crime against 
humanity’. 147 
The proponents of invocation of RtoP were mostly European and North 
American government representatives, former government officials and analysts.148 
Strong proponents of invoking RtoP were Bernard Kouchner (at that time French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Javier Solana (EU High Representative for the 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy). Also Lloyd Axworthy (Canadian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs) supported the use of RtoP based on the argument that ‘there is 
no difference between an innocent person being killed by machete or (…) dying in 
a cholera pandemic that could be avoided by proper international responses’.149 The 
goal of RtoP would then be to deliver aid ‘without the consent of the Myanmar 
government’. 150  It was also discussed whether undertaking action in the RtoP 
framework would mean the possibility to bypass the UN Security Council, referring 
to the humanitarian action undertaken in 1991 by the UK, France and the US to 
protect Kurds from Iraq and the action of NATO taken in Kosovo in 1999, both 
without Security Council permission.151 
In the discussion on whether RtoP could and should be invoked in the situation 
of Myanmar, three different questions are generally mixed up. In the first place, it is 
debated whether a situation such as Myanmar (i.e. a situation where the population 
suffers hardship as a result of actions or omissions by the government after a natural 
disaster) could constitute one of the four crimes falling under RtoP. In this 
discussion a second question is often raised as an answer to the first question, 
namely whether RtoP can be used in disaster situations at all. Finally, a third 
question often included in answering the first two, is whether an intervention to 
bring international assistance into a state is actually meaningful. It is striking to see 
that many confused these three different issues, like for example Kouchner did: 
‘(i)nstead of cogently linking the Burmese military regime’s refusal to accept aid to 
one of the enumerated crimes that triggers the application of RtoP, Kouchner 
instead equated RtoP to the right to intervene to provide humanitarian 
assistance’.152 Each of the three questions will be discussed separately below.  
 
6.2.2 Poor disaster response as a crime against humanity  
According to the World Summit Outcome of 2005, one of four crimes (i.e. genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity) must occur before RtoP 
can be invoked.153 Although the military junta knows a history of discriminatory 
treatment of the many ethnic groups living in Myanmar,154 it cannot be said that the 
actions and omissions of the junta were targeted against one specific group with an 
aim to destroy that group. The refusal of aid and lack of response did therefore not 
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constitute genocide (i.e. having the intention of destroying a national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group)155 or ethnic cleansing (i.e. without special intent to destroy a 
group but still targeting to forcibly remove a group).156 Moreover, even though the 
country was not free from violence and aggression at the time of the cyclone, it 
would go too far to speak of an armed conflict, as such excluding war crimes.157 
The discussion therefore focused on the question whether the refusal of aid and lack 
of individual response could constitute a crime against humanity. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) provides a 
definition of ‘crime against humanity’. This definition is used here as it is 
‘generally regarded as crystallizing, for the most part, notions that already existed in 
customary international law’.158 According to article 7 of the Rome Statute, a crime 
against humanity is a certain act (or omission) ‘committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack’. 159  A number of ‘acts’ are described in article 7, including murder, 
extermination, enslavement, and also the category ‘other inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health’.160 The phrase ‘attack against any civilian population’ refers to a 
‘course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in 
paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such attack’.161 In other words, for a crime 
against humanity to exist there must be an act (or omission) which falls under one 
of the categories of crimes against humanity, which was part of a widespread or 
systematic attack and of which there was knowledge (subjective element of the 
crime).162  
                                                        
155 International Criminal Court, ‘Elements of Crimes’ (ICC 2011) 2. 
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Before a crime against humanity can exist, it must be established that the ‘act’ is 
severe enough. Therefore, ‘the conduct must be comparable in nature and gravity to 
the broad categories of crimes listed in Article 5, and must compare also – in nature 
and gravity – to the crimes already specified in Article 7’.163 Subsequently, if an act 
is severe enough to constitute an ‘other inhumane act’, it must still be part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. In the ICTR-
case Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ‘widespread’ is defined as ‘massive, frequent, large-
scale action, carried out collectively and with considerable seriousness and directed 
against a multiplicity of victims’.164 In the same case, ‘systematic’ is described as 
meaning ‘thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on the basis of a 
common policy involving substantial public or private resources’.165 As such,  
 
It is required that a single crime be an instance of a repetition of similar crimes or be 
part of a string of such crimes (widespread practice), or that it be the manifestation of 
a policy or a plan drawn up, or inspired by, State authorities or by the leading 
officials of a de facto state-like organization, or of an organised political group 
(systematic practice).166 
 
Pinheiro and Barron define ‘widespread’ as ‘a large-scale attack with numerous 
victims’ and ‘systematic’ as ‘highly organized, often as part of a pattern or 
methodical plan’.167  
Finally, there must be knowledge of the attack; ‘there must be an intention to 
bring about a certain result; that the perpetrator must be aware of the risk that his 
action might bring about serious consequences for the victims; and that the 
perpetrator must be cognisant of the link between his misconduct and a policy or 
systematic practice’.168  
In theory, based on these elements, it would be possible to determine if the 
inadequate response and the refusal of international aid by the military junta after 
cyclone Nargis is in fact a crime against humanity. However, when applying these 
elements on the case of Myanmar, it becomes clear that a conclusion cannot be 
easily drawn. The last element is perhaps the clearest requirement in this particular 
case. The regime could not but have known about the consequences of the disaster, 
must have been aware of the lack of food, water, shelter and access to healthcare, 
and must have known that not responding would make the situation worse. Whether 
not responding to the disaster can be considered an ‘act’ or in this case rather 
‘omission’ severe enough to constitute an ‘other inhuman act’ and whether the ‘act’ 
was part of a widespread or systematic attack remains, however, debatable. Some 
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see the lack of response after Nargis in the light of other problems in Myanmar: ‘the 
Burmese military regime has a long history of perpetrating, and continues to 
perpetrate, severe, widespread, and systematic human rights abuses against its 
people’.169 It is, in this line of thought, argued that ‘(t)hese atrocities (…) in some 
cases rise to the level of both crimes against humanity and war crimes under the 
Rome Statute’.170 Crimes committed by the military regime which can be taken into 
the equation are the forcible transfer of population, mainly focussing on 3,600 
villages which were destroyed between 1996 and 2007,171 murder and torture,172 
rape and sexual violence,173 and the detention of political prisoners.174 If the flawed 
disaster response can indeed be seen in the light of these other crimes, it can be 
argued that the act was part of widespread and systematic attacks and that there is a 
crime against humanity. 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the junta was not refusing all aid 
and that the regime did not completely prevent aid agencies already working in the 
country from doing their work. Moreover, it can be argued that there ‘was no 
evidence of widespread intent by the authorities to cause suffering’.175 In this line, it 
may be wondered ‘(a)t what point does the junta’s intransigence create a death toll 
among the innocent Burmese population so high that it amounts to a ‘crime against 
humanity’?’176  
It therefore depends on the arguments used (and the interpretations of the facts 
of the case), the severity of the humanitarian situation and the context of the 
affected state whether inadequate disaster response in combination with the refusal 
of international assistance can be regarded as a crime against humanity. In this 
research, the stance is taken that in theory, when the response to a disaster like that 
of Myanmar takes place in a context of severe crimes already committed against a 
population, it can constitute a crime against humanity. Whether or not a crime 
against humanity was in fact committed in Myanmar by refusing international 
humanitarian assistance is difficult to determine without a more extensive study into 
the ‘systematic’ (other) crimes committed against the civilian population, but it is 
assumed here that the level of being ‘highly organized, often as part of a pattern or 
methodical plan’ cannot be demonstrated here.177 Nonetheless, the further line of 
argumentation in this section departs from the consideration that an extreme 
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situation like as seen in Myanmar could in theory constitute a crime against 
humanity. In that case, RtoP could be invoked. 
 
6.2.3 Applicability of RtoP in disaster situations 
Even though the refusal to accept international humanitarian assistance can in 
extreme situations be a crime against humanity, it is claimed by many that RtoP 
cannot be used in disaster situations.178 The origins of this discussion can be found 
in the ICISS-report.179 According to this report, natural disasters may provide a 
reason to invoke RtoP: when discussing in which situations military intervention for 
human protection purposes is justified, i.e. in situations of large scale loss of life, 
the ICISS explicitly includes ‘overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, 
where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, 
and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened’.180 In the World Summit 
Outcome of 2005, there is no mentioning of disasters; only in the case of one of the 
four earlier mentioned crimes RtoP can be invoked. 
When European and North American voices started to argue in favour of using 
RtoP in Myanmar, China and other states in the South East of Asia argued that RtoP 
did not apply. This opinion was shared by UK’s Secretary of State for International 
Development Douglas Alexander and Britain’s UN ambassador John Sawers, who 
agreed that RtoP should not be invoked to justify the forcible delivery of aid or to 
coerce the government of Myanmar.181 Also Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of 
the UN, argued in his report on the implementation of RtoP that it should not be 
applied in situations of natural disasters until Member States decide otherwise. He 
followed the stance of a number of scholars 182  in arguing that application in 
situations like Myanmar would ‘undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the 
concept beyond recognition or operational utility’.183  
The main argument used is that the vast majority of states agreed on a rather 
limited version of RtoP as laid down in the World Summit Outcome of 2005. In the 
three paragraphs of the Outcome Document dealing with RtoP, the four crimes are 
used as the point of departure, but the larger framework is by far not as extensive as 
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that of the ICISS. Nonetheless, it can be questioned how relevant it is that natural 
disasters are not mentioned in the Outcome Document. In the Outcome Document, 
states pledge that they accept the responsibility to protect their populations from, 
amongst others, crimes against humanity.184 The international community has the 
responsibility to help to protect populations through appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian, and other peaceful means or through action in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter when national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from, amongst others, crimes against humanity.185 When 
following the Outcome Document, it must therefore be established that international 
action is required when a state cannot protect or is not protecting its population 
from crimes against humanity; whether or not these crimes take place in a disaster 
situation is not relevant.  
Situations like Myanmar, in which the flawed response to a natural disaster 
taken together with crimes committed against the civilian population could possibly 
constitute a crime against humanity, are rare. While the mere occurrence of a 
natural disaster is not enough to invoke RtoP, disaster situations cannot be excluded 
from RtoP per se: ‘the construction of the doctrine does not, on its face, preclude 
such an application should a government’s actions following a natural disaster rise 
to the level of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against 
humanity’.186 However, coming to the final question, it must be asked whether RtoP 
is useful in cases like Myanmar.  
 
6.2.4 Usefulness of RtoP in disaster response 
The World Summit Outcome of 2005 clearly distinguishes between peaceful means 
of international assistance and methods of intervention. The calls for invocation of 
RtoP described above generally referred to rather intrusive measures, for example 
the airdrop of supplies187 or to force the passage of humanitarian assistance through 
the SC.188 Sir John Holmes, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, was requested by 
France to brief the SC and proposed a resolution calling on Myanmar to allow 
unhindered humanitarian access.189 The request was rejected by several countries. 
Moreover, several countries rejected the idea to apply RtoP on a natural disaster 
situation and even Sir Holmes described Kouchner’s call as unnecessarily 
confrontational.190 In the past, rather forceful measures have indeed been taken in 
humanitarian emergencies, like the humanitarian missions in Somalia in the early 
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1990s, in Haiti in 1993, and the humanitarian relief efforts for Iraqi Kurds in the 
1990s, although except for Haiti these actions took place in a context of armed 
conflict. 191  It can, however, be questioned whether forcefully providing 
humanitarian assistance into Myanmar would have been productive, as it would 
further polarise the position of the military regime. 
Even those who argue that RtoP is applicable in the situation of Myanmar do not 
necessarily endorse forceful measures. Former UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar 
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro argues for example that intervention (either under the 
framework of RtoP or otherwise) would not address any root causes, and would 
therefore only be a temporary solution.192  Attempting to seek Security Council 
authorization would lead to no result, as China and Russia held the position that 
forcing humanitarian aid would not be the best solution. Action without authority of 
the Security Council could lead to political tensions.193 Within the framework of the 
ICISS-version of RtoP, six criteria are formulated to test whether military 
intervention is an acceptable option for human protection purposes.194 In the case of 
Myanmar, not all these criteria would have been met: negotiations were still 
ongoing, especially with the support of ASEAN, and there is no certainty that the 
civilian population would have benefited from a military operation, possibly they 
would have suffered more as a result.195 
Instead, many supported the road that was actually taken. Through the platform 
provided by the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response, the ASEAN Secretariat and Member States could send a joint assessment 
team and negotiate access of humanitarian relief.196 Also, the US tried to stimulate 
dialogue between Myanmar and its partners, ASEAN, China and India so that these 
parties could ‘convince the regime to accept assistance from the international 
community’.197 In the end, Myanmar started to accept international assistance, but it 
took a relatively long time before negotiations achieved this. In the three weeks that 
Myanmar refused aid, the delay ‘led to unnecessary suffering and hardship for the 
victims at the very least and, at the worst, contributed to a higher number of deaths 
and casualties’.198  
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Therefore, one very important question that has been asked throughout this 
Chapter remains: does the international community have to await consent at all 
times or is it possible to intervene? As seen above, even in an extreme case like 
Myanmar it was impossible to come to an agreement on action. Possibly, RtoP will 
be applied sooner when there is an underlying situation of armed conflict, but recent 
cases once again illustrate that RtoP is still depending on the willingness of states to 
apply it. Accordingly, as will be illustrated in the next section, there is no effective 
answer to humanitarian emergencies in which consent cannot be obtained.  
 
6.3 The persisting gap in providing humanitarian assistance 
 
Myanmar is not the only example in which consent could not be obtained. The 
drought in Somalia of 2011 was already mentioned as another case, just as the 
L’Aquila and Sichuan earthquakes, and, partly, hurricane Katrina in US. The 
problems of humanitarian access also exist in armed conflict situations. In 2013, 
Blue Nile State in Sudan is the stage of a conflict while access of humanitarian 
agencies is denied, resulting in many IDPs throughout the region with no access to 
assistance. Throughout the conflict in Syria, humanitarian access has been a 
problem, now addressed by the Security Council through resolutions 2165 and 2191 
in which the Security Council grants access to Syria for (UN affiliated) 
humanitarian organisations in the state’s stead.199 Yet whether this solution by the 
Security Council will be applied in other situations remains to be seen. 
These examples make clear that when during a humanitarian emergency access 
is being denied, whether by a government, a party to an internal conflict, or a de 
facto leading power, there is no clear response from the international community 
other than trying to negotiate access. The rules and principles as described in the 
previous Chapter are not always followed in practice, and there is no answer when 
an affected state decides to refuse assistance. While it is often argued that state 
sovereignty stands in the way of action, the problems cannot be blamed on state 
sovereignty alone. Discussions on the ‘forfeiture of sovereignty’, ‘theory of 
conditional sovereignty’ or ‘temporary surrender of sovereignty’ appear interesting 
in theory, but cannot lead to practical results due to sovereignty itself.200 Requiring 
states to ‘temporarily forfeit their sovereignty when it allows gross violations of 
human rights to occur’ implies a higher authority to forfeit sovereignty to.201 In 
Chapter II the idea of sovereignty as responsibility has been discussed, where 
sovereignty does not cease to exist, but brings responsibilities for the state and for 
the wider international community. This idea lies at the basis of RtoP, but has not, 
as seen in this section, led to clear results.  
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The three steps of the legal framework on accepting external assistance after a 
disaster and the three rules directing states in their decision when they must seek 
and when they must accept such assistance have gained detail by looking at their 
applicability in practice. The primary role of the affected state is firmly established 
and forms the point of departure for relief operations. Due to the primary role, the 
affected state must make a needs-assessment to determine what it can deliver itself 
and what is needed from other actors. If the affected state decides that international 
assistance is required, it can initiate this process by requesting assistance or by 
responding to offers already made. Before relief can be delivered to an affected 
state, the consent of that state is needed and in practice always awaited. The 
limitations that were found on the state’s freedom to withhold consent appear, 
however, to not have great practical value.  
If an affected state comes to the conclusion that its own response is inadequate 
(or is likely to be inadequate), it must give its consent to international assistance. 
The problem is that it is up to the affected state to decide that its capacity is 
overwhelmed. Moreover, it is very difficult to determine when a state’s response is 
inadequate. Often this is a matter of opinion and a state may be successful in certain 
aspects but fail to address other aspects. 
In the second place, the affected state may not withhold its consent if it results in 
a violation of a norm of international law. There are no clear appeals on a certain 
norm that would be violated, although in extreme cases the state is reminded of its 
duties towards its own population. Under human rights law, these duties are most 
clearly and elaborately established. In situations like that of Myanmar, the refusal of 
aid can – when seen in the context of other acts directed against the population – 
constitute a crime against humanity, but circumstances must be extreme before poor 
disaster response can be considered as such. 
The third rule that helps a state to determine whether international assistance 
must be sought or accepted – the rule that consent may not be withheld arbitrarily – 
has become a bit clearer by looking at practical application. Humanitarian 
assistance offered by external parties must be of good quality and must meet the 
humanitarian principles. When meeting these principles, there is less ground for an 
affected state to refuse the offer. In practice there are some examples in which a 
refusal of assistance is considered tolerable because of the quality of the offer 
(conditional, culturally inappropriate, in violation of national legislation). In 
addition, it can be argued that a state must have very good reasons for withholding 
consent when the national capacity is overwhelmed or when a norm of international 
law will be violated by not giving consent. Still, how much room a state has exactly 
for valuing offers of assistance and refusing when the offer meets the humanitarian 
principles does not become completely clear from looking at the practical 
application. 
Although not being the main focus of the present study, it has been explored 






and where there is broad consensus that the state should give its consent. There is 
no solution to situations in which a civilian population suffers from the 
consequences of a disaster and in which the assistance delivered by the state is 
inadequate. Disaster situations are excluded from RtoP, although in rare cases the 
refusal of aid can be considered as a crime against humanity. In most situations 
though, this threshold cannot be reached and the question remains what the 
international community can do when the state refuses to give consent. This 
question will not be further addressed here: this research focuses on the preceding 















The goal of the present research is to find out to what extent public international 
law contains standards for affected states determining whether that state must 
accept international humanitarian assistance after the occurrence of a disaster. A 
legal framework has been identified based on the legal sources relating to 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response. This legal framework consists of 
three steps or sequences.  
Point of departure is the primary role of the affected state. It is not the 
occurrence of a disaster that instigates the existence of the primary role: 
responsibilities towards the own population follow from sovereignty and are also 
present when there is no disaster. The aspects of the responsibilities a state has 
towards its own population that are prompted by the occurrence of a disaster relate 
to humanitarian assistance. As a first step the affected state makes a needs-
assessment within the first seventy-two hours and determines whether it has the 
capacity to answer to these needs or whether additional assistance is required. 
The second step is to trigger international humanitarian assistance if necessary, 
which must follow from the needs-assessment. International humanitarian 
assistance is necessary when the national capacity is overwhelmed or when a rule of 
international law is violated by withholding consent. At this stage, there is no 
obligation to actually accept: affected states only have a duty to seek assistance by 
actively making requests or by going through the offers already made. The goal at 
this stage is to value the offers made to the affected state to see whether they are 
acceptable. This is determined by the content of the offer (is what is being offered 
needed in the affected state according to the needs-assessment? Is what is being 
offered useful for the particular situation at hand?) and by the form of the offer 
(does the offer meet the humanitarian principles?). Considering each individual 
offer and accepting what is needed can take much time. It is more efficient to issue 
a concrete request or multiple requests for the relief the affected state needs, based 
on the needs-assessment. In either case it is necessary to make the moment of 
acceptance explicit and foresee the acceptance of the necessary detail. This is the 
third step. 
Consent to international humanitarian assistance has major legal implications. 
Consent makes acts that would otherwise violate principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity legal. Given this function, certain details must be arranged, like 
the subject of consent (items, staff, transportation), the period during which relief 





international actors deliver humanitarian assistance while the affected state retains 
control and at a certain point operations are ended.  
Although the affected state is in principle free to withhold its consent to offers 
that are not needed or which do not meet the humanitarian principles, this freedom 
is limited if one of the following three situations occurs. First, if the capacity of the 
affected state is overwhelmed by the occurrence of a disaster, there is an obligation 
to accept assistance. Second, if the affected state is violating a norm of international 
(human rights) law by not accepting international humanitarian assistance, it must 
give its consent. Third, consent may not be withheld for arbitrary reasons. If what is 
being offered is needed according to the needs-assessment, is suitable for the 
situation at hand and meets the humanitarian principles, there is less ground – if any 
– for the affected state to refuse the offer.  
To a certain extent, the main research question can be answered through this 
legal framework: based on international law a framework is identified that contains 
the three main steps of the process of accepting international humanitarian 
assistance along with the standards that determine at what points the affected state 
must move to the next step in the legal framework, as such providing when the state 
must accept international humanitarian assistance. However, after placing the legal 
framework in the light of practice it became clear that the rules in that case prove 
too generally formulated to constitute concrete standards. Ending at this point 
therefore is quite unsatisfactory. Rather, something is needed that gives the rules 
found so far more detail, so that they can constitute concrete standards. What is 
needed is a way in which the needs-assessment can objectively and concretely set 
out what is required and based on which it can be determined whether the capacity 
of the affected state is adequate. Departing from this needs-assessment with more 
concrete standards, it would also become more easy to determine whether an offer 
is suitable and whether a refusal of assistance arbitrary or valid. In Chapter II, the 
ICESCR has already been identified as a very promising candidate for this purpose 
and throughout Chapters II and III it has been implied that human rights obligations 
could provide the standards of international law that co-determine whether 
assistance must be accepted or not. 
In Chapter II it has been more generally acknowledged that the standards set by 
human rights law can be a useful tool for setting disaster policy. With the help of 
human right indicators, it is possible to determine what a state must achieve (or aim 
to achieve) after a disaster. Looking at human rights instruments, in particular the 
ICESCR emerges as a very topical treaty. The ICESCR contains the rights to 
housing, food, water and health, rights that are of special importance in disaster 
settings. In addition, the ICESCR contains a provision on general obligations stating 
that apart from working on human rights realization individually, international 
assistance and cooperation must be used as well. Also, states must use, according to 
the general obligations, the maximum of its available resources, which could refer 






The next part of the research will aim at making the findings of this research so 
far more concrete by identifying standards under the ICESCR that tell states when 






























When analysing the instruments and documents that potentially contain rules on 
accepting international humanitarian assistance in response to disasters in Chapter 
II, it was explored how human rights standards could play a role in disaster 
response. At that point the question has been addressed to what extent human rights 
standards in disaster settings have correlative obligations for states eventually 
resulting in an obligation to accept humanitarian assistance if the state is unable to 
realize the human rights standards. In general, the standard-setting function of 
human rights law can help to concretize obligations for state parties immediately 
after a disaster, but in particular the ICESCR appears to give direction on accepting 
humanitarian assistance. The ICESCR contains a provision on the general 
obligations for state parties that could help to answer the question at what point an 
affected state is under an obligation to accept. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR tells state 
parties to come to the full realization of the rights ‘individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation’. In addition, each state party must use ‘the 
maximum of its available resources’. These general obligations must be read in 
conjunction with substantive rights, of which the ICESCR contains a number highly 
relevant in disaster settings, like the rights to housing, food, water and health.  
With the help of the ICESCR, it will be considered whether the legal framework 
as identified in the previous Chapters can be foreseen of more concrete standards. 
Possibly, the inclusion of the ICESCR will result in a clearer delineation of the 
primary role of the affected state, indicating when the affected state should move on 
to triggering international humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the obligations 
stemming from the ICESCR may be useful for determining when the point is 
reached at which the affected state must give its consent to international assistance, 
for example by giving standards to determine when the national capacity is 
exceeded, or by giving concrete obligations that can be violated by refusing to 
accept assistance. Accordingly, the ICESCR will be used to formulate a more 
complete answer to the main research question. 
To achieve this it must first be determined what exactly the content is of the 
obligations of article 2(1) ICESCR. After this, these obligations must be considered 
in the context of disaster settings, resulting in an overview of general expectations 
of state parties in the aftermath of disasters. These findings will be taken together 






and health) to establish standards for affected states on accepting assistance. The 
obligations following the ICESCR are in the first place directing the 164 state 
parties to the Covenant in their actions.1 To what extent non-party states are also 
bound by the findings below is subject to debate. Using arguments of obligations 
erga omnes, customary law (or at least the view that almost all rights in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so also ESC-rights, have a core that is 
recognized as customary law), the ‘do no harm’-principle and by looking at 
repeated recognition of extraterritorial aspects of economic, social and cultural 
rights, the position can be defended that also non-party states have certain 
obligations in this respect.2 Here, the position is taken that the existence of positive 
obligations for non-party states is a bridge too far, but that such states have at least a 
duty not to violate the rights of the ICESCR (which is in line with the ‘do no harm’-
principle).3 The present Chapter will start with identifying the general obligations of 
article 2(1). The next Chapter will place these findings in a disaster-context. To find 
the exact content and meaning of article 2(1), the methodology of treaty 
interpretation as described in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
will be used.4  
                                                        
1 According to the UN Treaty Collection’s Database, consulted on 21 April 2015. An additional 
five states has signed the ICESCR, meaning that they may not act in violation of the object and 
purpose of the treaty <https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en& 
mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty>.  
2 See for a discussion of these concepts and ideas Malcolm Langford, Fons Coomans & Felipe 
Gómez Isa, ‘Extraterritorial Duties in International Law’ in Malcolm Langford, Wouter 
Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin & Willem J.M. van Genugten (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: 
The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2013) 68-9. In section 3.3 of Chapter II it has already 
been argued that ESC-rights do (probably) not constitute customary law, yet that possible the core 
of these rights could crystallize into customary law more easily, which is in line with the 
customary-core idea.  
3 The ‘do no harm’-principle is a well-established norm in international environmental law and 
has been connected to human rights to define extraterritorial obligations. See Langford et al (n 2) 
69 referring to Sigrun I. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in 
International Cooperation (Intersentia, Antwerp 2006) 165 and Fons Coomans, ‘Some Remarks’ 
in in Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp 2004). 
4 The VCLT was adopted at the Vienna Conference in 1969 and entered into force in 1980. It 
contains three articles on treaty interpretation that are widely used and cited. For more 
background on the debate surrounding and leading up to the development of the rules on 
interpretation, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty 
Points’ (1951) 28 B. Yearbook of International Law 1; Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach 
to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference’ (1969) 18 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 318; ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ (Yearbook of the 
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The idea behind using the rules on treaty interpretation is to make the outcome 
of interpretation more predictable and less arbitrary (enhancing legal certainty), so 
that parties to a treaty can foresee and anticipate on what is expected in terms of 
obligations.5 Using the rules therefore gives the impression that applying them will 
‘place the “decision-maker” on a sort of conveyor belt which will lead him, as it 
were painlessly, if not always to the right spot precisely, then to some haven very 
close to it’.6 Yet, when considering the model and its practical functionality, it 
becomes clear that this very optimistic idea is not necessarily true and a few 
adjustments are made accordingly. 7  
Article 31 VCLT on the ‘general rule of interpretation’ states that ‘(a) treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’. Article 32 continues by providing that supplementary means (like 
preparatory work or circumstances of conclusion) may be used when the outcome 
of applying article 31 ‘leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure’ or ‘leads to a 
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’.8 Because interpretation exists of 
the ordinary meaning of words considered in context and in the light of object and 
purpose, with the inclusion of various sources, interpretation is a process rather than 
a single act.9 Within this process, ‘(e)lements can only be taken up one at a time, 
but they are to be evaluated together. Thus interpretation may require going round 
the circle more than once if a factor presents itself under an element of the rules 
                                                        
5 Ch. de Visscher, Problèmes d’Interpretation Judiciaire en Droit International Public (1963) 17 
cited by Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules (n 4) 306. 
6  Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or our 
“Interpretation” of it?’ (1971) 65 American Journal of International Law 358, 359.  
7  The main problem lies in making visible which choices the interpreter has made. See for 
example Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Restrictive Interpretation of the Human Rights Treaties in 
the Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 14 European Journal of 
International Law 529, in which the author explains the methodology of interpretation in some 
detail on page 533ff but does not illustrate how these features are applied while interpreting; only 
the – very interesting – outcomes are discussed. 
8 ‘The word “supplementary” emphasizes that article 28 (now article 32) does not provide for 
alternative, autonomous, means of interpretation but only for means to aid an interpretation 
governed by the principles contained in article 27 (now article 31). The Commission considered 
that the exception must be strictly limited, if it is not to weaken unduly the authority of the 
ordinary meaning of the terms’. ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties’ (n 4) ‘Commentary 
to draft articles 27 and 28’, para 19.  
9 Torres Bernárdez, ‘Interpretation of Treaties by the International Court of Justice following the 
Adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ at 726 para 11, cited by Richard 
K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford International Law Library, Oxford University Press 
2008) 30. This is confirmed in the ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties’ (n 4) 
‘Commentary to draft articles 27 and 28’, para 8. This idea is also taken up by, for example, the 
ECtHR, which said in the Golder-case that ‘the process of interpretation of a treaty is a unity, a 
single combined operation’. ECtHR Golder v. United Kingdom (App no 4451/70) (1975) Series A 






later in the list and which appears to outweigh one already taken up’.10 For this 
reason, before describing the content and meaning of article 2(1), first the 
immediate context will be discussed, followed by the object and purpose. 
What must finally be noted is that the goal here is to find the meaning in the 
light of present-day circumstances.11 Human rights standards may change over time, 
which is in the context of the ECHR referred to as the ‘living instrument’-doctrine. 
The notion ‘living instrument’ is generally attributed to the ECtHR-case of Tyrer v. 
United Kingdom, in which the Court stated that ‘the Convention is a living 
instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions’.12 From the Commission’s reasoning it becomes 
clear that the fact that a certain interpretation of a right or freedom was not 
recognized at the time of adoption does not mean that that interpretation cannot be 
read into a treaty at a later stage. Even though this reasoning is used in the context 
of the ECHR, the idea is based on the character of human rights instruments in 
general, so also the ICESCR must be considered in the light of present-day 
circumstances, for which the work of the Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) can be helpful.13  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is the treaty body 
created for the supervisory tasks foreseen in the ICESCR. Being the main authority 
for this Covenant, the CESCR is responsible for interpreting the rights and 
obligations of the ICESCR. Although not being able to give binding decisions like a 
court does – apart from the Optional Protocol’s individual complaint mechanism as 
                                                        
10 Gardiner (n 9) 7, 30, after recognizing that ‘(t)he rules are not a set of simple precepts that can 
be applied to produce a scientifically verifiable result. More guidance is needed to set the ground 
for a ‘correct’ result, or at least one which has been correctly ascertained’. 
11 Soren C. Prebensen, ‘Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
in Paul Mahoney et al (eds), Protection des droit de l’homme: la perspective europeenne (Carl 
Heymanns Verlag, 2000) 1131. 
12 ECtHR Tyrer v. United Kingdom (App no 5856/72) (1978) Series A no 26; (1979-80) 2 EHRR 
1, para 31. The Tyrer-case concerned the question whether judicial corporal punishment for 
juveniles (in this case three strokes of the birch on the bare behind) can be considered as 
‘degrading treatment or punishment’ in the sense of article 3 ECHR. This reasoning has been used 
in various subsequent cases, where usually the Tyrer-case is cited. See generally Alastair 
Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law 
Review 57, 61ff. Examples of cases are: Soering v. United Kingdom A 161 (1989); Sigurdur A 
Sigurjonsson v. Iceland A 264 (1993) (1993) 16 EHRR 462, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary 
Objections) A 310 (1995) (1995) 20 EHRR 99; Matthews v. United Kingdom 1999-I 251 (1999) 
28 EHRR 361; Selmouni v. France 1999-V 149 (2000) 29 EHRR 403, ECtHR Bayatyan v. 
Armenia (app. No. 23459/03) judgement of 27 October 2009 para 62. When closely considering 
the Court’s reasoning, it becomes clear that the Court does not provide any additional information 
for its living instrument-approach apart from the reference to the Commission (‘as the 
Commission rightly stressed’), but within the treatment of the case by the Commission no 
reference to ‘living instrument’ is made. 
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will be discussed below – the CESCR clarifies what is expected from state parties. 
Within General Comments, the CESCR has explained how various provisions and 
topics must be understood and be realized. These General Comments are widely 
cited when discussing the scope, nature and content of ESC-rights and the CESCR’s 
views will play a dominant role in the interpretation below.14  
 
2 CONTEXT: ARTICLE 2(1) IN THE IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF THE ICESCR 
 
Before going into concrete obligations stemming from article 2(1) and later from 
the substantive rights of the ICESCR, a preliminary question will first be addressed: 
to what extent does the ICESCR contain obligations for its state parties concrete 
enough to be justiciable? The first element of treaty interpretation, context, will be 
used to answer this question by looking at the place of article 2(1) within the 
ICESCR.15 
Part II of the ICESCR describes general expectations from state parties, so the 
‘way in which States Parties must behave in order to implement and guarantee the 
substantive rights contained in the Covenant’.16 The fact that article 2(1) can be 
found in part II of the ICESCR does not only confirm the general nature of the 
provision, but at the same time implies that what is written in article 2(1) is valid for 
the whole treaty. Moreover, there does not appear to be room for negotiation in the 
articles of Part II: they are rules of engagement states must adhere to, and it would 
seriously damage the function of these articles when states have too much 
discretionary freedom: ‘(i)ndeed, Part II imposes obligations on States parties with 
regard to each of the substantive rights contained in Part III. Provisions in Part II 
have a dynamic relationship with all substantive rights and the latter cannot be 
interpreted without taking into account Part II provisions’.17 The substantive rights 
                                                        
14 By becoming a party to a treaty, the state commits itself to ‘perform the treaty in good faith’, as 
laid down in article 26 VCLT. Although the General Comments are not legally binding 
instruments per se, the CESCR has obtained the task through the ECOSOC to explain to state 
parties how they must perform the treaty in good faith, and are therefore authoritative documents. 
15 What context is, is explained in article 31(2), (3) and (4) VCLT. 
16 Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp 2002) 16. Part I of the ICESCR is not 
mentioned because it contains only one provision (on self-determination) which is not relevant for 
the understanding of article 2(1). Part II contains general obligations, the equality of women and 
men, a limitation clause and the determination that the ICESCR may not be abused or 
misinterpreted to limit already existing rights. 
17  Magdalena Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (2006) 
24 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 271, 295. This is confirmed when considering the 
topics of the General Comments; article 2(1) is discussed in General Comment 3 under the title 
‘The Nature of States Parties Obligations’. This General Comment is preceded by a Comment on 
‘Reporting by States Parties’ and one on ‘International Technical Assistance Measures’. The 
Comments following General Comment 3 are all considering substantive rights. Assuming a 







of the ICESCR are laid down in Part III. These articles contain ‘a complex range of 
correlative duties, often divided into duties to respect, to protect and to fulfil’.18  
In the past, it used to be argued by some that when comparing economic, social 
and cultural rights (ESC-rights) to civil and political rights (as laid down in the 
ICCPR) ESC-rights constitute fewer obligations, if any. Instead, ESC-rights were at 
times considered not as rights but as goals of economic and social policy.19 These 
ideas can be traced back to the origins of the ICESCR. To be modelled after the 
UDHR, a single treaty was supposed to be adopted containing civil and political 
rights as well as ESC-rights. However, instead of adopting one text, two Covenants 
were created, which is ‘largely a reflection of the perception developed during the 
drafting of the Covenants that the two categories of rights were different in nature, 
origin, and significance’.20 No matter the reason for separating the Covenants, the 
mere existence of two instruments each containing a different set of rights has fed 
the assumption that the nature of the rights, and thus the nature of obligations, is 
essentially different.21 Civil and political rights used to be considered to constitute 
primarily negative obligations suitable for immediate application. ESC-rights, on 
the other hand, were deemed to have mostly a positive character, requiring long-
term planning, investments, and other efforts of states.22  
Truly, for some provisions of the ICESCR the drafters did not intend to create 
any obligations and they made this explicitly clear, but for most articles such a 
statement has not been made and already quite early in the ICESCR’s existence it 
was acknowledged that ‘(i)t cannot be assumed that the Covenant’s provisions do 
not possess legal force unless there are overriding indications otherwise’. 23 The 
variety in terminology indicating what is expected of state parties is not consistent 
(e.g. ‘respect’, ‘ensure’, ‘should’, ‘guarantee’, or omission of the word ‘right’) but 
                                                        
going into the actual rights. Article 2(1) would in that case be a provision applicable to all 
substantive rights.  
18 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 16. 
19 See Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 156, 158. See also See Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 312. 
20 Matthew C.R Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Perspective on its Development (Oxford Monographs in International Law, Clarendon Press, 1995) 
7. The distinction between the two sets of rights can be partly retraced to the disagreements 
between East and West: ‘(t)he Soviet States, on the one hand, championed the cause of economic, 
social, and cultural rights, which they associated with the aims of the socialist society. Western 
States, on the other hand, asserted the priority of civil and political rights as being the foundation 
of liberty and democracy in the ‘free world’.’ H. Gros Espiel, ‘The Evolving Concept of Human 
Rights: Western, Socialist and Third World Approaches’ in B. Ramcharan (ed.), Human Rights 
Thirty Years After the Universal Declaration (1979) 41 cited by Craven at p. 9. 
21 Craven (n 20) 9. 
22 See inter alia Alston & Quinn (n 19) 159. 
23 Of article 15 it is described in the preparatory work that no obligations were intended. Alston & 
Quinn (n 19) 186. R. Bernhardt, ‘Treaties’ in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Vol. 7, 
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this must not be considered as indicating the non-existence of an obligation. 24 The 
fact that article 10, for example, does not contain the word ‘right’ does not mean 
that it has a different nature than other rights: ‘(t)he Committee has considered it 
appropriate to infer the existence of a ‘right’ from the terms’.25  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) – created in 
1985 through the adoption of a resolution by ECOSOC for the monitoring of state 
parties’ compliance with the ICESCR – has further stressed that a number of rights 
of the ICESCR are readily applicable in courts. It explained in relation to the 
justiciability of the ICESCR as ‘those matters which are appropriately resolved by 
the courts’) and most rights are self-executing, (meaning that they are capable of 
being applied ‘by courts without further elaboration’). 26  The adoption of the 
Optional Protocol (OP) to the ICESCR in 2008, establishing an individual 
complaint procedure as is also existing for the ICCPR, is a further confirmation of 
the justiciability of ESC-rights. Through this mechanism the CESCR has obtained 
the position to give its views on concrete cases of potential rights violations in the 
state parties that ratified the Optional Protocol.27 During the drafting process of the 
OP to the ICESCR, the nature of obligations under the ICESCR and the 
justiciability of the rights of that Covenant were debated. Several delegations 
argued that the open-ended or vague formulation of rights make that the rights are 
unsuitable for an individual complaint mechanism.28 Yet the adoption of the OP 
shows that the general understanding of the ICESCR is that it contains concrete 
obligations which states could possibly violate and which would result in a certain 
claim for individuals. Through the General Comments and especially by defining 
for each right the minimum core obligations, the CESCR has started defining 
                                                        
24 Alston & Quinn place ‘guarantee’ and ‘respect’ on the same level. However, ‘respect’ does 
have a certain connotation to abstention; ‘respecting one’s privacy’ means not to intrude, so to 
abstain. Alston & Quinn (n 19) 186.  
25 Reporting Guidelines UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex IV 98-9, UN ESCOR, Supp. (No 3) (1991) 
cited by Craven (n 20) 135. 
26  CESCR, General Comment 9 on ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ (UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/24 of 3 December 1998) para 10. This view is shared by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 159. 
The resolution creating the CESCR is ECOSOC Res. 1985/17 of 28 May 1985. 
27  The Optional Protocol was adopted by the UN GA on 10 December 2008 (UN Doc. 
A/RES/63/117) and entered into force on 5 May 2013 upon deposit of the tenth instrument of 
ratification (ex article 18(1) OP). According the UN Treaty database, by April 2015, 20 states 
ratified or acceded to the Optional Protocol (and 45 states signed the Optional Protocol). 
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-a&chapter=4& 
lang=en> accessed 21 April 2015). By April 2015, only three cases are pending, two coming from 
Spain and one from Equador. See the Statistical Survey of the CESCR at <http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/PendingCases.aspx> accessed 21 April 2015. 
28 See for a summary of the arguments used: Commission on Human Rights, ‘Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to Consider Options Regarding 
the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 






obligations in detail.29 The CESCR also affirms that the nature of general legal 
obligations must indeed be based on article 2(1) ICESCR.30 Consequently, ‘among 
the principle obstacles to reasoned discussion of the Covenant (...) are various 
propositions that have been attributed by some commentators to the Covenant but 
that, on closer inspection, exist more in the eye of the beholder than in the text of 
the Covenant’.31  
 





Now that it is clear that art. 2(1) ICESCR contains certain obligations, it must be 
established what the nature of these obligations is through the object and purpose, 
but first it will be explained what is meant with these words. ‘Object’ and ‘purpose’ 
could be used as synonyms but the French version of the VCLT, speaking of 
‘l’objet et le but’, explains the difference.32 According to the doctrine underlying 
these terms a distinction must be made between ‘objet ou effet direct et immédiat de 
l’acte’ and ‘but ou résultat de l’effet juridique produit par l’acte’.33 The object of a 
treaty provision is ‘the situation which the author of the act has envisaged or the 
effect he is striving for’.34 The purpose is the reason why the object exists because it 
explains what it is that must be achieved in the end.35 So ‘object’ indicates ‘the 
substantial content of the norm, the provisions, rights and obligations created by the 
norm’.36 The purpose is ‘the general result which the parties want to achieve by the 
treaty’.37  
Article 2(1) is a ‘programmatic article’ which commonly contains the purpose of 
an instrument and it proposes the idea that the purpose of the ICESCR is the full 
realization of rights.38 This, as a purpose, has explicitly been addressed by the 
                                                        
29 This development started in CESCR, General Comment 3 on ‘The Nature of States Parties 
Obligations’ of 14 December 1990. 
30 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 1. 
31 Alston & Quinn (n 19) 220. 
32 Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, ‘The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ (1998) 3 
Austrian Review of International & European Law 311, 325. 
33 Ch. Rousseau, Droit International Public (Vol. 1, Paris 1970) 272 cited by Buffard & Zemanek 
(n 32) 325. 
34 P. Weckel, La concurrence des traités internationaux, Thèse Strasbourg III 1989, 26, n 10 
cited by Buffard & Zemanek (n 32) 325. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 326. 
37 Ibid.  
38 Besides this reference to the purpose, article 2(1) contains some indications as to the object, 
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CESCR.39 The preamble of the ICESCR confirms that the full realization of rights 
is indeed the purpose. It connects the ICESCR to the UN Charter: ‘(c)onsidering the 
obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms’. The preamble further 
refers to the UDHR: ‘in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his 
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights’. 
Apparently, the ideal of the UDHR is translated into the ICESCR and ICCPR, and 
concerns the conditions in which people can fully enjoy their rights. Taking 
together the references to the UN Charter and the ideals of the International Bill of 
Rights, it appears that the purpose of the ICESCR is directly connected to these 
ideals. From the preambles of the instruments of the International Bill of Rights it 
follows that a common goal is being pursued, namely the full and universal 
realization of human rights.40 As such, the purpose of ‘full realization’ is confirmed 





The object determines how state parties to the ICESCR must achieve the purpose. 
Without any object states would be free in determining how they would achieve the 
purpose, as long as they achieve it in the end. From the title of article 2(1) it follows 
that state parties are directed in how they must achieve the purpose, so article 2(1) 
must contain the object of the ICESCR. The CESCR has provided clarity on the 
object through its General Comments, in which mainly the ‘minimum core 
obligations’ constitute clear duties.41 Also on other occasions does the CESCR use 
                                                        
39 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 9. 
40  The CESCR has repeatedly confirmed the idea that the ICESCR, ICCPR and UDHR are 
inextricably connected and have therefore a shared purpose. Consequently, ‘efforts to promote 
one set of rights should also take full account of the other’. See inter alia CESCR, General 
Comment 2 on ‘International Technical Assistance Measures’ of 2 February 1990, para 6; 
CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 8. This has also been recognized with respect to individual rights: 
CESCR, General Comment 4 on ‘The Right to Adequate Housing’ of 13 December 1991, para 9, 
and also in CESCR, GC 9 (n 29) para 10; CESCR, General Comment 11 on ‘Plans of Action for 
Primary Education’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/4 of 10 May 1999), para 2; CESCR, General 
Comment 12 on ‘The Right to Adequate Food’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 of 12 May 1999) para 4. 
41 The CESCR provided initially the example where ‘any significant number of individuals is 
deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or 
the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the 
Covenant’; CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 10. Minimum core obligations can also be found in CESCR, 
General Comment 13 on ‘The Right to Education’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 of 8 December 
1999) para 57; CESCR, General Comment 14 on ‘The Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ 
(UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 of 11 August 2000) para 43; CESCR, General Comment 15 on ‘The 







strong and unequivocal phrases to refer to obligations (for example in the General 
Comment on the right to food: ‘(e)very State is obliged to ensure for everyone 
under its jurisdiction access to the minimum essential food which is sufficient, 
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure their freedom from hunger’),42 yet there 
are also many examples in which the Committee remains quite vague in its 
terminology (‘States parties should recognize the essential role of international 
cooperation’).43  
At one instance the CESCR is using very remarkable and somewhat confusing 
terminology in connection to obligations: ‘(t)he equal right of men and women to 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is a mandatory and immediate 
obligation of States parties’.44 On first sight this remark appears to indicate by 
explicitly referring to ‘mandatory obligations’ that there must be such a thing as 
‘optional’ or ‘discretionary’ obligations, which is a contradiction in terms. However, 
the CESCR made this comment with article 4 ICESCR in mind, which contains a 
limitation clause, making it possible for states to limit certain rights of the ICESCR. 
With the phrase cited above the Committee indicates that some obligations cannot 
be limited by article 4.45 The CESCR explains this in the following words: article 3 
ICESCR sets ‘a non-derogable standard for compliance with the obligations of 
States parties as set out in articles 6 through 15 of ICESCR’.46 It does not become 
clear whether this special status of article 3 is based on its place within the ICESCR 
(i.e. Part II) – which would mean that limitation of article 2(1) is not possible either 
– or whether the special status is attributed based on other reasons. 
The language in which the CESCR defined obligations has evolved over time, of 
which the temporary end is found in General Comment 21. In this General 
Comment, a summary can be found of what is expected from state parties in terms 
of obligations: 
 
                                                        
Comment 17 on ‘The Right of Everyone to Benefit From the Protection of the Moral and Material 
Interests Resulting From Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He is the 
Author’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 of 12 January 2006) para 39; CESCR, General Comment 18 on 
‘The Right to Work’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 of 6 February 2006) para 31; CESCR, General 
Comment 19 on ‘The Right to Social Security’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 of 4 February 2008) para 
59; and CESCR, General Comment 21 on ‘The right of everyone to take part in cultural life’ (UN 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 of 21 December 2009) para 55. 
42 CESCR, GC 12 (n 40) para 14.  
43 CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 38; the same words have been used in CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 
30; CESCR, GC 17 (n 41) para 36; CESCR, GC 18 (n 41) para 29; CESCR, GC 19 (n 41) para 52; 
CESCR, GC 21 (n 41) para 56. 
44 CESCR, General Comment 16 on ‘The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of 
All Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 of 11 August 2005) para 16 
(emphasis added). The CESCR refers here to CESCR, GC 3 (n 29). 
45 The obligation indicated here is equality between women and men as provided in article 3 
ICESCR. 
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To demonstrate compliance with their general and specific obligations, States parties 
must show that they have taken appropriate measures to ensure the respect for and 
protection of cultural freedoms, as well as the necessary steps towards the full 
realization of the right to take part in cultural life within their maximum available 
resources.47 
 
Here, the CESCR uses two categories of obligations: obligations of conduct 
(comparable to object or l’objet) and obligations of result (comparable to purpose or 
le but). The International Law Commission, which also uses the distinction, 
describes the obligation of conduct as an obligation ‘where an organ of the State is 
obliged to undertake a specific course of conduct, whether through act or omission, 
which represents a goal in itself’.48 ‘Obligation of result’ is described as requiring a 
‘State to achieve a particular result through a course of conduct (…), the form of 
which is left to the State’s discretion’.49 Eide uses similar terms to define the two 
categories of obligations: ‘an obligation of conduct (active or passive) points to 
behaviour which the duty holder should follow or abstain from. An obligation of 
result is less concerned with the choice of the line of action taken, but more 
concerned with the results which the duty-holder should achieve or avoid’.50 In 
defining the obligations, the CESCR has made the distinction: there is first a basic 
level which must be achieved, constituting immediate obligations (‘appropriate 
measures to ensure the respect for and protection of’). Next, there are obligations of 
conduct (‘the necessary steps towards full realization’) and finally the obligations of 
result (‘full realization of the right to take part in cultural life’). For each right of the 
ICESCR it would be possible to identify these obligations, yet the set of obligations 
of conduct would differ from right to right, also depending on the circumstances 
within a state.  
 References to ‘progressive realization’ and the debate on the nature of ESC-
rights made that the ‘full realization of rights’ was not considered as an obligatory 
goal. If the purpose is not understood as obligatory, the whole set of ‘obligations’ of 
the ICESCR would aim to realise a vague aspiration, making it even more difficult 
to pinpoint the exact obligations of the ICESCR. Likewise, having only obligations 
of result (or purpose) would deprive the Covenant of ‘any serious content’: ‘(a)s the 
terms of article 2(1) make clear, the result, namely the full realization of the rights, 
only has to be achieved in a progressive manner. If States had total discretion as to 
the means employed to that end, there would be little basis upon which to judge 
whether or not they were acting in good faith’.51 When the purpose of the ICESCR 
                                                        
47 CESCR, GC 21 (n 41) para 60. 
48 Craven (n 20) 107. 
49 Report of the ILC (1977) 2 Yrbk ILC 20, para 11-30 cited by Craven (n 20) 107. 
50  Asbjorn Eide, ‘Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold 
Approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal 35, 38 cited by Maria Green, ‘What We Talk 
about When We Talk about Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights Measurement’ 
(2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 1062, 1075.  






is understood as the full realization of rights, the set of obligations must be 
understood as concrete, hard and measurable legal norms, since it would otherwise 
become difficult to achieve that purpose. Consequently, article 2(1) is the bridge 
between the object and purpose, as it contains the final goal, and also in general 
terms what the general obligations are to achieve this final goal (further specified by 
the substantive articles).  
That both object and purpose can be found within article 2(1) is confirmed by 
Craven: ‘(a)lthough emphasis is placed on the result, namely ‘the full realization of 
the rights’, there are plenty of indications within article 2(1) and the substantive 
articles themselves as to what steps are to be taken’.52 According to Craven, ‘the 
objective of the State obligations is clearly stated in article 2(1), namely the ‘full 
realization of the rights recognized’ in the Covenant’.53 Article 2(1), consequently, 
is a rather ambiguous provision. It contains the formulation of the purpose of the 
treaty, it contains certain indications of the object and it is not a substantive article. 
Rather, article 2(1) is a programmatic article, making it not uncommon to contain 
both the purpose and the object of the treaty. In fact, ‘a closer examination shows 
that the difference between the two forms of obligations is not as great as first 
appears’.54 The object must be aimed at achieving the purpose and the purpose can 
be determined through assessing the direction of the objects.55  
If article 2(1) were understood as constituting a provision so vague as to amount 
to an aspiration without creating obligations it would completely undermine the 
ICESCR: ‘the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the Covenant (...) is to 
establish clear obligations for States Parties in respect of the full realization of the 
rights in question’.56  In other words, interpreting article 2(1) as not containing 
legally binding obligations would undermine the object and purpose of the 
Covenant.57 
 





Considering and defining each individual word of article 2(1) separately would 
result in having so much information that further analysis would become 
                                                        
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid, 109. 
54 Ibid, 107. 
55  When describing obligations of conduct, it is not uncommon to also find mention of ‘an 
objective towards which that conduct is aimed’. Ibid. 
56 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 9 cited by Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 312. 
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impossible. 58  Some of the words used in article 2(1) have dozens of possible 
meanings, many of which could immediately be eliminated in the light of the text. 
The provision will therefore be divided in ‘phrases’ to be able to make use of the 
immediate context of that phrase. The ‘phrases’ to be discussed here are deemed to 
be the most relevant for the question to what extent article 2(1) contains a duty to 
accept humanitarian assistance: ‘undertakes to take steps’; ‘individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation’; ‘to the maximum of its available 
resources’; ‘with a view to achieving progressively the full realization’; and ‘by all 
appropriate means’. Although this section depicts what in the methodology has 
been referred to as ‘ordinary meaning of words’, a complete overview of the 
content and meaning is given to which end a variety of sources is included along 
with the findings of the previous two sections. 
 
4.2 Undertakes to take steps 
 
According to the CESCR, the phrase ‘undertakes to take steps’ refers to an 
immediate obligation, meaning that it is an obligation that must be adhered to from 
the moment of becoming a party to the treaty.59 The obligation of taking steps is 
directly linked to the idea of progressive realization (also laid down in article 2(1)). 
In the words of the Committee: ‘full realization of the relevant rights may be 
achieved progressively; steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably 
short time after the Covenant’s entry into force’.60 Suggested alternatives to ‘take 
steps towards full realization’ were ‘to guarantee’ or ‘ensure’ the rights.61 Even 
though the requirement to ‘guarantee’ achievement of a certain goal seems more 
definite than ‘taking steps’ towards that goal, it does not mean that ‘taking steps’ 
cannot be considered a ‘hard’ legal norm. The formulation is also used in the 
ICCPR (where the phrase is used in article 2) and the CAT (also in article 2), which 
are considered to constitute legal obligations.  
The CESCR makes a distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations 
of result, the first category indicating obligations of action and the other category is 
                                                        
58 The text of article 2(1) ICESCR is: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’ 
59  Others understand ‘taking steps’ in the same way: ‘an immediate and readily identifiable 
obligation upon states parties’. Alston & Quinn (n 19) 166. In all five authentic languages of the 
ICESCR, the understanding is reflected that ‘to take steps’, although translated in different ways, 
indicates taking immediate action. 
60 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 2. 
61 UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.73 (1952) cited by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 165. Another proposal deemed 
unacceptable was ‘to pledge themselves’; 8 UN ESCOR C.4 (270th mtg.) at 11, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR.270 (1952) and 7 UN ESCOR C.4 (231st mtg.) at 18-9, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.231 






referring to the obligations of what must be achieved through this action. Taking 
steps would constitute an obligation of conduct ‘to take the necessary action to 
execute the provisions of the Covenant’.62 The nature of the obligation ‘to take 
steps’ is considered to be of such importance that it cannot be subjected to 
limitation.63 Accordingly, there is a strong indication that the limitation-clause of 
article 4 ICESCR cannot be applied on article 2(1). However, it has not been 
clarified whether the impossibility of limitation includes ‘limitation’ due to limited 
available resources.64  
The CESCR elaborated on its understanding of ‘steps’: these ‘should be 
deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the 
obligations recognized in the Covenant’. 65  The word ‘undertakes’ indicates a 
commitment to start doing something (and then to actually do it).66 In the context of 
this phrase, the commitment would be to ‘taking steps’ towards the full realization 
of rights. 
Through the state reporting procedure of article 16 ICESCR, states must explain 
the steps which they will take. According to the CESCR there is an obligation for 
parties to ‘work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive 
implementation of each of the rights of the Covenant’, a duty which is explicitly 
laid down in article 14 ICESCR.67 States can quite clearly explain their plans in the 
state reports, which makes it possible for the CESCR to examine the plans and thus 
the steps taken (or the steps that states intend to take). Yet, the Committee 
acknowledges that it is extremely difficult to do this, because the socio-economic 
situation in each state party is different and therefore the steps required for the full 
realization of the rights also differ. The CESCR therefore needs detailed 
                                                        
62 Craven calls this ‘a general rule of international law’ which he bases on PCIJ, The Case 
Relative to the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations under the Lausanne Convention VI 
(1925) Series B, No 10 at 20, Craven (n 20) 114. This is also concluded by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 
165. 
63 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 313, basing the statement on the General 
Comments and the Limburg Principles (Principle 16). 
64 The phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ will be discussed in section 3.4. 
65 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 2; CESCR, GC 13 (n 41) para 43, 52; CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 30; 
CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 17; CESCR, GC 18 (n 41) para 19; CESCR, GC 19 (n 41) para 40. 
Also according the dictionary, ‘steps’ refers to something as part of a sequence, although 
achieving a final goal is not necessarily part of the definition; Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary (7th edition 2007) 1503. This is in line with the referral to the phrase as an obligation 
of conduct, and not an obligation of result. 
66 An alternative meaning of undertake is ‘to agree or promise that you will do something’, where 
the actual action is not included. That here the actual taking of action is included follows from the 
meaning of ‘take’ (‘somebody is doing something, performing an action, etcetera’); Oxford 
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (7th edition 2007) 1667 resp. 1563. The word ‘undertakes’ is not 
in itself explained by the CESCR in any of the General Comments. 
67 CESCR, General Comment 1 on ‘Reporting by State Parties’ of 24 February 1989, para 4; these 
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information from the state reports and, where possible, other sources to have a 
proper check on the steps taken by states. 
 
4.3 Individually and through international assistance and cooperation 
 
There are two ways in which ‘individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation’ can be understood in terms of obligations. It is on the one hand 
possible to understand ‘international assistance and cooperation’ as an obligation to 
be used next to individual action, meaning that states are obliged to make use of 
international assistance and cooperation and that they violate the ICESCR when 
they only act individually. On the other hand, the phrase can also be understood as a 
means to achieve certain goals (or to fulfil certain obligations), like the full 
realization of the rights of the ICESCR. In that case, it could be considered as not 
constituting an obligation to cooperate internationally or to use international 
assistance: it is then merely a suggested alternative way of working (besides acting 
individually) in order to meet certain obligations. The CESCR is not taking a clear 
line in subscribing either of the two possible meanings. 
In the first General Comment, the language used regarding international 
assistance and cooperation is quite casual. The first General Comment aims at 
clarifying what is expected of states in the reporting mechanism, and the CESCR 
explains that it  
 
Is aware that this process of monitoring and gathering information is a potentially 
time-consuming and costly one and that international assistance and cooperation (...) 
may well be required in order to enable some States parties to fulfil the relevant 
obligations. If that is the case, and the State party concludes that it does not have the 
capacity to undertake the monitoring process (...) it may note this fact in its report to 
the Committee and indicate the nature and extent of any international assistance that 
it may need.68 
 
Here ‘international assistance and cooperation’ is not, in itself, considered to be an 
obligation. Instead, states are required to ‘fulfil the relevant obligations’, and to do 
so international assistance and cooperation ‘may’ be required. This – for legal 
purposes – soft language does not change much in the years following the first 
General Comment,69  although the third General Comment contains elements in 
which another view becomes somewhat visible. The line of reasoning that 
‘(w)ithout an active programme of international assistance and cooperation, the full 
                                                        
68 Ibid, para 3. 
69 General Comment 2 provides in relation to the debt crisis of many (developing) countries that 
‘international measures to deal with the debt crisis should take full account of the need to protect 
economic, social and cultural rights through, inter alia, international cooperation’. CESCR, GC 2 
(n 40) para 9 (the underlining from the original is omitted). In General Comment 3, the CESCR 
acknowledges ‘the essential role of such [international] cooperation in facilitating the full 






realization of economic, social and cultural rights will remain an unfulfilled 
aspiration’, with which the Committee is indicating that ‘international assistance 
and cooperation is only a means to realize the rights of the Covenant’,70 can also be 
found in General Comment 4 on article 11(1) ICESCR. In this article it is worded 
that states should recognize the ‘essential importance of international cooperation 
based on free consent’. The noncommittal language of ‘recognize’ and ‘free consent’ 
is not addressed or clarified in any way.  
Using stronger language compared to the previous Comments and to other 
paragraphs within the same Comment, General Comment 3 provides that 
‘international cooperation for development and thus for the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States’, especially for those that are 
in a position to assist others. 71  Consequently, the Committee understands 
‘international assistance and cooperation’ as a concrete obligation, and while still 
aimed at achieving a certain goal, it is not a policy choice between merely acting 
individually or using international assistance and cooperation. Moreover, the 
CESCR makes a distinction between states that are in a position to give assistance, 
and those who receive it. The states in the position to assist are especially under an 
obligation to do so. Whether or not other states are as a result under a duty to 
receive is not made clear. In the other General Comments, the CESCR continues 
with the rather confusing line on ‘international assistance and cooperation’, 
although it must be noted that language establishing an obligation has not been used 
in General Comments after number 17.72  
One way of achieving more clarity which has (perhaps unintentionally) been 
attempted by the CESCR is distinguishing between states that are offering or 
                                                        
70 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 14. With this phrase, the CESCR is arguing that a state party is not 
capable of realizing the rights of the ICESCR only by acting individually. 
71 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 14 (emphasis added); these words are repeated in CESCR, GC 21 (n 
41) para 58. 
72 Although the General Comments after number 17 still mention ‘international assistance and 
cooperation, only in weaker language: ‘States parties should recognize the essential role of 
international cooperation’, CESCR, GC 18 (n 41) para 29; CESCR, GC 19 (n 41) para 52; 
CESCR, GC 21 (n 41) para 56. The same words have been used in CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 38; 
CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 30 and in CESCR, GC 17 (n 41) para 36. Other examples of weaker 
formulations are ‘(i)nternational cooperation requires States parties to refrain from actions that 
interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries’ (a 
negative formulation), CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 31; ‘(i)f necessary, they should avail 
themselves of international cooperation and technical assistance in line with article 2, paragraph 1, 
of the Covenant’ and ‘(w)hen examining the reports of States parties and their ability to meet the 
obligations to realize the right to social security, the Committee will consider the effects of the 
assistance provided by all other actors’, CESCR, GC 19 (n 41) paras 41, 68 and 84. Examples of 
reference to ‘international assistance and cooperation’ as an obligation can also be found: 
‘international cooperation for development and thus for the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights is an obligation of all States parties (...)’ and ‘their obligations under the Covenant, 
in particular the obligations contained in articles 2 paragraph 1, (...) concerning international 
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providing assistance on the one hand and those states seeking or receiving it on the 
other, as was mentioned above in connection to General Comment 3. In General 
Comment 11 it is provided that ‘in appropriate cases, the Committee encourages 
States parties to seek the assistance of relevant international agencies’.73 Here, the 
CESCR is directing the suggestion to states ‘seeking’ assistance and not those 
offering it. The ‘obligation’ to international assistance as seen in General Comment 
3 was especially directed to states in a position to assist. It accordingly appears as if 
offering assistance has a stronger obligatory connotation than seeking assistance.74 
It has been acknowledged by others that this distinction exists, although no clear 
indicators on legal obligations can be found.75 At the very least, it is accepted that 
there is no right to do nothing.76  
One other quite interesting way of determining the obligations of state parties 
can be found in General Comment 12. In this Comment, the distinction is made 
between on the one hand violation of obligations due to inability of the state to do 
otherwise and on the other hand violation due to unwillingness to realize the rights 
                                                        
73 CESCR, GC 11 (n 40) para 11. 
74 Also in General Comments 8, 12, 13 14, 15 and 17 the CESCR refers to the providing-side in 
more obligatory wordings: ‘external entities’ have ‘an obligation ‘to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical’ in order to 
respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted 
country’ in CESCR, General Comment 8 on ‘The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and 
Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 of 12 December 
1997) para 14. ‘States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in 
other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid 
when required’ in CESCR, GC 12 (n 40) para 36. General Comment 13 (n 41) provides a list of 
instruments referring to international assistance and cooperation, which ‘all reinforce the 
obligation of States parties in relation to the provision of international assistance and cooperation’, 
para 56. General Comments 14 and 15 provide that: ‘(d)epending on the availability of resources, 
States should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods, and services in other countries, 
wherever possible and provide the necessary aid when required’. CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 39; 
CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 34. Finally, ‘it is particularly incumbent on States parties and other 
actors in a position to assist, to provide “international assistance and cooperation”.’ CESCR, GC 
14 (n 41) para 45; CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 38; CESCR, GC 17 (n 41) para 40. With regard to 
‘seeking assistance’, the CESCR merely argues that a state must do so when it does not have 
sufficient resources to realize the rights of the ICESCR. 
75 Alston & Quinn explain that the soft language for the seeking-side follows from the drafting of 
the ICESCR: UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.233 (1951) 8, cited by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 187. Although 
this explicitly constitutes a ‘duty’ to request or seek assistance, it also implies a duty to accept at 
the same time; otherwise the request would be futile as it would do nothing to supplementing the 
requesting state’s resources. See further Judith Bueno de Mesquita, Paul Hunt & Rajat Khosla, 
‘The Human Rights Responsibility of International Assistance and Cooperation in Health’ in 
Mark Gibney & Sigrun I. Skogly (eds), Universal Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2010) 113. 
76 Based on W. Verwey, The Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the 
Realization of the Right to Development and Welfare (1980) 22 and F. van Hoof, ‘Problems and 
Prospects with Respect to the Right to Food’ in P. van Dijk et al. (eds.) Restructuring the 






of the ICESCR. When a state claims that it could not carry out its obligations for 
reasons beyond its control (i.e. being unable to do so), the state has the ‘burden of 
proving that this is the case and that it has unsuccessfully sought to obtain 
international support to ensure the availability and accessibility of the necessary 
food’.77 Here, the duty to justify why a state did not fulfil its obligations under the 
right to food implies a duty to seek international assistance and cooperation, 
because proof that such assistance has been sought illustrates that the state was in 
fact willing to meet its obligations, yet unable to do so.  
Finally, some remarks on the meaning of ‘cooperation’ and ‘assistance’ as used 
by the CESCR are in place. In the understanding of the CESCR, ‘assistance’ is a 
specific kind of ‘cooperation’, where ‘cooperation’ must not be considered as 
development cooperation only.78 ‘Assistance’ would refer to the transfer of ‘funds, 
goods, and services’, as such indicating a one-way direction.79 Apparently, it was 
not at first the intention to include the word ‘assistance’, as illustrated by early 
drafts of article 2(1) that merely speak of ‘cooperation’. 80  In general, states 
responded negatively on the inclusion of ‘international assistance’. According to 
many states, ‘assistance’ can never be regarded as an obligation since it must be 
given out of free will (as such acknowledging that this part of article 2(1), at least, 
constitutes obligations). 81  Even so, the mere fact that in the drafting process 
obligations to international assistance and cooperation were not foreseen is not 
enough to conclude that no such obligations exist: 
 
On the basis of the preparatory work it is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain the 
argument that the commitment to international cooperation contained in the 
Covenant can accurately be characterised as a legally binding obligation upon any 
particular state to provide any particular form of assistance. It would, however, be 
unjustified to go further and suggest that the relevant commitment is meaningless.82 
 
What has been seen is so far is that the CESCR is not consistent nor fully clear 
in its understanding of ‘international assistance and cooperation’, on the one hand 
seeing it as a noncommittal option out of a number of other possibilities to realize 
the rights of the ICESCR and on the other hand as an obligation in the sense that it 
must necessarily be used to realize the rights of the ICESCR. Only where the 
Committee distinguishes between offering/providing and seeking/accepting 
international assistance and cooperation, some clarity is achieved, where the 
                                                        
77 CESCR, GC 12 (n 40) para 17.  
78 Craven (n 20) 147 cited by Rolf Künnemann, ‘Extraterritorial Application of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, Antwerp 2004) 203, 204. 
Künnemann bases this conclusion on the General Comments. 
79 Künnemann (n 78) 203. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Alston & Quinn (n 19) 190-1. 
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CESCR is more inclined to acknowledge the existence of an obligation to offer 
assistance than an obligation to accept (or seek) assistance. However, ‘there should 
be no doubt that the Committee considers that there are ‘legal’ obligations in regard 
to international assistance and cooperation’.83 This view is shared by Paul Hunt, 
former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health:  
 
If there is no legal obligation underpinning the human rights responsibility of 
international assistance and cooperation, inescapably all international assistance and 
cooperation fundamentally rests upon charity. While such a position might have been 
tenable in years gone by, it is unacceptable in the twenty-first century.84  
 
The exact ‘scope and content of international obligations still needs to be 
determined’ but other instruments of international law also refer to ‘international 
cooperation’.85 For example, the UN Charter – to which the ICESCR refers in its 
preamble – describes as one of the purposes of the UN ‘to achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human 
rights’.86 In addition, article 55 explains that certain conditions are required for 
international stability and peace, like higher standards of living, international 
cultural and educational cooperation, and universal respect for human rights. These 
purposes must be achieved, according to article 56, through joint and separate 
action of states in cooperation with the UN. Here again the articles do not provide 
any details with regard to what is expected from states and it is therefore very 
difficult to determine which parts constitute obligations, and what exactly these 
obligations would entail.87  The OAS does provide some details on obligations: 
‘Member States have obligations to work together for economic, social, and cultural 
                                                        
83 Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ (n 17) 278. Sepúlveda 
refers to other sources where the same conclusion is drawn, for example the Limburg Principles. 
Even so, she also acknowledges that in the years between the CESCR’s start with clarifying the 
scope and meaning of obligations and the time of her research more than ten years later, the 
meaning of the phrase has not become much clearer. 
84 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Paul Hunt, Addendum: Missions to the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC (20 October 2006) UN Doc. 
A/HRC/7/11/Add.2 of 5 March 2008, para 133 cited by Bueno de Mesquita, Hunt & Khosla (n 75) 
112. 
85 Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ (n 17) 275 & 278. 
86  Article 1(2) and (3) UN Charter. A comparable purpose can also be found for the OAS: 
‘(a)mong the core purposes of the OAS is the promotion, through cooperative action, of economic 
and social development’; Brian Concannon Jr. & Beatrice Lindstrom, ‘Cheaper, Better, Longer-
Lasting: A Rights-Based Approach to Disaster Response in Haiti’ (2011) 25 Emory International 
Law Review 1145, 1154 (footnotes omitted), referring to article 2(f) OAS Charter. 






rights, particularly when a state is seriously affected by conditions it cannot remedy 
alone’.88  
In Chapter II it has already been said that also the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child contains references to international assistance and cooperation. The CRC 
refers in article 4 to international assistance and cooperation and to using the 
maximum of available resources.89 The importance of international cooperation is 
also reiterated in the CRC’s preamble, in article 23 on rights of disabled children, in 
article 28 on the right to education and in article 45 on implementation of the 
CRC.90 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has frequently assessed when 
assessing state reports ‘whether ‘international assistance is needed’ for the 
fulfilment of the rights contained therein’.91 In the Concluding Observations the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child time and again recommends a state party to 
‘increase international assistance and to use the principles and provisions of the 
Convention as a framework for its programme of international development 
assistance’.92 
For now, it is only possible to give some general indications of obligations in the 
context of international cooperation and assistance, a conclusion that others also 
arrived at: ‘(i)n the context of the human rights responsibility of international 
assistance and cooperation, the devil is not in the detail, but in sweeping 
generalizations of an entirely abstract nature’.93 More detail can be found in the 
substantive articles of the ICESCR: ‘(i)n the context of a given right it may, 
according to the circumstances, be possible to identify obligations to cooperate 
internationally that would appear to be mandatory on the basis of the undertaking 
contained in Article 2(1) of the Covenant’.94 In other words, to determine whether 
an obligation regarding international cooperation and assistance exists, it must be 
considered what the circumstances are in individual cases for separate rights: ‘(i)n 
our view, the way forward is to look at this human rights responsibility in relation 
to specific sectors, issues, and rights’.95  
 
                                                        
88 Concannon & Lindstrom (n 86) 1154 (footnotes omitted), referring to articles 37 of the OAS 
Charter.  
89  The text reads: ‘with regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States parties shall 
undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, 
within the framework of international co-operation’. 
90 In addition, the CRC refers in articles 24 and 28 to ‘progressive realization’, and in article 23 to 
‘available resources’. 
91 Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ (n 17) 276. Sepúlveda 
cites the example of the List of Issues Trinidad and Tobago (UN Doc. CRC/C/Q/TRI/1 of 13 June 
1997). 
92 Concluding Observations Australia (UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.79) para 25, cited by Sepúlveda, 
‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ (n 17) 276. 
93 Bueno de Mesquita, Hunt & Khosla (n 75) 128-9 (emphasis in original). 
94 Alston & Quinn (n 19) 191. 




The Content and Meaning of Article 2(1) ICESCR 
141 
4.4 To the maximum of its available resources 
 
As was the case with the phrase ‘individually or through international assistance 
and cooperation’, the phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ can be 
understood in two ways. First, it can be an obligation stating that as many resources 
as possible must be obtained for the realisation of the ICESCR (making it part of 
the whole set of obligations stemming from article 2(1)). In the second place, it 
could also be understood as a justification for non-compliance: when the state does 
not meet certain obligations, it can argue that it did not have the resources to 
comply. For this research it is crucial what the meaning of the phrase is. In the first 
option states appear to have a duty to seek assistance if their own resources are 
insufficient (which is not uncommon in disaster situations). The second option 
means that states can use the occurrence of a disaster – and consequently not having 
sufficient resources – as a justification for non-compliance.  
In the travaux préparatoires of the ICESCR it has been stressed on various 
occasions that having insufficient resources should not be considered as a ground to 
circumvent obligations.96 To prevent abuse it has been argued that ‘real’ resources 
should be taken into account instead of only considering allocations made by the 
government. 97  Furthermore, ‘resources’ were meant ‘to include whatever 
international as well as national resources were available’, so that states were not 
free to ‘arbitrarily and artificially determine for themselves the level of commitment 
required by the Covenant’.98 Any discretion granted to states ‘cannot be entirely 
open-ended or it would have the de facto effect of nullifying the existence of any 
real obligation’.99 ‘To the maximum of its available resources’ therefore includes 
those resources available internationally and using the maximum of available 
resources is an obligation, giving ground for the related obligation to seek 
international assistance if insufficient resources are available.100 
Notwithstanding the intentions of the drafters, it appears that the CESCR 
considers the phrase to be a justification for non-compliance, but with some 
limitations. These limitations lie in certain obligations a state has at all times, also 
when little resources are available. States should always, at the very least, continue 
                                                        
96 It must be noted that although ‘resources’ has a connotation to consists of monetary resources, 
it can also include material items like ‘equipment’. See Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 
(7th edition 2007) 1293. 
97 Alston & Quinn (n 19) 178. 
98 Ibid, 179. 
99 Ibid, 177.  
100 The CESCR too recognized the phrase as ‘intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to 
both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international community 
through international cooperation and assistance’. CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 13. This was 
repeated in General Comment 4: ‘To the extent that any such steps are considered to be beyond 
the maximum resources available  to a State party, it is appropriate that a request be made as soon 
as possible for international cooperation’; CESCR, GC 4 (n 40) para 10 (emphasis added to 






to monitor and to make strategies and plans (which is in line with ‘undertakes to 
take steps’),101 and in times of ‘severe resources constraints’ the state must at least 
take care of the most vulnerable groups through ‘relatively low-cost targeted 
programmes’.102 Moreover, the minimum core obligations of each right must also 
be realized at all times. A minimum core obligation – or the core content of a right 
– must 
 
Ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the 
rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which 
any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant. If 
the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a minimum core 
obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être.  
 
While the core contents must at all times be realized (by General Comment 17 it is 
even explicitly stated that the core contents are non-derogable), the CESCR did 
however leave an opening for situations of resource constraints: 
 
It must be noted that any assessment as to whether a State has discharged its 
minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying 
within the country concerned. (…) In order for a State party to be able to attribute its 
failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources 
it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum 
obligations.103 
 
Consequently, not having sufficient resources to realize certain rights of the 
ICESCR can be used as a justification for non-compliance, but not for all 
                                                        
101 ‘A State party cannot escape the unequivocal obligation to adopt a plan of action on the 
grounds that the necessary resources are not available. If the obligation could be avoided in this 
way, there would be no justification for the unique requirement contained in article 14 which 
applies, almost by definition, to situations characterized by inadequate financial resources’. 
CESCR, GC 11 (n 40) para 9. 
102 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 11-2. Also in General Comment 5 it is stated that ‘the duty of States 
parties to protect the vulnerable members of their societies assumes greater rather than less 
importance in times of severe resource constraints; CESCR, General Comment 5 on ‘Persons with 
disabilities’ of 9 December 1994, para 10; see also CESCR, General Comment 6 on ‘The 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons’ of 8 December 1995, para 17, CESCR, 
GC 15 (n 41) para 13; CESCR, CESCR, GC 17 (n 41), para 20; CESCR, GC 21 (n 41) para 23. 
103 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 10. This is also confirmed by others. See inter alia Craven (n 20) 
141, citing A. Eide, ‘Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold 
Approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal 35, 43-7, Mratchkov E/C12/1990/SR.46, at 8 
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obligations,104 and not when a state has failed to seek additional resources through 
international assistance and cooperation. Here, the difference between an unable 
and unwilling state becomes clear. An unable state has tried to obtain additional 
resources, an unwilling state is either not using the maximum of its available 
resources or has not tried to obtain additional resources internationally. 105  To 
monitor the use of resources, the CESCR had to overcome some practical hurdles. 
Allocation of resources is a matter of the state and the Committee cannot easily 
judge on compliance and it cannot dictate how each state must allocate its 
resources.106 Therefore, only in case of non-compliance with other obligations the 
use of resources is checked: ‘the question of resources enters into the discussion at 
the point of determining whether or not the minimum core obligation has been 
satisfied’. 107  Not fulfilling certain obligations results in a violation of the 
Covenant,108 on which the Committee assesses the budgetary decisions and claims 
on resources made by the state party and gives its opinion on it.109 This approach 
appears to solve a number of difficulties the CESCR would have in monitoring:  
 
As far as the Committee is concerned, it avoids the problems of measuring progress 
against resources availability, of speculating as to alternate courses of action, or of 
acquiring evidence of State responsibility. In cases where significant numbers of 
                                                        
104 As inter alia depicted in GC 14: ‘If resource constraints render it impossible for a State to 
comply fully with its Covenant obligations, it has the burden of justifying that every effort has 
nevertheless been made to use all available resources at its disposal in order to satisfy, as a matter 
of priority, the obligations outlined above.’ CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 47; the same words are 
used in CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 41 and in CESCR, GC 17 (n 41) para 41. 
105 See for example CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 47: ‘(a) State which is unwilling to use the 
maximum of its available resources for the realization of the right to health is in violation of its 
obligations under article 12’. Notably, the CESCR argues that this is a violation of article 12, and 
not of article 2(1) which contains the phrase ‘maximum of its available resources’. The same 
terminology is used in CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 41, only ending the phrase with ‘is in violation 
of its obligations under the Covenant’. In GC 17 also the same terminology is used, but then 
ending the phrase with reference the particular right under discussion; CESCR, GC 17 (n 41) para 
41; see further CESCR, GC 18 (n 41) para 32 with explicit referral to article 6 ICESCR. 
106 Although states have certain obligations of realizing minimum core obligations, limiting the 
freedom of resource allocation slightly as it is directed by the obligations stemming from the 
ICESCR. Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 315. Alston & Quinn (n 19) 181. As an 
extra check, the Committee recommends the involvement of national courts in the allocation of 
resources; CESCR, GC 9 (n 29) para 10. 
107 Craven (n 20) 143. 
108 Ibid, 142. 
109 Ibid, 137. Resources allocated to a certain goal must be used for that goal, through which a 
state has the duty to prevent corruption and to make sure that resources are used properly: 
Concluding Observations Nigeria (UN Doc. E/1999/22 paras 97 and 119), Concluding 
Observations Mexico (UN Doc. E/2000/22 paras 381 and 394) and Concluding Observations 
Colombia (UN Doc. E/ 1996/22 para 181), cited by Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 






people live in poverty and hunger, it is for the State to show that its failure to provide 
for the persons concerned was beyond its control.110 
 
The burden of proof is transferred to the state, yet it must first be determined 
whether or not a certain obligation has been fulfilled, which is challenging 
enough.111 If a situation of non-compliance is found in which it is concluded that 
insufficient resources were available, it does not automatically mean that the 
problem of non-compliance would indeed have been resolved by using more 
resources.112  
In the context of the the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR – creating room 
for individual complaints – the evaluation of complaints regarding the obligation 
to use the maximum of available resources has been explained following this 
line. In the words of the CESCR: 
 
The “availability of resources”, although an important qualifier to the obligation to 
take steps, does not alter the immediacy of the obligation, nor can resource 
constraints alone justify inaction. Where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to ensure the widest possible 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights under the prevailing circumstances. 
The Committee has already emphasized that, even in times of severe resource 
constraints, States parties must protect the most disadvantaged and marginalized 
members or groups of society by adopting relatively low-cost targeted programmes.  
 
The undertaking by a State party to use “the maximum” of its available resources 
(…) entitles it to receive resources offered by the international community. (…)113 
 
For evaluating individual complaints on this ground, the CESCR explicitly 
stated that if a country is recovering from a disaster, that particular circumstance 
will be taken into account. In addition, whether or not the state has rejected 
offers of assistance will also be taken into account.114 Using the maximum of 
available resources is therefore an obligation of conduct, including seeking 




                                                        
110 Craven (n 20) 143.  
111 The core obligations can be useful here, as they are somewhat easier to measure due to the 
relatively concrete formulation. 
112 As already issued by the US; Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
para 701, reporters’ note 8, 467 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) cited by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 178. 
113 CESCR, ‘Statement by the Committee: An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the 
“Maximum of Available Resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2007/1 of 21 September 2007) paras 4 and 5. 
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4.5 With a view to achieving progressively the full realization 
 
Perhaps the most controversial and ambiguous phrase of article 2(1) ICESCR is that 
of ‘progressive realization’, as it seems to make the existence of any direct 
obligations under the ICESCR impossible. ‘Progressive realization’ has been 
referred to as the ‘linchpin of the whole Covenant’ because the meaning and nature 
of state obligations turns on this phrase.115 Since ‘progressive realization’ is not 
found within the ICCPR, it is often assumed that the ICCPR contains immediate 
obligations and the ICESCR does not. Yet even in the context of civil and political 
rights it is impossible to claim that all rights are suitable for immediate 
implementation.116 For some rights, certain efforts and plans are required, making 
progressive realization the only option. 117  In the preparatory phase, this was 
acknowledged by looking at categories of rights that can be realized immediately, 
or those that would require long-term planning and programming.118 
The CESCR responded to the difficulties of the phrase at an early stage: 
 
The fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen under 
the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the 
realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring 
full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase 
must be read in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the 
Covenant which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the 
full realization of the rights in question.119  
 
What ‘progressive realization’ means in terms of obligations has been explained in 
the same paragraph: to ‘move as expeditiously and effectively as possible’ towards 
realizing the rights of the ICESCR.120  
It has been confirmed by the CESCR that immediate as well as long-term 
obligations follow from the ICESCR.121 The phrase ‘achieving progressively the 
full realization’ indicates long-term obligations (to achieve in the end full 
                                                        
115 Alston & Quinn (n 19) 172. 
116 Craven (n 20) 130. 
117 See e.g. Van Hoof (n 76), cited by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 172. 
118 6 UN GAOR C.3 (565th mtg.) para 9, UN Doc. A/C.3/565 (1952) cited by Alston & Quinn (n 
19) 173. 
119 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 9. 
120 Ibid. The same words have also been used in CESCR, GC 13 (n 41) para 44; CESCR, GC 17 
(n 41) para 26; and CESCR, GC 18 (n 41) para 20. This interpretation is in line with the general 
meaning of the words, where ‘progressive’ means ‘steadily and continuously’. Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s Dictionary (7th edition 2007) 1207. 
121 See CESCR, GC 12 (n 40) para 16; see also CESCR, GC 13 (n 41) para 43: ‘While the 
Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowledges the constraints due to the limits 







realization), but even so there is an immediate obligation to start taking steps:122 
‘the implementation of the rights in question should be pursued without respite’.123 
‘Undertake to take steps’ and ‘progressive realization’ are consequently inextricably 
linked to each other: ‘to promote progressive realization of the relevant rights to the 
maximum of their available resources clearly requires Governments to do much 
more than merely abstain from taking measures which might have a negative 
impact on persons with disabilities’.124  
‘The ultimate objective of the Covenant [namely] the ‘full realization’ of the 
rights’ is what must be achieved progressively. 125  Using ‘full realization’ was 
preferred over ‘implementation’, as this would ‘strengthen rather than to weaken 
the objective set before future contracting parties’.126 However, in combination with 
‘progressive’, this phrase ‘introduced a dynamic element, indicating that no fixed 
goal had been set’,127 and that ‘the realization of those rights did not stop at a given 
level’. 128  In each individual state party ESC-rights are in different stages of 
realization and that the further realization strongly depends on the economic and 
social circumstances in each state. Obligations imposed on state parties could 
therefore not be phrased in absolute terms.129 Consequently, the obligation of result 
leaves room for individual state circumstances, but making it difficult to measure 
compliance.  
A consequence of ‘progressive realization’ is that taking retrogressive measures 
can in principle not be allowed. ‘Progressive realization’ indicates ‘a continuous 
improvement of conditions over time without backward movement of any kind – in 
what may be described as a form of ‘ratchet effect’.’130 It can be argued that it is 
                                                        
122  CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 30, which is repeated in CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 17 and in 
CESCR, GC 17 (n 41) para 25. 
123 7 UN ESCOR C.4 (233rd mtg.) at 8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.233 (1951) (Mr. Azmi Bey, Egypt) 
cited by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 175. 
124  CESCR, GC 5 (n 102) para 9. See also CESCR, GC 12 (n 40) para 14: the ‘principal 
obligation is to take steps to achieve progressively the full realization of the right to adequate food’ 
(italics in original). 
125 Craven (n 20) 128. 
126 Cassin (France) E/CN.4/SR.223, at 8 (1951) cited by Craven (n 20) 128. 
127 Sørensen (Denmark) E/CN.4/SR.236 at 21 (1951) cited by Craven (n 20) 129. 
128 Mr Whitlam (Australia) E/CN.4/SR.237 at 5 (1951) cited by Craven (n 20) 129. 
129 8 UN ESCOR C.4 (271st mtg.) at 12, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.271 (1952) (Mr. Azkoul, Lebanon) 
cited by Alston & Quinn (n 19) 174. 
130  Craven (n 20) 131 (also citing the Committee’s repetitive formulation on retrogressive 
measures); Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 319-20. The obligation of 
‘continuous improvement’ can be found in article 11 ICESCR, where it is provided that there 
must be a ‘continuous improvement of living conditions’. Retrogressive measures are mentioned 
in CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 9; CESCR, GC 13 (n 41) para 45; CESCR, GC 14 (n 41) para 32 and 
48; CESCR, GC 15 (n 41) para 19 and 42; CESCR, GC 16 (n 44) para 42; CESCR, GC 17 (n 41)  
para 27 and 42; CESCR, (n 41) para 21; CESCR, GC 19 (n 41) para 42 and 64 (where in para 42 
criteria have been formulated); and CESCR, GC 21 (n 41) para 46 (speaking of ‘regressive 
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possible for states to violate their obligations by not acting.131 If a deterioration of 
the level of rights takes place and the state does not undertake action, it would 
violate the ICESCR.132 Retrogressive measures are not violations of obligations per 
se, but when such measures are taken it is provided that such measures ‘require the 
most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use 
of the maximum available resources’.133 The CESCR provides two justifications for 
taking a retrogressive measure: ‘for the purpose of improving the situation with 
regard to the ‘totality of the rights in the Covenant’ and an economic crisis which 
makes progression impossible even if all available resources are used.134 
In their reports states are expected to show progress over time with respect to 
effective realization of the rights, including quantitative and qualitative data.135 
Through the reports containing the plans made by the state parties, the CESCR is 
able to monitor progress made.136 Progressive realization does not preclude the 
obligation of immediate realization where this is possible, but the CESCR assumes 
that also developed states work on realizing the rights progressively and it has, at 
times, ‘been unwilling to accept statements of government representatives claiming 
that the rights are fully implemented in their country’.137 It remains difficult to 
determine exactly what ‘progression’ is, how much progression is possible in an 
individual country, and to what extent non-realization is attributable to the state.138 
It must be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether and to what extent a state has 
done all it can to realize the rights of the Covenant. 
                                                        
131 See for a more detailed overview of the evolution in case law Sepúlveda, The Nature of the 
Obligations (n 16) 320, n 46. 
132 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 321. Examples of this view can be found in 
Concluding Observations (threats to natural environments in the Solomon Islands affecting article 
11, Concluding Observations Solomon Islands UN Doc. E/2000/22 paras 204 and 209; increase of 
HIV infections in the Russian Federation, Concluding Observations Russian Federation UN Doc. 
E/1998/22 paras 113 and 126; protection against sexual exploitation of children in Sri Lanka, CO 
Sri Lanka UN Doc. E/1999/22 paras 76 and 90. These examples are derived from Sepúlveda, The 
Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 322. 
133 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 9. See Craven (n 20) 132. 
134 Craven (n 20) 132.  
135 CESCR, GC 1 (n 67) para 7. 
136 The General Comment on the right to education illustrates this: within two years state parties 
must work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive realization within a 
reasonable number of years to achieve free and compulsory primary education (paras 1 & 8). The 
number of years deemed reasonable by the state party must be fixed in the plan of action. CESCR, 
GC 11 (n 40) para 10. 
137 The example mentioned by Craven is the reaction to the Austrian representative’s statement 
that its domestic situation was fully in conformity with the Covenant: E/C.12/1988/SR.4 at 2 para 
3, Craven (n 20) 133. 
138 Craven mentions the example of homeless persons: it is difficult to determine whether a person 







4.6 By all appropriate means 
 
The phrase ‘by all appropriate means’ is not widely discussed in the General 
Comments apart from the explanation by the CESCR that it is a means to satisfy the 
obligation ‘to take steps’.139 Because article 2(1) ICESCR mentions ‘particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures’ to be included in ‘all appropriate means’, the 
CESCR provides some further clarification on this. ‘All appropriate means’ should 
not be limited to legislative measures only, but instead the phrase must be given its 
‘full and natural meaning’. 140  From the travaux préparatoires it follows that 
‘legislative measures’ were indeed not meant as an obligatory element in the 
realization of ESC-rights, but merely as one out of many examples of means to fully 
realize the rights.141 Also according to the ILC, legislative measures are ‘the most 
normal and appropriate for achieving the purposes of the Covenant in question’, yet 
not the sole means.142 Appropriate means are for example judicial, administrative, 
financial, educational or social measures.143 
The CESCR has addressed the question what ‘appropriate’ is and determined 
that while the state must decide which means it finds appropriate, ‘the ultimate 
determination as to whether all appropriate measures have been taken remains one 
for the Committee to make’.144 The measures taken are required to be ‘reasonable’ 
and ‘effective’, and they must produce results compatible with the obligations under 
the Covenant.145 Through plans for full realization, including the identification of 
certain benchmarks to monitor progress, it is possible for the CESCR to determine 
what constitutes ‘appropriate means’.146  
Consequently, ‘all appropriate means’ are considered to be a means to an end 
and an open-ended indication of obligations of conduct aimed at the full realization 
of the rights. How this must be achieved is not precisely defined. Yet, at the same 
time states must act in good faith when deciding which means would be appropriate 
for their specific context. In the ICCPR an equal phrase can be found. In this 
context, the meaning of the phrase has been described as imposing a ‘‘conditional’ 
obligation of conduct’. 147  This description strokes with the meaning found in 
ICESCR-context.  
                                                        
139 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 3. 
140 Ibid, para 4. The CESCR is at one point explicit in an example: creating effective remedies, 
which is also emphasized in the ICCPR, is an appropriate means of immediate effect; ibid, para 5. 
‘Means’ in its ‘natural meaning’ refers to ‘an action, an object or a system by which a result is 
achieved; a way of achieving or doing something’, or ‘the money that a person has’. 
141 UN Doc E/CN.4/SR.427 at 10 (1954) cited by Craven (n 20) 125. 
142 ILC (1977) 2 Yearbook ILC 20, para 8 cited by Craven (n 20) 117. 
143 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 7 cited by Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 336. 
144 CESCR, GC 3 (n 29) para 4. 
145 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 337. 
146 Craven (n 20) 118. 
147 For example article 23(4) ICCPR, providing ‘States Parties to the present Covenant shall take 








What has been done in this section is analysing the ordinary meaning of words, yet 
in the broadest meaning possible. To find the legal content of each of the phrases of 
article 2(1) discussed above, a wide variety of sources has been included. This has 
resulted in a preliminary overview of general obligations stemming from article 
2(1). At certain points it has already been concluded that these phrases must be 
considered together, which is done here. The main findings will be reiterated in 
short before moving on the final conclusions in which all elements of the 
interpretation are taken together. 
State parties to the ICESCR must from the moment of becoming a party to the 
Covenant take steps that are targeted at the full realization of the rights of the 
ICESCR. Although there is room for full realization in steps and therefore for 
progressive realization, it does not mean that states can stand still in human rights 
achievements. For the progression states must use all available resources, also those 
available internationally. If a state’s own resources are inadequate, states must seek 
additional resources from the international community. This is one clear element of 
the duty to international assistance and cooperation; otherwise the reference to 
international assistance and cooperation remains rather unclear as to which exact 
obligations follow from it.148  
 
5 CONSIDERING CONTEXT, OBJECT AND PURPOSE AND ORDINARY MEANING 
TOGETHER: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the findings of this Chapter – consisting of the context, object and purpose 
and ordinary meaning of article 2(1) ICESCR – it is possible to construct the 
article’s content and meaning in terms of obligations. The CESCR formulated 
obligations stemming from article 2(1) in terms of obligations of conduct (‘object’) 
and obligations of result (‘purpose’), and in immediate obligations and long-term 
obligations. The long-term obligation of result is the full realization of rights; the 
obligations of conduct (immediate as well as long-term) follow from the phrases of 
article 2(1). Although the obligations formulated by the CESCR are directed at the 
state parties to the ICESCR, certain obligations to respect (and other obligations 
acquiring abstention from states to meet that obligation) can be clearly adhered to 
by non-state parties under the ‘do no harm’-principle. The nature of these 
obligations are primarily formulated in the context of substantive rights and will 
therefore be mentioned in the next Chapter.  
                                                        
148  The obligatory nature of international assistance and cooperation in case of insufficient 
resources has been explicitly recognized during the drafting of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR. Commission on Human Rights, ‘Elements of an Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Analytical Paper by the Chairperson-







The phrase ‘undertakes to take steps’ is in terms of obligations inextricably 
linked to the phrase ‘with a view to achieving progressively the full realization’. 
State parties are obliged to take action to achieve the purpose of the treaty from the 
moment of becoming a party to the ICESCR. The steps taken should be deliberate, 
concrete and targeted towards the purpose, although circumstances may dictate the 
size of the steps taken. Through these steps, rights are being realized progressively. 
Progressive realization indicates the steady and continuous movement (as 
expeditiously and effectively as possible) towards a certain goal, in this case the full 
realization of rights, where there is no room for a state to do nothing: progression 
does not mean a standstill. Since ‘with a view to’ is part of this phrase, states must 
have the intention to actually realize the rights, something that has also become 
clear from ‘undertakes’. Consequently, ‘undertakes to take steps with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization’ constitutes immediate obligations of 
conduct to take action and to continue this action, which must be aimed at the long-
term obligation of full realization of rights. Retrogressive measures, which include 
deterioration of the level of rights enjoyment through passiveness of the state, 
cannot be allowed, but if they are nonetheless taken they must be fully justified. 
The phrases ‘individually and through international assistance and cooperation’ 
and ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ must also be considered together. 
Being obligations of conduct, these phrases explain how the full realization of rights 
must be achieved. Apart from taking steps individually, states should or could make 
use of international assistance and cooperation. The extent to which this is an 
obligation is not entirely clear but a few indicators have been found. Distinguishing 
between offering/providing states on the one hand and requesting/accepting states 
on the other, the CESCR is more inclined to assume a duty to offer or provide than 
to request or accept. Possibly, obligations to international assistance and 
cooperation may be found within the context of substantive rights, but more detail 
is needed before this can be confirmed or refuted. Only when looking at the phrase 
‘maximum of its available resources’ a clear obligation to use international 
assistance and cooperation can be found. When a state has insufficient resources to 
take steps towards full realization, and therefore to make sufficient progression, 
there is an obligation to use those resources available internationally. This is in line 
with the legal framework on accepting international humanitarian assistance where 
the needs-assessment must demonstrate whether the affected state’s capacity is 
sufficient and, if not, the affected state must trigger the process of obtaining 
international humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, within the ICESCR not having 
sufficient resources can be used as a justification for non-compliance, but only if 
the state has tried to obtain additional resources internationally and not for the 
obligations that are non-derogable, like the non-discrimination provision or the core 
obligations of each right. This can be compared to the evaluation of offers during 
the second stage of the legal framework on accepting assistance where the affected 
state must seek international assistance but also has discretionary space to 
determine whether offers by international actors are needed, suitable and in line 
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‘By all appropriate means’ refers to an open-ended obligation of conduct that 
state parties must use any means available to achieve the full realization of rights. It 
will differ from case-to-case which means are suitable, acceptable, and/or correct 
for the circumstances. Basically, this phrase is an extra confirmation of ‘undertakes 
to take steps’, leaving open which steps must be taken. 
Consequently, state parties to the ICESCR are under the obligation to achieve 
the full realisation of rights. They must start to work towards this goal continuously 
from the moment they have become a party to the ICESCR. Working towards the 
final goal occurs in steps or stages without deterioration of the level of rights 
enjoyment. State parties are obliged to make use of their maximum available 
resources which they have to obtain – if necessary – internationally. Whether 
making use of international assistance and cooperation is an obligation outside 
situations in which insufficient resources are available does not become clear 
because the CESCR is not consistently taking a line and because more detail is 
required to determine the exact scope of the phrase. Based on the location of article 
2(1) in the ICESCR it can be concluded that the general obligations found here are 
applicable on each individual right as provided in Part III of the treaty and the 
substantive rights may provide the context that is needed to formulate more precise 
obligations.  
At this point, the obligations found in article 2(1) provide a general idea of what 
the duties are of an affected state, but only when these general obligations are 
placed in the light of disaster response it is possible to give a more detailed 
description of what these obligations mean for the affected state when it comes to 
accepting international humanitarian assistance. To give even more detail to the 
obligations article 2(1) must be considered together with concrete rights, in this case 
the rights most often affected by disasters: housing, food, water and health. This 
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To be able to place the findings of the previous Chapter in the light of disaster 
response, the framework as described in the first Part of this research will be 
included. This allows to see the obligations found for article 2(1) in the broader 
context of obligations on accepting humanitarian assistance. The three steps of the 
legal framework are the primary role of the affected state, the initiation or triggering 
of international humanitarian assistance, and the acceptance of international 
humanitarian assistance. The obligations of article 2(1) are placed in this framework 
to see how much room individual state parties receive to fulfil their obligations 
individually and when article 2(1) prescribes that states must look for international 
assistance and cooperation. As the last step, it will be considered how article 2(1) 
sets standards on accepting international assistance. 
Apart from placing the findings of the previous Chapter in the light of disaster 
response and applying them on the substantive rights of the ICESCR, this Chapter 
will address a question that has remained unanswered so far. In Chapter II it was 
explained that derogation from human rights obligations is possible during the 
existence of a ‘state of emergency’, at least under the ICCPR. Before looking at 
disaster-specific obligations for state parties to the ICESCR, it would not be 
superfluous to first establish to what extent state parties to the ICESCR may 
derogate from their obligations in (post-) disaster obligations. Section 2 will provide 
an answer to this question. Next, in section 3, the findings of the previous Chapter 
will be considered in the context of disaster response resulting in an overview of the 
general obligations that states must adhere to immediately after a disaster. With 
these results, the rights to housing, food, water and health will be analysed in 
section 4 to find out whether any concrete standards can be identified that dictate 

















Article 4 of the ICCPR contains an option to derogate from certain obligations 
under that treaty in case of an emergency.1 The ICESCR does not contain a similar 
derogation clause, but still it is at times questioned whether it is possible to derogate 
from the obligations stemming from the ICESCR in times of an emergency. The 
answer to this question is of particular importance in this research. If the option to 
derogate would indeed exist, it would be no use to look at disaster-specific 
obligations of states since these could be set aside. Therefore, this section will 
establish to what extent states have an option to derogate during emergencies under 
the ICESCR.  
The function of a derogation-clause is to temporarily stop the working of a 
certain right due to an exceptional situation.2 Consequently, people cannot appeal to 
that right during the time of derogation. To protect people against abuse of 
derogation, there are some criteria and requirements before states can derogate from 
their obligations. Looking at the text of article 4 ICCPR, a number of safeguards 
can be identified.3 Moreover, a number of provisions are excluded from derogation, 
like the right to life of article 6.4  
The drafters of the ICESCR apparently considered the option of limitation of the 
rights since in article 4 ICESCR a limitation-clause is included, yet did apparently 
not consider it necessary to include a derogation-clause in the ICESCR. When 
considering the preparatory work of the ICESCR, no specific discussion can be 
found ‘on the issue of whether or not a derogation clause was considered necessary, 
or even appropriate, in the context of a covenant dealing with economic, social, and 
                                                        
1 Article 4 ICCPR provides ‘In time of public emergency (...) the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant (...)’. 
Comparable derogation-clauses can be found in article 15 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, article 30 of the European Social Charter, and article 27 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
2 Jan-Peter Loof, Mensenrechten en staatsveiligheid: verenigbare grootheden? Opschorting en 
beperking van mensenrechtenbescherming tijdens noodtoestanden en andere situaties die de 
staatsveiligheid bedreigen (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2005) 378; Jaime Oraá, Human 
Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1992) 9-10. 
3 According to article 4, the emergency must threaten the life of the nation, the existence of the 
state of emergency must be officially proclaimed, derogation is allowed to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, the measures may not be inconsistent with other 
obligations under international law and may not be discriminatory. In addition, the state declaring 
the state of emergency must immediately inform the other States Parties of the provisions from 
which it has derogated and of the reasons by which it was actuated and of the date of ending the 
state of emergency.  
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cultural rights’. 5  If the drafters discussed or considered the inclusion of a 
derogation-clause, it must either be recorded in the drafting history or a derogation-
clause would have been included in the ICESCR.6  
The mystery of the missing derogation clause has led to different opinions on 
the implications. Roughly, these opinions can be divided into two positions that 
appear to arrive at different conclusions but at closer scrutiny are in line with each 
other. Here, the opinions will be presented as different positions after which their 
overlap is clarified, which forms the basis for the position on derogation taken here. 
The first position argues that due to the nature of the ICESCR derogation is not 
possible. The second position contends that the option to derogate is implied in the 
obligations of the ICESCR.  
 
2.2 Position 1: Derogation is not possible in the context of the ICESCR 
 
The obsolete idea that the ICESCR does not contain concrete obligations but merely 
policy indicators makes the existence of a derogation-clause superfluous. In that 
case it is argued that without obligations there is no need to have an option to 
derogate and that derogation even becomes impossible. 7  When considering the 
earlier discussion on the obligations stemming from article 2(1) though, it is clear 
that this position is not supported here.  
Another argument supporting the position that derogation from obligations 
under the ICESCR is not possible is founded on the words ‘progressive realization’ 
as used in article 2(1). When understanding progressive realization as allowing a 
state to bring progression at a standstill in exceptional situations, it is not possible to 
derogate from obligations. The formulation of progressive realization stands in the 
way of derogation. This argument is also refuted here. In the first place it has 
already been established that progressive realization cannot be used in this way, 
although available resources and special circumstances may determine the amount 
of progression that can be expected. In addition, it is determined that absolute 
standstill is not acceptable: for example the non-derogable core obligations that the 
CESCR identified for most rights must be realized at all times and there is an 
obligation of continuous improvement.8 As will also be argued further below, even 
                                                        
5 Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of State Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, (1987) 9 Human Rights 
Quarterly 156, 217. 
6 See for example Alston & Quinn (n 5) 217 and Rebecca J. Barber, ‘Protecting the Right to 
Housing in the Aftermath of Natural Disaster: Standards in International Human Rights Law’ 
(2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 432, 441. 
7 See for example Oraá who excluded ESC-rights from the scope of his research because of the 
programmatic nature of the rights: Oraá (n 2) 2. 
8 The problem with non-derogable core contents is that the term prompts some to argue that the 
rest of a right is ‘derogable’, so can be derogated from. See Michael J. Dennis, ‘Application of 
Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation’ 






in times of severe resources constraints, it cannot be accepted that a state violates its 
core obligations.9  
 
2.3 Position 2: Even in the absence of an explicit clause, derogation is possible 
 
There are those who argue that derogation from the rights of the ICESCR is 
possible despite the absence of a derogation-clause. Two views supporting this 
position are mentioned here. 
First, some argue that article 4 ICCPR constitutes customary international law. 
Because of this status, the provision, including its conditions, can be applied in 
situations outside the scope of the ICCPR, so also in the context of the ICESCR. 
The lack of a derogation-clause in a human rights instrument would then not 
necessarily stand in the way of derogation.10 For this position quite a bit of support 
can be found. The former Special Rapporteur on the state of emergency collected 
many reports of states that proclaimed the state of emergency, including states that 
were not a party to the ICCPR.11 Based on these reports, the Special Rapporteur 
identified certain principles commonly valued during states of emergency, which 
potentially are applicable in all emergency situations. 12  These principles are, 
amongst others, non-derogability of certain rights, the proclamation of the state of 
emergency, legality, notification, exceptional threat, proportionality, temporariness 
and non-discrimination. 13  Still, this does not conclusively prove that article 4 
ICCPR can be considered as customary law and practice shows only few examples 
of actually using article 4 in this way. One is the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) which refers to the derogation clause of the ICCPR when there is a situation 
of emergency, because no derogation clauses are present in its own instruments.14 
Moreover, the ICJ has also considered this option in the Wall-case, where the Court 
argued that article 10 of the ICESCR remains applicable in the situation of 
occupation because Israel ‘was not entitled to derogate from the provisions of the 
                                                        
9 See section 4.2 below. 
10 Alston & Quinn (n 5) 219. Dennis argues that derogation is allowed as there is no article that 
says the contrary. Dennis (n 8) 140. 
11 In 1985, the UN sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
appointed a special rapporteur to research derogation of rights during the state of emergency. The 
sub-commission already did some work on derogation during the state of emergency, and the UN 
Commission on Human Rights urged the sub-commission to continue and take further steps. 
Therefore special rapporteur Mr Leandro Despouy worked in the framework of a sub-commission. 
UN Commission on Human Rights Res. 1985/23; Jaime Oraá, ‘The Protection of Human Rights 
in Emergency Situations under Customary International Law’ in Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan 
Talmon, The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1999) 423-4. 
12  Oraá mentions inter alia the idea that some rights are non-derogable and that states of 
emergency must be officially proclaimed; Oraá (n 11) 423. 
13 Ibid. Oraá is referring to UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/19 (17 June 1985). 
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ICESCR because the ‘protection offered by human rights conventions does not 
cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation 
from the kind found in article 4 of the (ICCPR)’.’15 This reasoning by the ICJ can 
be understood in different ways. One way is as a statement that derogation from the 
ICESCR is not possible, as it does not contain a clause as in article 4 ICCPR. 
Another way of reading this dictum is to regard it as an opening for applying the 
rules of article 4 ICCPR in the ICESCR-context. Although there are some indicators 
to argue that article 4 ICCPR can be applied outside the ICCPR, the position is 
taken here that there remains sufficient uncertainty to not understand the provision 
as customary international law.  
The second line of thought comes close to what has been argued in the second 
line of thought for the first position: the words used in article 2(1) make derogation 
possible even in the absence of a derogation-clause. If a state has tried everything in 
its power to follow-up on its obligations stemming from article 2(1) (especially 
using the maximum of its available resources and seeking additional resources 
internationally) but still cannot make sufficient progression, the breach of 
obligations would be excused. The conditions for derogation are in this case not 
those of article 4 ICCPR, but follow from article 2(1).  
 
2.4 To derogate or not to derogate? 
 
From the foregoing it becomes at the very least clear that there are strong indicators 
to accept that derogation during an emergency would somehow be possible under 
the ICESCR. The way in which article 2(1) ICESCR is phrased leaves room for 
flexibility in progression made after a disaster, at least when certain conditions are 
met. In this respect it has already become clear that states have an obligation to seek 
international assistance when insufficient resources are available for fulfilling the 
obligations of the ICESCR. Consequently, the obligation to seek international 
assistance remains intact even if an option for derogation exists. The flexibility that 
the option to derogate entails is most relevant for the amount of progression that can 
be expected. How this will influence the obligations under the ICESCR in disaster 
contexts and ultimately the obligation to accept international humanitarian 
assistance will be considered below. 
 
                                                        
15 ICJ Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
131 para 106, see Barber (n 6) 438. It was furthermore provided by the Court that Israel was not 
able to use the limitation clause of article 4 ICESCR as ‘the restrictions on the enjoyment by the 
Palestinians living in the territory occupied by Israel of their economic, social and cultural rights’ 
were not ‘solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’.’ 
Consequently, as Israel could not invoke the limitation clause of the ICESCR, it would have to 
seek recourse in an option to derogate, opened here by the ICJ when it does not exclude the 










In this section, the findings of the previous Chapter will be placed in the light of 
disaster-contexts. To specify the obligations that follow from article 2(1) ICESCR 
further, the tripartite typology (consisting of the duty to respect, protect and fulfil).16 
The CESCR divided the obligation to fulfil further into a duty to facilitate, provide 
and promote.17 With ‘facilitating’ the CESCR indicates the requirement of the state 
to be active in making sure that individuals can enjoy their rights.18 ‘Providing’ 
relates to situations in which (groups of) individuals are unable to realise their rights 
by themselves by the means at their disposal due to reasons beyond their control.19 
It hardly needs pointing out that this obligation is specifically relevant in disaster 
situations. ‘Promoting’ relates to supporting the further development and promotion 
of human rights in their territory. 20  General Comments and Concluding 
Observations by the CESCR will be used insofar they provide any insight in 
obligations in disaster settings, along with the work of scholars and interpretations 
like the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights21 and Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 22  This research focuses on the 
                                                        
16 The tripartite typology in terms of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil can be ascribed to 
Asbjorn Eide and his work as Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, although Eide based his 
version of the tripartite typology on Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press 1980). See generally A. Eide, ‘The Right to Adequate 
Food as a Human Right’ UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 of 7 July 1987, see also Magdalena 
Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp 2003) 161ff for a more extensive analysis on the 
development of the tripartite typology. The obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil each contains 
elements of obligations of conduct and obligations of result; Asbjorn Eide, ‘State Obligations 
Revisited’ in Wenche Barth Eide & Uwe Kracht (eds), Food and Human Rights In Development: 
Volume II – Evolving Issues and Emerging Applications (Intersentia, Antwerp 2007) 147. 
17 See also Chapter IV above. 
18 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 199. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 The Maastricht Guidelines were adopted in 1997 as the follow-up of the Limburg Principles on 
the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The 
Maastricht Guidelines are recognized by the UN and published as an official UN document 
(ECOSOC, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13 of 2 October 2000). 
22 The Maastricht Principles (2013) contain the interpretation of extraterritorial elements of ESC-
rights by experts in the field of international (human rights) law and who are or were members of 
various human rights treaty bodies. The Principles are therefore an authoritative authorization not 
purporting ‘to establish new elements of human rights law. Rather, the Maastricht Principles 
clarify extraterritorial obligations of States on the basis of standing international law’ 
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immediate post-disaster phase (including the disaster-proper phase) and not 
immediately on the preparedness and recovery phases. However, the phases 
together are seen as a full ‘cycle of protection’ where it is not always possible to 
exclude the other phases.23  
 
3.2 Undertakes to take steps  
 
The obligation to ‘take steps’ has been described in the previous Chapter as an 
immediate obligation, or at least an obligation which must be fulfilled within a 
reasonably short time after becoming a party to the Covenant. The steps to which 
article 2(1) refers must be deliberate, concrete and targeted, making this an 
obligation of conduct. Whether or not states comply with this obligation can be 
assessed through the state reports in which states are expected to work out and 
adopt a detailed plan of action. 
The occurrence of a disaster only affects these obligations in part. Certain 
obligations remain intact. Also immediately after a disaster, steps can be taken 
towards full realization. At the very least, states can make plans of action. That 
scarcity of resources is in principle not standing in the way of this obligation, 
follows inter alia from Concluding Observations made with regard to the state 
report of Iraq. This state had difficulties to realize the rights of the ICESCR due to 
sanctions imposed against it. The CESCR stated that Iraq nonetheless had to work 
on realizing the rights to food and health to the maximum of its available resources, 
or in other words, by taking steps.24 The scope of the obligation to take steps is, 
however, determined by the availability of resources. In this way the basis of the 
obligation remains intact, but what can be expected from states exactly is 
determined by the availability of resources. Consequently, not having sufficient 
resources due to a disaster can limit the ‘steps’ a state party makes after that disaster 
without violating the ICESCR while the obligation to take steps remains intact. 
Nonetheless, the CESCR stresses the existence of the obligation to take steps 
also in relation to disasters, for example in connection to the right to social services: 
‘(p)articular attention should be paid in this regard to persons (...) living in remote 
or disaster-prone areas, (...) so that they, too, can have access to these services’.25 
This appears to be of special importance in the preparedness-phase, yet logic 
dictates that it certainly must also be applicable in the immediate post-disaster 
                                                        
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (FIAN International, 
Heidelberg 2013). 
23 Walter Kälin, ‘Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons: Addendum on Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in 
Situations of Natural Disasters’ UN Doc. A/HRC/10/13/Add.1 of 5 March 2009, para 21. 
24 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 314, referring to Concluding Observations Iraq 
UN Doc. E/1998/22. 
25 CESCR, General Comment 19 on ‘The Right to Social Security’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 of 4 






phase. In the same General Comment, the CESCR further provides that ‘States 
parties should also consider schemes that provide social protection to individuals 
belonging to disadvantaged and marginalized groups, for example crop or natural 
disaster insurance for small farmers (...)’26 and ‘(s)pecial attention should be given 
to ensuring that the social security system can respond in times of emergency, for 
example during and after natural disasters, armed conflicts and crop failure’.27 State 
parties to the ICESCR therefore have obligations to take steps right after a disaster 
although these steps can be influenced by the availability of resources.  
 
3.3 International assistance and cooperation 
 
In the previous Chapter it has been explained that the nature of the obligation of 
international assistance and cooperation is rather ambiguous. Nevertheless, of at 
least one element of the phrase it was found that it constitutes an obligation: when 
the national capacity in terms of available resources of a state is overwhelmed, the 
state should accept international assistance and cooperation. A similar duty 
followed from the general legal framework where it was argued that the limit of a 
state’s freedom to withhold consent can be co-determined by the national capacity 
of the affected state. Another major point that followed from the analysis of 
‘international assistance and cooperation’ is that there is a stronger obligation on the 
offering parties to offer assistance than on the accepting-side to seek or accept 
assistance.28 Even more so, it is often emphasized that international assistance may 
be requested but that there is no legal right to claim or receive assistance.29 Article 
11 ICESCR emphasizes this by providing that international cooperation should be 
based on free consent.30  
                                                        
26 Ibid, para 28. 
27 Ibid, para 50. 
28  Although it must be stressed that the General Comments have not been consistent in the 
language used. General Comment 12, for example, refers to a ‘responsibility’ to provide disaster 
relief and humanitarian assistance. CESCR, General Comment 12 on ‘The Right to Adequate 
Food’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 of 12 May 1999) para 38. 
29 Craven mentions in this respect para 33 of the Limburg Principles. Matthew C.R. Craven, The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its 
Development (Oxford Monographs in International Law, Clarendon Press, 1995) 149. Sepúlveda 
has also considered international obligations in the light of the tripartite typology and comes to 
the same conclusions as Craven, but she also emphasizes that the CESCR created an opening in 
the duty to fulfil: the General Comment on the right to health provides that ‘states should 
facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries’. CESCR, 
General Comment 14 on ‘The Highest Attainable Standard of Health’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 of 
11 August 2000) para 39 cited by Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 374.  
30 Craven (n 29) 149. The clause in article 11(1) ‘based on free consent’ should ‘not be seen as 
restricting the obligatory nature of international co-operation’; Rolf Künnemann, ‘Extraterritorial 
Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Fons 
Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
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When considering this finding in the light of the entire legal framework and in 
the context of the rest of article 2(1), it cannot but be concluded that the emphasis 
on the offering-side makes sense. Due to the fundamental concepts of sovereignty 
and territorial integrity and because of the danger of too much assistance hampering 
humanitarian operations it is understandable that the accepting-side cannot be under 
an unlimited obligation to accept offers of assistance: ‘the recipient State should not 
be obliged to accept aid if the aim of the donor country was to exploit the 
relationship to its own advantage’.31  There must always be a certain room for 
discretion. Yet, when the state does not have sufficient resources to fulfil its 
obligations, it has a duty to seek international assistance. On the other hand, the 
same arguments can be used for the providing-side: ‘it would be a breach of 
sovereignty on the part of the wealthy state to be required to provide aid to a 
particular country’.32  
Compared to the General Comments more emphasis on a duty to seek or accept 
international assistance can be found in several Concluding Observations to state 
reports. Developing states are often found to be under an obligation to actively seek 
assistance and to request this assistance from wealthier states, UN Specialized 
Agencies (e.g. ILO, UNESCO, WHO, FAO), or intergovernmental or non-
governmental organisations, including the World Bank and IMF.33 The difference 
between the tone in General Comments and that in Concluding Observations may 
be explained through the specifics of the case. Apparently, the CESCR finds a 
general obligation for the receiving-side to use international assistance too 
farfetched, but is willing, when taking the circumstances of a certain state into 
account, to acknowledge the existence of an obligation to accept assistance based 
on the specifics of that particular case.34 
When developing states receive assistance, they have further obligations to 
‘refrain from obstructing international organisations in their legitimate efforts to 
gain access to individuals under the jurisdiction of the State in order to assist them 
                                                        
31 This point was made by the representative of the Congo during the drafting of the Covenant. 
UNGA Third Committee, Meetings 1181 to 1185 (UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1181 of 13 November 
1962), at 237 para 30; Craven (n 29) 149. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 376. 
34 This can also be seen in the work of the ILC. ‘The matter of international cooperation and 
assistance was considered in relative detail by the ILC Special Rapporteur in his past reports, 
putting forward that obligations of assistance and cooperation exist, both on the part of the 
international community and the affected State – although some matters might still require further 
elaboration.’ ILC ‘Fourth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by 
Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur’ (UN Doc. A/CN.4/643 of 11 May 2011); ILC 
‘Fifth Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, 






in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights’,35 to use the assistance for 
realising the rights of the ICESCR,36 to make sure that there is a check on the 
proper use of assistance 37  and to give priority to the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups.38  Most of these elements were also found above, yet in 
specific disaster context the primary role of the affected state was emphasized 
including the control that the affected state retains over humanitarian operations. 
Through the CESCR’s observations made in response to state reports the CESCR 
has to a certain extent given grounds to limit this control of the affected state (e.g. 
by stating that international organisations may not be obstructed in their legitimate 
efforts to gain access to individuals). This is quite remarkable considering the way 
that the primary role of the affected state is respected and adhered to in practice. 
The CESCR gives direction to affected states on how they should execute their role 
and in this way the primary role of the state gains content. 
In terms of the duty to fulfil – and the three components to facilitate, to provide 
and to promote – the difference between the offering and accepting-sides can be 
defined further. The duty to facilitate implies that states must make sure that 
through development programmes, facilitation of rights is made possible.39 The 
duty to provide is closely linked to the pledge of developed states to spend 0.7% 
GNP on development assistance and ‘this level entails the duty of developed states 
to provide, subject to the availability of resources, a specific type of international 
assistance for the satisfaction of Covenant rights in other States’.40 In the Maastricht 
                                                        
35 See for example the Concluding Observations El Salvador (UN Doc. E/1997/22) paras 171 and 
185; Concluding Observations Mexico (UN Doc. E/2000/22) para 387; CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) 
para 19; Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 376. 
36  See for example Concluding Observations Guatemala (E/1997/22) para 137; Concluding 
Observations Colombia (E/1996/22) para 202; CESCR, GC 14 (n 29) para 45; Sepúlveda, The 
Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 377. 
37  See for example Concluding Observations Sri Lanka (UN Doc. E/1999/22) para 86; 
Concluding Observations Ukraine (UN Doc. E/1996/22) para 271; Concluding Observations 
Colombia (UN Doc. E/1996/22) para 202; CESCR, General Comment 4 on ‘The Right to 
Adequate Housing’ of 13 December 1991, para 19; Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 
16) 377.  
38 See e.g. Concluding Observations Sri Lanka (E/1999/22) para 86; CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 
38; Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 377. 
39 This is explained in the words: ‘any international assistance and cooperation programme should 
provide for the institutional machinery that will facilitate the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights in the recipient country, and developed states must ensure that economic, social 
and cultural rights form an integral part of any existing international assistance programme’. 
Concluding Observations Slovakia, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add. 81, para 21 cited by Magdalena 
Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (2006) 24 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 271, 285. 
40 Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ (n 39) 286-7. Sepúlveda 
concludes that this pledge does not constitute a general obligation. The CESCR indeed refers to 
the 0.7%-pledge in Concluding Observations: when the state’s spending on development 
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Principles, the duty to provide is described as follows: ‘(a)s part of the broader 
obligation of international cooperation, States, acting separately and jointly, that are 
in a position to do so, must provide international assistance to contribute to the 
fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights in other States (...)’.41 Through 
this, the (non-legally binding) Maastricht Principles establish a duty to provide 
assistance as a part of the broader obligation of international cooperation, albeit in a 
more general context and not for the specific case of the occurrence of a disaster. 
The duty to promote, finally, would refer to a duty to assist the recipient state in 
implementing its treaty obligations, a duty not (yet) explicitly recognized by the 
CESCR.42  
The Maastricht Principles add the obligation to seek international assistance to 
the duty to fulfil: ‘(a) State has the obligation to seek international assistance and 
cooperation on mutually agreed terms when that State is unable, despite its best 
efforts, to guarantee economic, social and cultural rights within its territory (...)’.43 
This is in line with the second step of the legal framework on accepting 
humanitarian assistance: at first, there is an obligation to seek assistance, and the 
third step concerns the obligation to accept. The Principles explain how states must 
respond to a request for international assistance and cooperation: ‘States that 
receive a request to assist or cooperate and are in a position to do so must consider 
the request in good faith, and respond in a manner consistent with their obligations 
to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially (...)’.44 Consequently, 
the Maastricht Principles acknowledge the obligation to seek international 
assistance and a corresponding obligation (therefore indicating the use of targeted 
requests) to consider the request and to respond to the request in line with 
extraterritorial obligations to fulfil ESC-rights.  
Various treaty bodies have commented on a possible obligation to make use of 
international assistance and cooperation, 45  the conclusions of which the ILC 
summarized as follows: ‘the bodies have currently referred to obligations to request 
                                                        
achieves the 0.7%: Concluding Observations France, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.72, paras 14 and 24; 
Concluding Observations Sweden, UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.70, para 7, Concluding Observations 
Luxembourg, UN Doc. E/2004/22, para 67; Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance 
and Cooperation’ (n 39) 287-8. 
41 Principle 33. 
42 Sepúlveda, ‘Obligations of ‘International Assistance and Cooperation’ (n 39) 289. 
43 Principle 34. 
44 Principle 35. 
45 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 17; CEDAW Concluding Observations Belarus’ UN Doc. A/55/38 
of 2000, para 374; CRC, ‘Concluding Observations Uzbekistan’ UN Doc. CRC/C/111 of 2001 
para 576-7; CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations Uzbekistan’ UN Doc. E/2006/22 of 2006, para 
503; CRC, ‘Concluding Observations Honduras’ UN Doc. CRC/C/87 of 1999, para 112; HRC, 
‘Concluding Observations DPRK’ UN Doc.  CCPR/CO/72/PRK of 27 August 2001, para 12, 
cited by Marlies M.E. Hesselman, ‘Establishing a Full ‘Cycle of Protection’ for Disaster Victims: 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery according to Regional and International Human Rights 






or search international help for affected States when overwhelmed, both in General 
Comments and State reporting, or to requirements to not arbitrarily refuse and 
accept offers made by international actors’.46 What is confirmed, therefore, is the 
existence of the obligation to move to the second step of the legal framework on 
accepting assistance, but for moving on to the next step of accepting only the rule 
that consent may not be withheld arbitrarily is explicitly recognized. The Maastricht 
Principles speak explicitly of a duty to seek international assistance and cooperation, 
but they are, although regularly accepted as an authoritative and well-researched 
interpretation of the status quo of ESC-rights and of the extraterritorial obligations 
of states in relation to these rights, not legally binding. 
In conclusion, although it is established that states have an obligation to seek 
international humanitarian assistance (in rather unspecified cases) it is very difficult 
to define the obligation to accept international assistance and cooperation as a 
general obligation. In this case the ‘devil lies not in the detail’ but more detail is 
needed to determine the exact nature of the duty to accept assistance as a part of the 
obligation to international assistance and cooperation. The CESCR has followed the 
same line when staying on the surface in General Comments, but defining duties in 
more detail in Concluding Observations in the light and context of individual cases. 
It must be stressed, though, that ‘(d)ue to Article 2(1) international co-operation, as 
an obligatory ingredient to full realization, is implicit in all provisions of the 
ICESCR part III provisions’. 47  The general obligation also follows from the 
distinction the CESCR made between unwilling and unable states. An unable state 
can prove that it has done everything in its power to obtain international assistance. 
If it did not succeed, it at least did not violate any obligation. Unwilling states 
cannot justify non-compliance as they have not tried to obtain international 
assistance.  
  
3.4 Using the maximum of available resources and other appropriate means 
 
Not having sufficient resources for the realization of the ESC-rights was not meant 
by the drafters of the ICESCR as an excuse for not fulfilling obligations. It implies, 
in fact, an obligation to seek resources internationally. This creates a link between 
using the maximum of available resources and international assistance and 
cooperation as an obligation. The CESCR does, however, give some room for not 
having sufficient resources as a justification for non-compliance: if a state has done 
everything it can to obtain resources but has not succeeded, it has fulfilled its 
                                                        
46 Valencia-Ospina, ‘Fourth Report’ (n 34) paras 51-77; CESCR, General Comment 3 on ‘The 
Nature of States Parties Obligations’ of 14 December 1990, para 13; CESCR, ‘Statement by the 
Committee: An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available 
Resources” under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1 of 21 
September 2007) para 10; CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 19. 
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obligation. Only some elements must be realised at all times, like core obligations. 
Using the maximum of available resources is therefore an obligation of conduct.  
In this context the obligation of conduct – or the obligation to make an effort – is 
defined by the CESCR as to ‘strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the 
relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances’.48 Even in situations of severe 
resource constraints, states must try to achieve as much as possible, and ‘at least 
vulnerable groups must be reached by low-cost targeted programmes’.49  Again, 
there is a difference between unwilling and unable states, where the latter category 
can show it has done everything in its power to obtain resources and violations due 
to a lack of resources may be excused. Unwilling states have not attempted to attain 
additional resources and are in violation of their obligations. In monitoring state 
compliance, it is advisable to first assess to what extent a state has fulfilled its 
obligations. If a state did not comply, it can be assessed whether failure is due to not 
having sufficient resources, and if that is the case, a state’s effort to obtain more 
resources can be evaluated. The state party must at that point show that it has done 
everything in its power to obtain additional resources. If it cannot do this, it would 
not necessarily be a violation of substantive rights (although the inquiry starts at 
finding such a violation), but at least a violation of the duty to use the maximum 
available resources and the duty seek international cooperation and assistance.  
It must be noted that resources do not merely relate to financial resources, but 
also to more material items like tents, vehicles, field hospitals, food, water, et cetera, 
and to human resources, like rescue workers, medical personnel and construction 
experts. In disaster context, using ‘all appropriate means’ must also be understood 
to include different types of resources which can satisfy the obligation ‘to take steps’ 
and may also include creating legislation for example following the IDRL 
Guidelines. The state can decide what it deems appropriate, but if it comes to 
establishing violations of ESC-rights the CESCR has the final saying in this. The 
means used must be reasonable and effective and must produce results compatible 
with Covenant obligations. Using appropriate means is therefore an obligation of 
conduct. 
Quite often it is not the availability of resources which poses a problem, but the 
way in which these resources are spent. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, for 
example, with all the offers of assistance made, the US had no problem to come by 
                                                        
48 CESCR, GC 3 (n 46) para 11. 
49 Ibid, para 11-2. Also in General Comment 5 it is stated that ‘the duty of States parties to protect 
the vulnerable members of their societies assumes greater rather than less importance in times of 
severe resource constraints; CESCR, General Comment 5 on ‘Persons with disabilities’ of 9 
December 1994, para 10; see also CESCR, General Comment 6 on ‘The Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of Older Persons’ of 8 December 1995, para 17, CESCR, General Comment 15 
on ‘The Right to Water’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 of 20 January 2003) para 13; CESCR, GC 17 
on ‘The Right of Everyone to Benefit From the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests 
Resulting From Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He is the Author’ (UN 
Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 of 12 January 2006) para 20; CESCR, General Comment 21 on ‘The right of 






sufficient resources, but the problems in New Orleans were mainly related to the 
way of using these resources. 50  Getting assistance to the people living in the 
affected area ‘took several days’.51 The same problems were experienced in another 
relatively wealthy state: Japan. Despite the thorough preparation by Japan, there 
were problems in responding to the earthquake and tsunami of 2011. There are 
reports claiming that in the region affected by the floods there was a shortage of 
food, power and gasoline and for some time people were not assisted by the 
government.52 The Japanese military was mobilized at large scale to assist in the 
disaster response: around 100,000 troops were sent to go on a search-and-rescue 
operation, while relatively few people were injured and trapped underneath 
rubble.53 It therefore took longer to bring relief goods to surviving victims. Also the 
response relating to the nuclear leak was flawed. Reports claimed that access to the 
contaminated area took so long that many initial disaster survivors were much later 
found dead because of starvation.54 The presumed failure of Japan’s response was 
reflected in the opinion of the Japanese population: 70 percent was of the opinion 
that the government failed in its response, arguing that Prime Minister Naoto Kan 
should resign.55 In such cases a state arguably complied with its duty to use the 
maximum of its available resources, but failed in complying with obligations 
relating to substantive rights, as will be illustrated in section 4 below where four 
rights will be discussed. 
 
3.5 Progressive realization and retrogressive measures 
 
Progressive realization has been interpreted as moving as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards realizing the rights of the ICESCR. It is therefore an 
obligation of conduct aimed at achieving the obligation of result and is both an 
immediate obligation (to start immediately by taking steps) and a long-term 
obligation (to come to full realization). The formulation has been used as a means to 
                                                        
50 The international community offered over 1 billion US dollars in cash and supplies; Tyra R. 
Saechao, ’Natural Disasters and the Responsibility to Protect: From Chaos to Clarity’ (2006-7) 32 
Brookings Journal of International Law 663, 692. It must be stressed that the US is not a party to 
the ICESCR and this case serves merely as an illustration. 
51 Ibid. 
52  Andrew Higgins, ‘Japan’s Slow Tsunami Response Stirs Anger’ The Washington Post 16 
March 2011. 
53  Daniel Kaufmann & Veronika Penciakova, ‘Preventing Nuclear Meltdown: Assessing 
Regulatory Failure in Japan and the United States’ Brookings 1 April 2011 
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/04/01-nuclear-meltdown-kaufmann> 
accessed 23 April 2015. 
54 Hiroko Tabuchi, ‘An Anniversary of ‘Heartbreaking Grief’ in Japan’ The New York Times 12 
March 2012. 
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stay flexible as every state party has to start working from different circumstances. 
This flexibility is also very useful in post-disaster situations. 
To monitor progressive realization, plans prepared and adopted by state parties 
are evaluated through the state reporting mechanism, which was also seen with the 
duty ‘undertakes to take steps’. State parties are expected to comply with the 
requirement of ‘continuous improvement’, meaning that states can violate a right by 
not acting when deterioration of rights take place. In the words of the CESCR: 
states ‘should modify the domestic legal order as necessary in order to give effect to 
their treaty obligations’.56 The benchmarks which states must set according to the 
CESCR so that progress can be measured are an example.57 
Making progression is one of the key duties of article 2(1) and retrogressive 
measures are – in principle – not allowed.58 Examples of retrogressive measures 
discussed in state reports are: adoption of legislation with a direct or collateral 
negative effect on the enjoyment of the rights; abrogation of legislation consistent 
with rights;  unjustly making a reduction in public expenditures devoted to these 
rights and the adoption of regional human rights measures while not integrating 
ESC-rights.59 Apart from these examples, retrogressive measures have not been 
extensively discussed in the Concluding Observations and where it has been 
discussed, the CESCR has not been very strict.60 One explanation for this is that it is 
difficult for the CESCR to determine whether any retrogressive measures have been 
taken.61 The amount of attention paid to retrogressive measures increased after the 
adoption of the Maastricht Guidelines. In Guideline 14 it is provided that the 
adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measure that reduces the level of human 
rights enjoyment, or the reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure 
                                                        
56  CESCR, General Comment 9 on ‘The Domestic Application of the Covenant’ (UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1998/24 of 3 December 1998) para 3. 
57 CESCR General Comment 10 on ‘The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in the 
Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/25 of 10 December 
1998, para 3(d). 
58 Retrogressive measures – or also called regressive measures – are discussed in the CESCR’s 
General Comments 13 on ‘The Right to Education’ para 45; CESCR, GC 14 (n 29) para 32 and 
48; CESCR, GC 15 (n 49) para 19 and 42; CESCR, General Comment 16 on ‘The Equal Right of 
Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2005/4 of 11 August 2005) para 42; CESCR, GC 17 (n 49) para 27 and 42; CESCR, 
General Comment 18 on ‘The Right to Work’ (UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18 of 6 February 2006) para 
21; CESCR, GC 19 (n 25) para 42 and 64; and CESCR, GC 21 (n 49) para 46 and 65. 
59 Sepúlveda extracts these examples from various concluding observations. However, she also 
notes that the Committee has taken a rather flexible approach to retrogressive measures: ‘For 
many years, with a few exceptions, the Committee did not strictly monitor the adoption of 
deliberately retrogressive measures’. Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations (n 16) 323-4. 
60 Ibid, 325. 






resulting in the lowering of the level of rights enjoyment constitutes a violation of 
ESC-rights.62  
When a state is recovering from armed conflict or natural disaster, the CESCR 
has adopted a more flexible approach on retrogressive measures.63 Still, in order to 
justify a retrogressive measure, a state must adhere to a number of conditions, 
including that of proving that it has unsuccessfully sought international assistance.64 
It can be argued therefore that not using sufficient resources and not seeking 
international assistance and cooperation may clash with the duty to ‘continuous 
improvement’ when it hampers progression, and may even lead to retrogression. 
Not accepting humanitarian assistance could possibly be seen as taking a 
retrogressive measure. 
When considering the practice of disaster response, many examples can be 
found where the affected state’s response is discussed in terms of progression made, 
although not extensively by the CESCR or other treaty bodies. Usually, reports of 
progression made are published around the first or second anniversary of a disaster. 
Around 11 March 2012, for example, the first anniversary of Japan’s earthquake 
and tsunami was evident through the many items in newspapers. Although many 
people were unable to return to their homes due to nuclear danger, it is 
acknowledged that ‘Japan’s reconstruction has accomplished much in the past 
year’.65 According to one reporter, ‘(v)irtually all of the tsunami zone’s roads have 
been fixed, and many landscapes once strewn with debris are now lined with tidy 
plots and a growing number of restored buildings’. 66  In relation to Hurricane 
Katrina’s fifth anniversary, US President Obama acknowledged the difficulties still 
existing in New Orleans, yet added that there has been ‘steady progress’ and that 
there is still ‘a long way to go’.67 Although information like this is available, it does 
not constitute an objective, thorough and structured assessment into the ESC-
achievements made by a state, leading to rather subjective and not necessarily 
reliable information. On Italy’s response to the earthquake in L’Aquila in 2009, for 
example, a variety of opinions can be found. 68  Apart from the praise for the 
government’s response, there were reports stating that people were still living in 
                                                        
62 Maastricht Guidelines, guideline no 14 under (e) resp. (g), cited by Sepúlveda, The Nature of 
the Obligations (n 16) 326.  
63 For example in the Concluding Observations on the report by Honduras, as the country was 
recovering from hurricane Mitch (UN Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.57 para 11); Sepúlveda, The Nature of 
the Obligations (n 16) 329. 
64 As is in line with the Maastricht Guidelines, Guideline no 13, cited by Sepúlveda, The Nature 
of the Obligations (n 16) 331. 
65 Tabuchi (n 54). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Helene Cooper, ‘Progress Will Continue, Obama Tells New Orleans’ The New York Times 30 
August 2010. 
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emergency housing and hotels in April 201069 and the IFRC reported that it was 
still running nine tent camps by mid October 2009. 70  That the recovery work 
certainly did not end ‘before the winter’, becomes clear from the DREF Final 
Report which provides that the plan of action of the Italian Red Cross was intended 
to be concluded at the end of October 2010 and that ‘social health assistance 
activities will be carried out in the field until full recovery and return to normality 
are insured’.71 The Red Cross as such calculated that it would need to work on 
recovery at least for 18 months after the disaster.  
When insufficient progress creates new problems, an argument of rights 
violations may be more easily accepted, as illustrated by Haiti’s earthquake. The 
problem in Haiti was that ‘tremendous generosity at the giving end has not, in 
almost two years, been translated into even adequate progress on the ground for 
Haiti’s earthquake victims, infrastructure, and economy’.72 In a report made more 
than a year after the disaster, the situation was described as follows: 
 
Thousands of blue and grey tents continue to sit sandwiched between developments 
and rubble along Port-au-Prince’s roads and hundreds of thousands of internally 
displaced persons (…) survive in camps that fail to meet even minimum international 
standards, severely lacking in access to clean water, latrines, and security.73  
 
In June 2011 Haiti was struck by heavy rains, creating floods and landslides. As a 
result, 23 persons lost their lives, amongst which people who were still living in 
tents a year and a half after the earthquake.74 Tents as temporary housing are highly 
inadequate for a country like Haiti which knows a rainy season and even a 
hurricane season; a lesson learned already in the context of the Indian Ocean 
tsunami where it was requested to ‘provide transitional shelter – not just tents’.75 
Another illustration is the outbreak of cholera on Haiti. By August 2011, an 
estimated 6000 persons lost their lives because of the cholera epidemic. In one year, 
around 420.000 people were infected, of which the largest part lived in the refugee 
camps where the circumstances are described as ‘abysmal’.76 When discussing the 
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provision of, amongst others, water, health care and shelter, John Holmes, head of 
OCHA, stated that ‘with the rainy season looming, these unmet needs are taking on 
additional urgency, not least from the health and protections points of view and 
given the potential consequences in terms of both politics and security of large 
demonstrations in some sensitive places’.77 
In the Concluding Observations to state reports, the CESCR can develop certain 
standards on the progression it expects after a disaster, although so far not many 
state reports have coincided with the occurrence of a disaster, nor has the CESCR 
referred to disaster-specific achievements. For now, it can be concluded that there is 
at least an obligation to move forward and continuously improve, although as seen 
in the examples of disaster situations as given above the context of a specific state 
can co-determine what progress may be expected from states. 
The obligations following article 2(1) seen in the light of disaster response 
reflect the steps of the legal framework on accepting international humanitarian 
assistance after a disaster and the standards that were found on moving from one 
step to the next are also mirrored. However, at this point the obligations of article 
2(1) are not concrete enough to make the standards clearer. In the next section, four 
substantive rights will be analysed so that the general obligations can be applied to 
these rights resulting in more concrete standards on accepting international 
assistance.  
 




The content of ESC-rights has been subject to extensive debate over the years. 
While it has been established that ESC-rights contain concrete obligations, defining 
the exact content of the obligations for each right remains challenging. In the 
General Comments, the CESCR has tried to describe the content of each right. In 
doing so, the CESCR started to make use of defining the ‘core content’ or 
‘minimum obligations’ to give concrete obligations for each right. This core of each 
right must be realized at all times: ‘(t)he CESCR considers that all States Parties to 
the ICESCR are to ensure, as its raison d’etre, particular minimum essential levels 
of all rights, such as basic food, shelter, health or education, if necessary with the 
help of internationally available resources’. 78  This description of core contents 
seems to fit seamlessly into the structure of general obligations laid down above: it 
provides the step that a state must at the very least take, with the use of international 
assistance when necessary. Yet, what comes after this very first step remains 
unclear and a number of questions remain that must be answered in this section. In 
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the first place, it can be wondered what the effect would be of the level of 
development of a state: should there be higher expectations from a developed state 
than from a developing state? And how can it be determined what the expectations 
are in correlation to the level of development? What is the influence of the pre-
disaster level of rights enjoyment within a state? Can non-compliance prior to a 
disaster be an excuse for lower performance? Before going into the obligations that 
exist under the rights to housing, food, water and health, it is first necessary to look 
into these questions. In a way, all these questions revolve around a single theme: 
setting benchmarks that determine what states must achieve considering their 
specific circumstances in terms of availability of resources and severity or type of 
disaster. In the next section it will be explained how benchmarks will be used and 
how they can be determined. Core contents will fulfil a key role in setting post-
disaster benchmarks, so in the further sections, the rights to housing, food, water 
and health will be described in terms of their core obligations. Departing from this 
core, further benchmarks and standards will be looked for to establish the 
obligations for state parties in post-disaster settings. 
 
4.2 On benchmarks and core contents 
 
Defining the exact content and scope of ESC-rights and corresponding obligations 
has been a challenge ever since the adoption of the ICESCR. Due to the 
‘progressive realization’-formulation of ESC-rights, the understanding is or was 
that there are no absolute rights or obligations. The formulation was indeed meant 
to be used as a flexible tool taking into account the level of development of each 
state party. At this point, however, it has already become clear that the CESCR has 
done much to give more general content to obligations, but it also considers the 
performance of states based on individual circumstances. States must make plans 
and the CESCR can measure to what extent these plans have been executed. These 
plans made by states can be used as benchmarks, taking into account the specific 
circumstances of a state: 
 
In brief, benchmarks can be defined as goals or targets that are specific to the 
individual circumstances of each country. As opposed to human rights indicators, 
which measure human rights observation or enjoyment in absolute terms, human 
rights benchmarks measure performance relative to individually defined standards.79 
 
Especially when looking at disaster-situations, it is necessary to remain flexible. 
Not every disaster is equally severe nor leads to the same amount of damage. 
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Moreover, one state is better equipped to cope with the consequences than the next. 
A framework for benchmarks on post-disaster obligations must therefore: 
 
- Take account [of] resource availability; 
- Take into account the level of deprivation in the country; 
- Take account of the policy options available; 
- Identify clearly those [parts of – SJW] rights that are not subject to progressive 
realization or to resource availability; 
- Use at least some universal indicators to reflect universal rights.80 
 
These requirements for an effective benchmark were developed for general 
application, yet the way it is formulated makes it especially useful for the purposes 
of this research. Only in the fourth requirement an adjustment is suggested to give 
more flexibility in terms of defining obligations. Based on this framework, 
benchmarks can be set to determine what state parties to the ICESCR must achieve 
immediately after a disaster. By allowing room to take the context into account, it is 
not possible here to set the benchmark for each right discussed below. The first 
three elements constitute factors that are subjective to the circumstances in the state, 
thereby answering some of the questions posed above. Resource availability 
determines the steps a state can make, so also how much progression a state can 
make. However, it has become clear that at certain points a state has an obligation 
to seek additional resources. Due to this obligation, a choice is made on what is 
going to be measured by the benchmark: the post-disaster enjoyment of rights or 
(the violation of) obligations by state parties.81 While it is sometimes argued that 
these are two sides of the same coin,82 this stance is rejected here. If a state can 
prove that it has done everything in its power to obtain additional resources and that 
it has made use of international assistance so far it was offered but still cannot live 
up to certain standards, the state is not in violation of its obligations, while there 
could be a breach of the enjoyment of a right. Especially immediately after a 
disaster, a state can comply with its obligations, while disaster victims find that 
certain rights are violated.83 
Next, the level of deprivation – i.e. damage caused by the disaster – is also taken 
into account. This could either mean departing from objective standards by 
determining what basic needs people are lacking, or departing from subjective 
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standards by looking at what people lost. In the latter case, deprivation could be 
more severe merely because there was more to lose to begin with. Objective 
standards make more sense here as it makes it possible to identify the needs for 
survival and therefore what is needed in terms of assistance. Moreover, these 
standards fit the line taken on core contents as will be explained below. The third 
element, the policy options available, allows room to negotiate around complicating 
factors within a state or the particular set-up of a state. 
Because these first three elements are strongly depending on the particulars of 
the case, it is difficult to determine in detail what can be expected at each moment 
after a disaster occurred in terms of achievements on the rights to housing, food, 
water and healthcare. There are, however, standards available on humanitarian 
assistance in response to disasters that in varying detail explain what humanitarian 
aid must achieve. Most notably, the Sphere Standards give detailed information on 
the standards immediately after a disaster and at later stages. Although not being a 
human rights instrument, the Sphere Standards are used to give content – together 
with human rights sources – to the human right benchmarks. 
The fourth element of the framework for benchmarks sets objective standards by 
referring to those parts of rights that cannot be derogated from (not through 
progressive realization, nor through having insufficient resources). Earlier, it was 
seen that core contents meet this description. Without core obligation, a right would 
be largely deprived of its raison d’être and in case of violation of the core content, 
the state must demonstrate that it has done everything in its power to obtain more 
resources as the only way of justification.84 The core contents will therefore fulfil a 
prominent role in the benchmarks. In addition, the fifth element speaks of universal 
indicators to reflect universal rights. This element will be understood as those parts 
of the rights that are not culturally or context-sensitive, but which are of universal 
importance to all humans. There is a clear reason for taking this interpretation: in 
determining what the core contents are, it is possible to depart from a needs-based 
approach, or from a value-based approach.  
Much debate has surrounded the question what the content of a minimum core 
obligation should be exactly. In the initial formulation of core contents by the 
CESCR, there is a certain emphasis on needs: ‘this type of inquiry immediately 
orients the “core” of the right to the essential and minimally tolerable levels of food, 
health, housing and education. (…) [Basic needs are therefore] amounting to 
survival and life’. 85  It makes sense to depart from this minimum for human 
existence, or the minimum for human survival. Without certain preconditions, there 
is no life. Moreover,  
 
The focus on life, survival, and basic needs has the additional advantage of pointing 
to the requirements for rights protection that are apparently self-evident, rather than 
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requiring a more controversial examination of what is needed for the satisfaction of 
more elaborate aims, and a “thicker” understanding of the good life.86  
 
In other words, looking at basic needs sets standards which are to a certain extent 
objective and concrete. The subjectivity of expecting certain standards of living 
with various gradations of luxury is avoided and looking further can lead to 
standards which are ‘too encompassing and too unlimited’. 87  Nonetheless, 
objections to this approach can be made: merely looking at basic needs leaves no 
room (or ample room) for considerations of human dignity and ‘human flourishing’ 
intrinsic to many interpretations to the right to life.88 An alternative approach would 
be a value-based approach: ‘(a) value-based core goes further than the “basic-needs” 
inquiry by emphasizing not what is strictly required for life, but rather what it 
means to be human.’89 Human dignity plays a major role in determining the core 
content when following the value-based approach, but then the question is 
immediately raised what can be understood with human dignity. On the one hand, a 
person can feel that his or her feelings of self-worth and self-respect are affected, 
but it is also possible to look at human dignity as experienced by a social group or 
society, where there is a societal feeling of indignation.90 It is doubtful that this way 
of considering the core obligations is more useful than looking at the needs-based 
core. After a disaster most survivors will find themselves in situations of increased 
dependency, resulting in feelings of indignation and dented self-respect.  
When looking at post-disaster obligations, survival is the first priority, making 
the needs-based approach more sensible. Further development and higher standards 
move into the realm of rebuilding and even – where applicable – the development 
phase. Understanding core obligations in terms of basic needs is also placing 
developing and developed states on equal footing: the basic needs are the same for 
both, the progression made afterwards reflects the capacity of the state and the 
expectations of the standards. Human dignity is given due consideration in 
handbooks, guidelines and standards on delivering humanitarian assistance and is in 
that way not neglected in a needs-based approach to the core contents. The needs-
based approach are therefore more fitting for the disaster-context under scrutiny 
here. Still, the difficulty to set standards based on needs is not underestimated: 
 
People have been known to survive with incredibly little nutrition, and there seems to 
be a cumulative improvement of life expectation as the dietary limits are raised. (...) 
There is difficulty in drawing a line somewhere, and the so-called ‘minimum 
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nutritional requirements’ have an inherent arbitrariness that goes well beyond 
variations between groups and regions.91  
 
Again, the particulars of each individual case are of crucial importance to setting 
the benchmarks.  
In the following, the rights to housing, food, water and health will be discussed. 
For each of these rights it will be explained, after an introduction of the general 
features of each right, what the core obligations are. These core obligations are 
based on the interpretation by the most authoritative body on the ICESCR, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  The core obligations will 
form the basis of the formulation of specific disaster obligations for each right. Here, 
it will be considered what has been found in the general legal framework on 
accepting international humanitarian assistance and what has been found in terms of 
general obligations under article 2(1). In addition, General Comments will be taken 
into account along with practical handbooks like the Sphere Standards to identify 
standards that determine when a state must move from its individual response to 
initiating or triggering the process of international humanitarian assistance in order 
not to violate its obligations under the ICESCR and when a state must move on to 
accepting international humanitarian assistance.  
 
4.3 The Right to Housing 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Article 11 ICESCR, which contains the rights to housing, food, and implicitly water, 
provides: 
 
(1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this 
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent. 
(2) The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through 
international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which 
are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by 
making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating 
knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian 
systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and 
utilization of natural resources;  
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(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting 
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in relation to 
need.92 
 
In general, being granted the right to housing means more than ‘merely having a 
roof over one’s head’. 93  Rather, it must be understood as ‘the right to live 
somewhere in security, peace and dignity’.94  The main features of the right to 
housing are: ‘the protection against forced evictions and arbitrary destruction and 
demolition of one’s home; the right to be free from arbitrary interference with one’s 
home, privacy and family; and the right to choose one’s residence, to determine 
where to live and to freedom of movement’.95 In terms of entitlements, the right to 
adequate housing includes ‘security of tenure; housing, land and property restitution; 
equal and non-discriminatory access to adequate housing; participation in housing-
related decision-making at the national and community levels’. 96  The term 
‘adequate’ has been described as constituting ‘adequate privacy, adequate space, 
adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure 
and adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities – all at a reasonable 
cost’.97  Adequacy is determined in part by social, economic, cultural, climatic, 
ecological and other factors. 98  An adequate house must further have facilities 
essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition99 and must be ‘habitable’ in the 
sense that it must protect inhabitants from ‘cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other 
threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors’.100 
In terms of the tripartite typology, the duty to respect the right to housing 
‘requires States to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment 
                                                        
92 It must be noted that the right to housing is not only laid down in this provision, but in other 
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of the right to adequate housing’.101 As for the duty to protect, states are required to 
prevent third parties from interfering with the right to housing, for example private 
actors like landlords and landowners.102 The duty to fulfil requires states to ‘adopt 
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other 
measures to fully realize the right to adequate housing’.103 Moreover, ‘in essence, 
the obligation is to demonstrate that, in aggregate, the measures being taken are 
sufficient to realize the right for every individual in the shortest possible time in 
accordance with the maximum of available resources’.104 
 
4.3.2 Core contents 
The CESCR did not formulate explicit core obligations for each right from its 
beginning, and therefore there are no core obligations on the right to housing. Even 
so, the CESCR determined that states have immediate obligations with regard to the 
right to housing no matter the level of development since ‘many of the measures 
required to promote the right to housing would only require the abstention by the 
Government from certain practices and a commitment to facilitating “self-help” by 
affected groups’.105 For these parts, it is determined that insofar ‘that any such steps 
are considered to be beyond the maximum resources available to a State party, it is 
appropriate that a request be made as soon as possible for international cooperation 
in accordance with articles 11(1), 22 and 23 of the Covenant, and that the 
Committee be informed thereof.’106 There is no explanation in the same paragraph 
of what these immediate steps are exactly. The next paragraph, however, continues 
by explaining that due priority must be given ‘to those social groups living in 
unfavourable conditions by giving them particular consideration’. In the same 
paragraph it is acknowledged that external factors can affect the right, but that 
‘despite externally caused problems, the obligations under the Covenant continue to 
apply’.107   
A further obligation of immediate effect recognized in the General Comment is 
that of effective monitoring ‘to ascertain the full extent of homelessness and 
inadequate housing within its jurisdiction’.108 State reports must therefore contain 
information ‘“(...) about those groups within ... society that are vulnerable and 
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disadvantaged with regard to housing”.’109 These include amongst others homeless 
persons and those inadequately housed. 
In general, non-discrimination is recognized as an immediate obligation and can 
therefore be mentioned as part of the core content. A number of these elements 
require mostly abstention from the state, or require only little effort from states 
perfectly possible in disaster situations.  
 
4.3.3 Obligations relating to disasters 
The goal of identifying disaster-specific obligations for each right is to define 
standards based on which it can be determined if an affected state must move from 
one step to the next in the legal framework on accepting international humanitarian 
assistance. To this end, benchmarks must be created for the four rights. However, as 
explained in section 4.2, benchmarks are context-sensitive (depending on the 
context of the case, so the destructiveness of the disaster, the amount of resources 
available within the state, the amount of offers of assistance made to the affected 
state and the quality of these offers (i.e. whether they meet the humanitarian 
principles)), making it difficult to set general standards. One element is nonetheless 
fixed: the core obligations of each right must be realized at all times, also 
immediately after a disaster. Moving beyond the core obligations, states must make 
sufficient progression, which is largely depending on the particulars of the case. 
Therefore, in describing the disaster-specific obligations for the four rights selected 
here two layers are distinguished. First, the core obligations that must be realized at 
all times provide concrete standards. Next, the standards on progressive realization 
can be less concretely defined, but indications will be provided that help to 
determine in each case whether a state makes sufficient progression. It must be 
called to mind that very detailed frameworks on humanitarian achievements exist 
that are of use here like the Sphere Standards or the UN Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee’s Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, but 
repeating all standards here is unnecessary.110 
The standards set by the core obligations must be included in the needs-
assessment so that the affected state can quickly determine whether it will be able to 
realize this or not. If a state cannot (or fears that it cannot) realize the core 
obligations it must seek international assistance and even accept international 
assistance if suitable offers are found. For the right to housing, no concrete core 
obligations were formulated by the CESCR. It cannot therefore be said with full 
certainty what the obligations are that must be realized at all times, although above 
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some obligations were identified as constituting the core contents. Of these, a 
number is especially relevant in post-disaster settings. First, the affected state must 
have an idea of the number of persons that are left homeless. In addition, it must 
establish which people live in emergency shelter and determine how long that 
emergency shelter is tangible given the circumstances of the case (for example 
considering the weather forecast, accessibility of relief workers and goods, and 
influx of more disaster survivors). The Sphere Handbook gives concrete standards 
on the tangibility of emergency housing.111  
When looking at the core obligations, the affected state must especially consider 
the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. ‘Victims of natural disasters’ 
and ‘people living in disaster-prone areas’ can be considered a ‘disadvantaged 
group’ and therefore need some degree of priority consideration and discrimination 
is not allowed.112 Implementing these obligations in a plan of action in which the 
state determines which steps will be taken from this basis helps to make founded 
decisions on whether the state must start to seek international assistance and 
cooperation and whether the state must accept this. At this point, the standards 
consist of the obligation to realize the core contents of the right to housing. If the 
affected state lacks the resources to fulfil its core obligations, it is in violation of its 
obligations stemming from the ICESCR.  
After the core obligations, the affected state has an obligation to move forward, 
or to make progression through taking steps. At this time, the immediate disaster 
response will gradually turn into reconstruction phase. It is difficult to pinpoint 
where one phase ends and another begins. Nonetheless, a couple of indicators can 
be mentioned making it possible to formulate disaster-specific obligations with 
regard to the right to housing. To determine the progression a state must make, the 
CESCR’s formulation of ‘adequacy’ can be used. It is established what can be 
understood with ‘adequate’ housing in terms of privacy, having enough space, 
lighting, ventilation and access to basic infrastructure. Based on the needs-
assessment, the affected state can describe in its plans which steps it will take to 
move from emergency shelter to housing that increasingly meet the standards of 
adequacy. The Sphere Handbook contains concrete standards on the amount of 
covered living space, including consideration for privacy and household uses which 
can be used as benchmarks.113  
The IASC Guidelines provide that basic services must be available, accessible, 
acceptable and adaptable, which must be considered next to the CESCR’s 
                                                        
111 See for example the housing and shelter options and response scenarios on p. 245 and the 
minimum standards starting on p. 249. Sphere Project, ‘Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards in Disaster Response’ (Oxfam Publishing, Oxford 2011).  
112 CESCR, GC 4 (n 37) para 8(e); Charles W. Gould, ‘The Right to Housing Recovery after 
Natural Disasters’ (2009) 22 Harvard Human Rights Journal 169, 175. 






requirement of adequacy. 114 As a consequence, there must be sufficient emergency 
housing, this must be made available and must be of sufficient quality. In addition, 
the housing must be made available without discrimination. Non-discrimination is 
an obligation that is relevant for all rights in disaster contexts and is an issue 
returning often. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW Committee) ‘noted that female tsunami victims in 
Indonesia did not have their needs for (reproductive) health, clothing, housing and 
safety met. The CEDAW Committee was also concerned that households in which 
women were the head of the household suffered from ‘discriminatory treatment in 
trying to get access to housing or food aid provided to male heads of the 
households’. The Committee explicitly urged Indonesia to ‘eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women with respect to access to housing and food aid in 
emergency and natural disaster situations.’115  
Further, the housing provided must be culturally appropriate and must be 
sensitive to gender and age, for example by granting privacy. The adaptability 
finally requires that the emergency shelter can be easily transformed into more 
permanent housing, this way making room for progression from the start. The 
transition from emergency shelter to permanent housing must be 
‘speedy’.116Keeping survivors in tents during a hurricane season, for example, is 
insufficient progression. Permanent housing must meet the requirement of 
‘adequacy’, which is by the IASC described as ‘accessibility, affordability, 
habitability, security of tenure, cultural adequacy, suitability of location and access 
to essential services such as health and education’.117 
The shelter or housing as achieved may not be downgraded as that would 
constitute a retrogressive measure. To this end, the security of tenure (including 
prevention of forced evictions) also applies to emergency housing.118  
In conclusion, immediately after a disaster the affected state must seek and 
accept assistance if it is unable to identify those persons left homeless and those 
living in emergency shelter and to make plans for progression for this point. 
Progression that must be made immediately after the occurrence of a disaster is 
granting sufficient privacy, living space (determined by standards of the Sphere 
Handbook), lighting, ventilation and access to basic infrastructure. Throughout the 
progress made, the shelter or housing must be affordable, culturally adequate, and 
there must be security of tenure. The speed with which this progression is made 
depends on the context, but where an affected state is not making progression, there 
is an obligation to accept assistance. 
                                                        
114 Gould (n 112) 180. See also the Sphere Handbook on the standards (n 111). IASC Guidelines 
(n 110) B.2.1. 
115 CEDAW, ‘Concluding Observations Indonesia’ UN Doc. CEDAW/C/IDN/CO/5 of 10 August 
2007, para 38-9, cited by Hesselman (n 45) 123. 
116 IASC Guidelines (n 110) C.3.1 and C.3.3. 
117 Ibid, C.3.2. 
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4.4 The Right to Food 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The right to adequate food is also laid down in article 11 ICESCR, the text of which 
was provided in the previous section.119 The CESCR has been quite clear on the 
obligation of result of the right to food: ‘(t)he right to adequate food is realized 
when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has physical 
and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement’.120 
Consequently, for the right to food to be realized, food must be ‘available, 
accessible and adequate’. 121  Availability indicates that food must be available 
through means of production (agriculture, animal husbandry), gathering (including 
fishing, hunting) or that it must be purchasable in stores and markets. 122 
Accessibility means that it must be affordable without ‘compromising on any other 
basic needs’123 and that it must be accessible also for physically vulnerable persons, 
like the elderly and disabled.124 Finally, adequacy refers to the quality and type of 
food, so that it contains the nutrients needed for each group of individuals (i.e. 
children, adults, pregnant women, elderly etc.), also meaning that it must be safe 
and culturally acceptable.125  
In terms of the tripartite typology, states must respect the access to food that is 
already established and the means of obtaining food already established in any 
way.126  The obligation to protect indicates that states must prevent third parties 
from destroying sources of food and states must make sure that food available at 
national markets is safe and also that food is nutritious and healthy.127 The first 
aspect of the obligation to fulfil - to facilitate - tells states to be ‘proactive in 
strengthening people’s access to and use of resources and means of ensuring their 
                                                        
119 And in inter alia article 12 CEDAW, article 24 (on food) and 27 (on an adequate standard of 
living) CRC, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and a number of regional 
instruments. 
120 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 6. 
121 Ibid, para 7; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Right to Adequate 
Food: Fact Sheet no 34’ (UN, Geneva 2010) 2. The key elements as identified by Maria Green are 
in line: ‘1) the right to sustainable access to adequate food; 2) the right to safe food, including the 
right to information about food and nutrition; and 3) international aspects of the right to food’. 
Green (n 79) 1074. 
122 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 12. 
123 OHCHR, Fact Sheet no 34 (n 121) 2. 
124 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 13. 
125 Acceptability is therefore also mentioned as a separate category; Federica Donati & Margret 
Vidar, ‘International Legal Dimensions of the Right to Food’ in George Kent (ed), Global 
Obligations for the Right to Food (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Lanham 2008) 51. 
CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 11. 
126 OHCHR, Fact Sheet no 34 (n 121) 18. This includes recognizing (customary) land rights, the 
rights of persons to seek an income to come by food through free choice of work, and abstention 
from projects which potentially harm the production of food. Eide (n 16) 150. 






livelihoods, including food security’.128 The aspect ‘to provide’ dictates states to 
provide food assistance or to ensure social safety nets for those who are unable, for 
reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to food by the means at their 
disposal,129 so to ‘give poor people food, or giving them money by which to buy the 
food’.130  
In an extraterritorial context, there is at the very least an obligation to respect the 
right to food in other countries.131 Also, states should ‘take steps (…) to protect that 
right, to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid when required’ in 
other countries. 132  In this respect it is noted that recognizing ‘international 
assistance and cooperation’ as relating to ‘more than development assistance and a 
duty to ‘provide’, is essential’.133 Moreover, ‘states have an obligation to support 
the fulfilment of the right to food in other countries’.134 For the accepting-side it is 
acknowledged that not seeking assistance and prevention of access of food aid is a 
violation of the right to food: ‘(a) State claiming that it is unable to carry out its 
obligations for reasons beyond its control therefore has the burden of proving that 
this is the case and that it has unsuccessfully sought to obtain international support 
to ensure the availability and accessibility of the necessary food’.135 
 
4.4.2 Core contents 
The right to food does not constitute an entitlement to receive food from the state. 
The state must create the environment in which people can obtain food themselves. 
Only where people are unable to provide for themselves for reasons beyond their 
control, the state must provide food.136 The minimum core obligation of the right to 
food therefore is ‘to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum 
essential level required to be free from hunger’.137 As the right to food may be 
realized progressively, states must at least create a roadmap towards full realization 
                                                        
128 OHCHR, Fact Sheet no 34 (n 121) 18. 
129 Ibid, 19. 
130 Eide (n 16) 152. 
131 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 36; Donati & Vidar (n 125) 60, 68; Sigrun I. Skogly, ‘Right to 
Adequate Food: National Implementation and Extraterritorial Obligations’ (2007) 11 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 339, 352. 
132 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 36. 
133 Skogly, ‘Right to Adequate Food’ (n 131) 351. 
134 Rolf Künnemann & Sandra Ratjen, ‘Extraterritorial Obligations: A Response to Globalization’ 
in George Kent (ed), Global Obligations for the Right to Food (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Inc., Lanham 2008) 42. 
135 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 17. Künnemann recognizes that a ‘state could need to co-operate 
internationally to meet its territorial obligations, for example in a state of emergency for securing 
domestic access to food through international assistance’. Künnemann (n 30) 204. 
136 Donati & Vidar (n 125) 52. 
137 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 17. This minimum level is described as ‘food that will maintain an 
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of the right to food. 138  Moreover, ‘States have a core obligation to take the 
necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger as provided for in paragraph 2 of 
article 11, even in times of natural or other disasters.’139 Other core obligations are: 
making sure that there is such availability of food that dietary needs are satisfied; 
that food is culturally appropriate and that it is accessible in such a way that it is 
sustainable and that there is no interference with the enjoyment of other human 
rights.140 Finally, in situations of ‘severe resource constraints, whether caused by a 
process of economic adjustment, economic recession, climatic conditions or other 
factors, measures should be undertaken to ensure that the right to adequate food is 
especially fulfilled for vulnerable population groups and individuals.’141 If a state 
claims it does not have the resources to realize this, ‘the state has to demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all the resources at its disposal in an effort to 
satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations’.142 
 
4.4.3 Obligations relating to disasters 
The core obligations on the right to food give the most concrete standards on when 
an affected state must seek and/or accept assistance. Immediately after a disaster, 
the affected state must make sure that disaster survivors are free from hunger (under 
the obligation to mitigate and alleviate hunger). As a consequence, the affected state 
must actively provide food assistance to those without access to food.143 At this 
point, adding the need for food items in the needs-assessment is not enough. 
Immediately after a disaster an obligation to accept food assistance exists if the state 
cannot alleviate hunger and the state cannot await the needs-assessment.144 The 
needs-assessment can be used to plan the next steps and to specify what further 
food aid is required. At this stage (as core obligations), the food assistance must 
satisfy dietary needs, and the food must be culturally appropriate and must be 
accessible in a sustainable way so that there is no interference with other human 
rights. 145 These criteria give grounds for judging the offers of assistance and give 
                                                        
138 Making such a plan is an immediate obligation, as is the prevention of discrimination, taking 
steps towards full realization, the prohibition of retrogressive measures, and the realization of the 
minimum core content. UN-OHCHR, Fact Sheet no 34 (n 121) 20-22. 
139 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 6.  
140 Ibid, para 8. 
141 Ibid, para 28. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Donati and Vidar claim in this respect that a state violates its obligations ‘if it let people starve 
when they were in desperate need and had no way of helping themselves’. Donati & Vidar (n 125) 
58. 
144 UN Development Programme, ‘Disaster Assessment’ (2nd edition 1994) 24 cited by David 
Fisher, ‘Fast Food: Regulating Emergency Food Aid in Sudden-Impact Disasters’ (2007) 40 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1127, 1131. 
145  CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 39. Sustainability and long term-planning is generally 
recommended in delivering food assistance: ‘the response is based on people’s immediate food 
needs but will also consider the protection and promotion of livelihoods strategies’. Sphere 







room for states to refuse an offer. The Sphere Handbook gives indicators on 
requirements of nutrition based on which a state can determine which food 
assistance can satisfy dietary needs. 146  Apart from immediately providing food 
assistance, the affected state must – as a core obligation – create a roadmap towards 
full realization (the CESCR formulated a clear definition of the full realization of 
the right to food). In this roadmap there is room for particular consideration of the 
situation at hand.  
After the core obligations, the progression that a state must make is determined 
by the factors ‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’, both being a part of ‘adequacy’.147 
Here, the affected state must continue the core obligation of providing food, yet 
now the standard is providing the access to food for those who cannot obtain it 
(either cannot purchase it for lack of means or lack of offer). The CESCR 
formulated this as follows: ‘an individual or group is unable, for reasons beyond 
their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the means at their disposal, 
States have the obligation to fulfil (provide) that right directly. This obligation also 
applies for persons who are victims of natural or other disasters’.148 Throughout the 
disaster response, states must therefore accept assistance if they cannot provide 
food to disaster survivors: ‘(e)ven where a State faces severe resource constraints, 
whether caused by a process of economic adjustment, economic recession, climatic 
conditions or other factors, measures should be undertaken to ensure that the right 
to adequate food is especially fulfilled for vulnerable population groups and 
individuals’.149  
The requirement of ‘availability’ indicates that food must either be obtained 
from productive land or other resources (which is usually hampered after a disaster) 
or through well-functioning distribution or market systems (the first steps in disaster 
response).150 The affected state must therefore set up such a system or request 
assistance to this end. ‘Accessibility’ requires that food is economically accessible, 
so in the beginning usually free of costs with a gradual increase of costs, and that 
food is physically accessible, also to those groups more vulnerable (elderly, 
children, disabled). The affected state must therefore actively provide food to those 
                                                        
response manager in ——, ‘Emergency Food Aid’ Disaster Emergency Committee 25 August 
2011 <http://www.dec.org.uk/appeals/east-africa-crisis-appeal/emergency-food-aid> accessed 15 
August 2012 stating: ‘(e)mergency food aid is the option of last resort. It is desperately needed 
now to save lives, but it does not solve any of the underlying causes. One thing which has made a 
long term difference in areas of Kenya is helping people strengthen their livelihoods, which can 
help them withstand future crises’ 
146 See the scheme on p. 142 and Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Standard 2: Nutrition in 
the Sphere Handbook (n 111) 154. 
147 These factors were explained in the introduction to the right to food above. 
148 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 15. 
149 Ibid, para 28; Donati & Vidar (n 125) 58. In the same paragraph, Donati and Vidar also note 
that ‘States that, through neglect or misplaced national pride, make no such appeals or 
deliberately delay such appeals are violating their obligation’. 
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who cannot obtain it or provide the means to obtain food. Ensuring access to food 
not only entails providing the actual food, but also materials to prepare and 
possibilities to store food, and means of distribution.151 According to the CESCR 
and to the Sphere Handbook, states may not hamper the access to food, so if a third 
party is providing food aid, the state may not block access to the assistance.152 
Consequently, the affected state must accept international humanitarian 
assistance if it cannot provide basic food aid immediately after a disaster. If the 
affected state is not able to provide basic food, it violates its obligations under the 
CESCR and must therefore give its consent to suitable offers. The obligation to 
provide exists throughout the disaster response phase, where the affected state must 
meet increasing standards of nutrition. These standards can be used to determine the 
amount of progression the affected state must make.   
 
4.5 The Right to Water 
 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The right to water is not laid down explicitly in the ICESCR, but is derived from 
articles 11 and 12 ICESCR. Without clean and safe water it is impossible to enjoy 
the right to food and health and certain aspects of the right to housing cannot be 
achieved (like access to infrastructure). It is possible to consider the right to water 
as ‘subordinate and necessary’ to realize other human rights, yet by now it can be 
argued that the right to water is an independent human right as well. 153  This 
suggestion is reinforced by the adoption of the right in various treaties154 and by the 
General Comment made by the CESCR on the right to water, recognizing it as a 
part of articles 11 and 12 ICESCR and also of the right to life and human dignity.155 
According to the CESCR, ‘(t)he human right to water entitles everyone to 
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal 
and domestic uses’.156 On the one hand this means that people have the ‘right to 
maintain access to existing water supplies’ and the ‘right to be free from 
interference’, on the other hand that the state foresees in a ‘system of water supply 
and management that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right 
to water’.157 The CESCR determines further that water must be adequate for human 
dignity, life and health and gives a number of indicators to determine adequacy: 
availability (sufficient for daily household use); quality (safe and of acceptable 
                                                        
151 Fisher, ‘Fast Food’ (n 144) 1141. 
152 CESCR, GC 12 (n 28) para 19. In the Sphere Handbook: states ‘should also facilitate safe and 
unimpeded access for international assistance’. The Sphere Handbook (n 111) 144. 
153  Erik B. Bluemel, ‘The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water’ (2004) 31 
Ecology Law Quarterly 957, 967-8. 
154 For example article 14(2) CEDAW and article 24(2) under (c) CRC. 
155 CESCR, GC 15 (n 49) para 3. 
156 Ibid, para 2. 






colour, odour and taste); and accessible (physical, economical and without 
discrimination).158 If persons do not have sufficient means they should be provided 
with the necessary water and water facilities and discrimination must be 
prevented. 159  Especially certain groups must be protected, amongst which are 
mentioned IDPs and refugees.160 
States have immediate obligations to realize the right to water (non-
discrimination and the obligation to take steps). States ‘have a constant and 
continuing duty (…) to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards 
the full realization of the right to water’161 and no retrogressive measures may be 
taken.162 Further, states are under duties to respect, protect and fulfil, where they 
must fulfil ‘the right when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond 
their control, to realize that right themselves by the means at their disposal’.163 
If a state is unwilling to use the maximum of its available resources to realize 
the right to water, it is in violation of its obligations. Where a state is in violation of 
its obligations due to resource constraints, it has to justify that every effort has been 
made to use all resources at its disposal to realize the right to water.164 
 
4.5.2 Core contents 
The CESCR has identified a number of core obligations. These core obligations 
constitute the duty to ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water; to 
ensure the right of access to water and water facilities without discrimination and 
especially for disadvantaged or marginalized groups; to ensure physical access to 
water without long waiting times and at reasonable distance; safe physical access; 
equitable distribution; to adopt a plan of action; to monitor; to adopt relatively low-
cost targeted programmes to protect vulnerable and marginalized groups165 and to 
take measures to prevent treat and control water-based and water-borne diseases.166 
These obligations are explicitly recognized to be non-derogable and a state cannot 
justify non-compliance with these core obligations.167 
 
4.5.3 Obligations relating to disasters 
It is noticeable that the system of core contents had evolved by the time the General 
Comment on the right to water was created: the contents mentioned are both 
relatively extensive and elaborate. In disaster contexts, water is of essential 
                                                        
158 Ibid, para 12 under (a) to (c). 
159 Ibid, para 15. 
160 Ibid, para 16 and 16(f).  
161 Ibid, para 18. 
162 Ibid, para 19. 
163 Ibid, para 25. 
164 Ibid, para 41. 
165 Apart from being mentioned under paragraph 37, this core obligation is also recognized as a 
general obligation in paragraph 13 of CESCR, GC 15 (n 49). 
166 Ibid, para 37 under (a) to (i). 
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importance and is immediately linked to the fulfilment of other rights. Water is for 
example needed to make use of food aid, which often consists of dried food stuffs 
like dried noodles and rice.168 Another example is provided as a core obligation: the 
right to health can be violated through water-based and water-borne diseases, which 
must be prevented, treated and controlled under the right to water. 
Immediately after the occurrence of a disaster, the affected state party has a 
number of obligations to fulfil. In the first and foremost place, the state must 
provide access to safe water, where a number of specifications are given. First, the 
affected state must provide the minimum essential amount, for which the Sphere 
Handbook contains standards. 169  Next, water must be provided without 
discrimination. Third, physical access must be guaranteed, where the affected state 
must make sure that there are no long waiting times,170 that the distance to the water 
source is reasonable,171 and that the access to the water sources is safe, for example 
by having sufficient lighting at night and having separate facilities for men and 
women. 172  Within the progression the state must made, these standards give 
indications on what must be achieved (less waiting time, closer distances, more 
safety to users). The Sphere Handbook gives for example standards on the number 
of facilities for certain amounts of people, and the progression from latrines to 
actual toilets.173 Where groups are ‘facing difficulties with physical access to water, 
such as (...) victims of natural disasters, (...) are provided with safe and sufficient 
water’.174 To achieve this, the state must be well-equipped. As with the right to food, 
the danger is that waiting for the needs-assessment takes too long and that fast 
decisions are required in order not to violate the core obligations.  
The basis for the progression is also laid down in the core obligations by 
referring to the plan of action, to monitoring and to adopting relatively low-cost 
targeted programmes to protect vulnerable and marginalized groups (under which 
disaster victims can be ranged). Further progression is again determined by the 
elements that constitute ‘adequacy’ (availability, quality, accessibility). Using these 
factors as guidelines and taking the context of the state and disaster into account, 
the affected state party must make sure that it takes steps towards the full realization. 
In the IASC Guidelines, the formulation used is that of the ‘right to sufficient, safe, 
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic 
use without discrimination’.175  
                                                        
168 Fisher, ‘Fast Food’ (n 144) 1137. 
169 The Sphere Handbook divides the needs for water in various purposes, like hygiene, excreta 
disposal and drainage. For each purpose there are different minimum amounts. Sphere Handbook 
(n 111) 82. 
170 See for example the maximum queueing time of 30 minutes provided by the Sphere Handbook, 
ibid, 97. 
171 The Sphere Handbook prescribes a maximum distance of 500 metres, ibid. 
172 IASC Guidelines (n 110) B.2.2. 
173 See Appendix 3 to the Sphere Handbook (n 111) 130 and the table at 109. 
174 CESCR, GC 15 (n 49) para 16(h). 






Ultimately, if a group is or individuals are unable to obtain water, the state party 
must fulfil the right. In the context of the right to water it is explicitly recognized 
that progression includes the preparation for the occurrence of a new disaster: states 
must plan for response mechanisms for emergency situations176 and the failure to 
adopt such mechanisms constitutes a violation of the right to water.177 
Apart from identifying obligations with regard to the right to water stemming 
from the ICESCR, ‘(t)he Committee notes that during armed conflicts, emergency 
situations and natural disasters, the right to water embraces those obligations by 
which States parties are bound under international humanitarian law’.178 Here, the 
CESCR argues that in cases of natural disaster, international humanitarian law 
applies, which is a striking comment as there is no ground to assume that in a 
peacetime disaster humanitarian law can be applied.179 Large parts of IHL can be 
considered as customary international law and can generally be applied, and the 
comment of the CESCR may be understood as referring to general principles 
depicted by IHL.180 These are the very basic needs with regard to access to clean 
water, as laid down in the core contents of the right to water. 
Affected states must seek assistance when disaster survivors do not have access 
to sufficient amounts of safe water and the state cannot facilitate this access 
immediately after a disaster. This obligation remains in place during the progression 
the state must make afterwards, where indicators like adequacy, availability, quality 
and accessibility determine what can be expected from a state. Although the steps 
remain dependent on the specifics of the case, the Sphere Handbook give concrete 
standards that the affected state can use in its plan.  
 
4.6 The Right to Health 
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Article 12 ICESCR, containing the right to the highest attainable standard of health 
(and implicitly also the right to water), provides: 
 
(1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
(2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
                                                        
176 CESCR, GC 15 (n 49) para 28(h). 
177 Ibid, para 44(v). 
178 Ibid, para 22. 
179  The CESCR comments in a footnote that the ICJ Nuclear Weapons-case (1996) can be 
consulted for the interrelationship of human rights law and humanitarian law. 
180 Although the option must be considered that the CESCR referred to IHL only in relation to 
armed conflicts, possibly in combination with the occurrence of a disaster. See for an overview of 
the relation between IHL and disaster response Michael H. Hoffman, ‘What is the Scope of 
International Disaster Response Law?’ in IFRC, International Disaster Response Laws, 
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(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;  
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.181 
 
Reading this article makes clear that the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health is quite elaborate and complex. It consists of physical and mental health and 
the elements vary from reproductive health to workplace environments, control of 
epidemics and working on the services providing health care.182 The key elements 
can be narrowly defined as: ‘1) rights involving freedom and control over one’s 
health, including for instance reproductive freedom and freedom from torture; 2) 
the right to health care; 3) the right to underlying determinants of health, including 
for instance clean water, sanitation, healthy and natural workplace environment and 
information about health’.183 The CESCR provides a more layered analysis of the 
content of the right to health in one of its General Comments. It emphasizes that the 
right to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy, but through freedoms 
and entitlements people should be able to pursue the highest attainable standard of 
health. 184  Freedoms relate to the abstention of governments in choices made 
regarding one’s health and body and elements like freedom from torture. 
Entitlements ‘include the right to a system of health protection which provides 
equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable standard of 
health.185  
Because the right to health is so broad and all-encompassing, a useful way to 
define the content of the right to health is making use of the aspects of ‘availability’, 
‘accessibility’, ‘acceptability’, and ‘quality’, as the CESCR has also done in the 
context of other rights. Availability relates to the presence of health-care facilities 
and goods, but also to availability of underlying determinants, like clean water.186 
Accessibility must be understood in terms of non-discrimination, physical 
accessibility, economic accessibility (affordability) and accessibility of 
                                                        
181 The right to health is also provided in, inter alia, article 25(1) UDHR and article 24 CRC. 
182 The CESCR gives this list of topics in the General Comment and explains there that the list is 
not exhaustive. It is explained what each of the issues under article 12(2) ICESCR entails and it is 
further emphasized that certain groups may need specific attention, like women, children, the 
elderly, the disabled and indigenous people. CESCR, GC 14 (n 29) paras 18-29. 
183 Green (n 79) 1074. 
184 CESCR, GC 14 (n 29) para 8. It is obvious that states cannot prevent people from becoming ill 
entirely, but they must protect against illnesses wherever they can. Even so, certain lifestyle 
choices are also of influence, but are not necessarily related to the right to health in disaster-
contexts. 
185 Ibid.  






information. 187  Next, health facilities, goods and services must by culturally 
appropriate, so acceptable in the society.188 Finally, the quality must be such that 
staff and goods are safe and that equipment and facilities are clean and furnished.189 
The CESCR further states – again – that states must take targeted steps towards full 
realization with an obligation to move forward and that retrogressive measures are 
not allowed.  
As with the other rights, the duties to respect and protect relate to not blocking 
access to health care or medicines in any way, or allow other to block this access. 
Under the obligation to fulfil, states are encouraged to at least adopt recognition of 
the right in national political and legal systems and to set up programmes and 
campaigns related to health. Moreover, states must ‘ensure provision of health care’ 
and ‘ensure access for all underlying determinants of health’, like safe food, water 
and adequate housing.190 States must further provide for a specific right of the 
ICESC when persons ‘are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize the 
right themselves by the means at their disposal.’191 
 
4.6.2 Core contents 
As core obligations, the CESCR identifies a number of duties: ensuring the right of 
access to health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis, 
especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups; to provide essential drugs; to 
ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities, goods and services; to adopt and 
implement a strategy and plan of action, including benchmarks with particular 
attention to all vulnerable or marginalized groups.192 Under the core contents of the 
right to health other rights are mentioned as well: to ensure access to the minimum 
essential food; to ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation and an 
adequate supply of safe and potable water.193  
The CESCR continues by providing a list of obligations which are ‘of 
comparable priority’. It may be assumed that these obligations are of the same level 
as the core obligations, but why the CESCR did not choose to just make one longer 
list is not clear. This second list provides: to ensure reproductive, maternal and child 
health care; to provide immunization against the major infectious diseases occurring 
in the community; to take measures to prevent, treat and control epidemic and 
endemic diseases; to provide education and access to information concerning the 
main health problems in the community, including methods of preventing and 
controlling them; to provide appropriate training for health personnel, including 
                                                        
187 Ibid, para 12(b). 
188 Ibid, para 12(c).  
189 Ibid, para 12(d). 
190 Ibid, para 36. 
191 Ibid, para 37. 
192 Ibid, para 43 under (a), (d) to (f). 
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education on health and human rights.194 Again, the CESCR stresses that ‘a State 
party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance with 
the core obligations (…), which are non-derogable.’195 
 
4.6.3 Obligations relating to disasters 
Since it is very broad and consisting of many factors, realizing the right to health is 
already challenging in ordinary times and in times of emergency it has proved 
‘exceedingly complex’.196 States must provide for access to health care, meaning 
access to facilities, staff, goods, medicines, etc. The IASC Guidelines formulate the 
right to health in emergency contexts as the right ‘to timely and appropriate, 
accessible, culturally acceptable and gender sensitive health care without 
discrimination’. 197  Access to health care also includes access to underlying 
determinants, like clean water, safe and nutritious food and adequate shelter.198 
Especially for marginalized and vulnerable groups, and for those who are unable to 
obtain health care for reasons beyond their control, like disaster victims, the state 
must provide access. After a disaster, states must therefore provide for the whole 
package, and cannot afford to only focus on one of the aforementioned rights.  
Granting access means making health care affordable, which post-disaster 
means in most cases free of charge. This goes especially for obtaining essential 
drugs, which is one of the core obligations of the right to health. Health care must 
also be in the vicinity of disaster survivors so that it is physically accessible. This 
entails an equitable distribution of emergency facilities throughout the disaster area 
and in the areas where IDPs or refugees are staying. An example of a violation of 
the obligation to respect include the ‘denial of access to health facilities, goods, and 
services’, so where states refuse to accept assistance that must contribute to 
realizing the right to health, it may be understood as denial of access. 199  An 
overview of what essential health services encompass is provided in the Sphere 
Handbook.200  
Providers of humanitarian assistance relating to health care must make sure that 
the assistance is culturally appropriate. States also have a role in ensuring that the 
assistance is meeting this requirement and also that it meets certain standards of 
quality. An example is provided by the sensitivity to gender, to which end the state 
must make sure that female health care is accessible for women and girls. 201 
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Because of its many aspects, the right to health therefore ‘can be used to monitor 
the humanitarian response by local, regional, national and international actors’.202 
While immediately after a disaster the health care may be of emergency-level, states 
have an obligation to make progression and to make steps towards full realization of 
the right to health, so emergency health care is only acceptable right after a disaster. 
Making plans and setting benchmarks are steps that states can take immediately and 
will help to determine how to move on from the post-disaster phase to the recovery 
phase, and will allow a state to make targeted requests for assistance.    
Finally, the right to health must also aim at preventing the outbreak of epidemics 
and endemic diseases, which includes ‘the creation of a system of urgent medical 
care in cases of accidents, epidemics and similar health hazards, and the provision 
of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in emergency situations’.203 Especially 
after water-related disasters, special measures must be taken to prevent the outbreak 
of diseases, like disposing of bodies and cleaning sources of drinking water. To this 
end, the Sphere Handbook contains clear standards on the control of communicable 
diseases, where general prevention measures refer to the rights mentioned before: 
shelter, water and food security.204  
The CESCR has summarized these disaster-specific obligations in the General 
Comment on the right to health, stating that states and international organisations 
should: 
 
Cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of 
emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. (…) 
Priority in the provision of international medical aid, distribution and management of 
resources, such as safe and potable water, food and medical supplies, and financial 
aid should be given to the most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the 
population.205  
 
This is repeated in relation to the role of international organisations in realizing the 
right to health. The role of these organisations is of special importance 
 
In relation to disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergencies, 
including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Priority in the 
provision of international medical aid, distribution and management of resources, 
such as safe and potable water, food and medical supplies, and financial aid should 
be given to the most vulnerable or marginalized groups of the population.206 
 
The set of obligations for affected states under the right to health is quite 
complex as it includes standards from the aforementioned rights. In any case, the 
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affected state must be able to provide access to basic health care, immediately 
after a disaster free of charge, with access to essential medicines. Standards 
following the core obligations are again determined by formulations of adequacy, 
accessibility, quality and availability and must be measured by including 
standards of the other rights.  
 
4.7 Disaster-specific obligations under the substantive rights 
 
When considering the four rights discussed here together a number of issues 
become clear. Throughout the General Comments, the CESCR has used the same 
words to define obligations, yet often this has also led to general obligations and not 
to specific obligations relating to each right. The advantage of this is that certain 
conclusions can be drawn on what is at least expected from states in disaster 
situations. However, certain gaps remain with regard to each right on the details and 
specifics of the obligations.  
The core contents contain obligations that must be realized at all times and for 
which, according to General Comments 14 and 15, no justification for non-
compliance is possible. An evolution in the usage of core contents can easily be 
discerned in the work of the CESCR. Where the formulation of core obligations 
was missing in the General Comment on the right to housing, the mechanism was 
already used for the right to food and with respect to the rights to health and water 
the formulation of non-derogable obligations was used. Core contents provide the 
minimum of obligations that states must realize at all times, also immediately after 
a disaster. If a state does not have the resources to do this, it must seek additional 
resources and therefore accept international assistance when necessary. 
Consequently, the core obligations provide a clear standard on when an affected 
state is obliged to accept international humanitarian assistance.207 Core contents 
have been formulated quite elaborately and not all (parts of) the core obligations are 
of particular relevance in disaster settings. Those parts that are relevant in the 
aftermath of a disaster and for which an obligation exists to accept international 
humanitarian assistance if the affected state cannot realise it by itself are to: 
- Give particular consideration with respect to housing to social groups 
living in unfavourable conditions; 
- Monitor to ascertain the full extent of homelessness and inadequate 
housing; 
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- Ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, the minimum essential amount 
of water and minimum level required to be free from hunger; 
- Take the necessary action to mitigate and alleviate hunger; 
- Make sure that food is culturally appropriate, accessible and sustainable; 
- Ensure that the right to food is especially fulfilled for vulnerable population 
groups and individuals;  
- Ensure the right of access to water and water facilities (including safe and 
quick access); 
- Adopt relatively low-cost targeted programmes to protect vulnerable and 
marginalized groups; 
- Take measures to prevent, treat and control water-based and water-borne 
diseases and provide immunization against major infectious diseases; 
- Treat and control epidemic and endemic diseases; 
- Provide access to information concerning health issues, including 
preventing and controlling diseases; 
- Ensure access to health facilities, goods, and services, especially for 
vulnerable and marginalized groups; 
- Provide essential drugs. 
Moving beyond core obligations, the question immediately arises what states 
must achieve further in terms of progression.  In the context of each right, the 
CESCR has given its interpretation of ‘adequacy’. The elements constituting 
‘adequacy’ can be used to determine the progress a state party must make, like 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality. 208  However, the progress is 
depending on availability of resources, the size of the disaster, and the specifics of 
the affected state. One obligation that was identified for all rights is the positive 
obligation to provide for those persons who cannot obtain or fulfil a right for 
reasons beyond their control. If persons do not have access to housing, food, water 
or health care after a disaster, a state must provide this access. This obligation is 
mentioned under the duty to fulfil where the CESCR discusses the tripartite 
typology and does not fall under the core contents. Consequently, a state must make 
sure that it seeks additional resources (and as such has an obligation to accept 
assistance) when it does not have sufficient resources to provide, but where a state 
has made sufficient efforts to obtain additional resources and can still not provide, it 
does not violate its obligations. Nonetheless, where states are unable to provide for 
access to one of the aforementioned rights, there is an obligation to accept 
international assistance. The other duties of the tripartite typology are treated in the 
same way. The duties to respect and to protect lead to the same results for each right: 
states must abstain from interfering in the enjoyment of a right and must make sure 
that third parties do not interfere either. 
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It has become clear that during and immediately after a disaster state parties to the 
ICESCR have obligations that cannot be set aside merely by the occurrence of a 
disaster. Most notably, the core contents that the CESCR has defined for most rights 
are non-derogable and justification for violating these core contents is not possible. 
As a consequence, if an affected state party to the ICESCR is unable to realize the 
core contents of a right after the occurrence of a disaster, that state has an obligation 
to seek and accept international humanitarian assistance for the realization of the 
core contents. Departing from this initial obligation, affected states must also 
comply with the general obligation to take steps towards full realization of the 
rights of the ICESCR. What the further steps beyond the core obligations should 
look like is less easy to define, nor is it possible to clearly demarcate where disaster 
response in terms of human rights standards ends and the rebuilding-phase begins, 
at which point more progression can already be expected. It is acceptable that states 
make less progression in the realization of the ESC-rights than they would 
otherwise do, although this lenience is subject to a number of ifs and buts. As soon 
as a state finds that its performance is limited by resource constraints, it must seek 
additional resources and make use of international assistance and cooperation. This 
indicates a clear transition from the first to the second step of the legal framework 
on accepting international humanitarian assistance. The standard dictating the point 
of transition is in line with what was found in the first part of the research: if the 
national capacity is overwhelmed, a state must seek assistance (by triggering the 
process). Within the reach of available resources (including those available 
internationally), a state must take steps towards full realization. Even though these 
steps are – as said – limited in scope due to resource constraints, a state must 
nonetheless move forward. Where a state made an effort to obtain additional 
resources, it is not violating its obligations.  
The obligation to use (and therefore accept) international assistance and 
cooperation – i.e. humanitarian assistance in the context of disasters – is not 
recognized as a general obligation, yet exists in the context of what has just been 
said: if resource constraints cause lack of progression (or standstill or regression) as 
no steps can be taken and as such obligations under the ICESCR are violated, the 
state has an obligation to accept. Again, the ICESCR provides a standard for 
moving to the next step of the legal framework on accepting international 
humanitarian assistance in line with the standards of Part I of this research: the 
needs-assessment must determine whether the affected state has sufficient capacity 
to respond to a disaster. Human rights standards can be used in this needs-
assessment. If the capacity is overwhelmed, so if at least the core contents cannot be 
realized, there is an obligation to accept. At this point lies a check for the CESCR: a 
willing state is able to demonstrate what it has done to obtain assistance. An 
unwilling state that does not make sufficient progression through even the smallest 
steps cannot demonstrate what it has done to obtain international assistance and is 






in which article 2(1) is formulated therefore functions to a certain extent as a 
derogation clause. In situations of severe resource constraints, less progression can 
be expected from states than in ordinary situations, yet what exactly the standards 
are must be determined for each right. 
With regard to the rights to housing, food, water and health the minimum 
obligations can be found in the core contents. These must be realized at all times 
and where a state lacks the resources to do this, it must seek and accept additional 
resources. Further, as a next step there is for each right a clear positive obligation to 
provide access to that right for disaster victims. The standard of this duty is not 
clearly defined for each right. Rather, it is part of the general obligation to fulfil. 
Yet, when looking at the standards that determine adequacy, more becomes clear on 
what progressive realization must lead to. However, here the transition is made 
from the disaster-proper-phase to the recovery-phase, which is excluded from the 
present research. Nonetheless, making plans for progressive realization is part of the 
core contents and therefore the needs-assessment must already take into account 
how the affected state will progress.  
In conclusion, refusing offers of international assistance after a disaster when a) 
core contents are not realized or b) access of disaster victims to certain rights is not 
provided leads to a violation of obligations under the ICESCR. Also, not accepting 
international humanitarian assistance when it is needed to make progress in the 
realization of human rights after a disaster could also be seen as taking a 
















Disasters have devastating effects on the lives of people. The occurrence of a 
disaster can kill thousands in an instance, injure many others, damage homes and 
destroy livelihoods. Reconstruction takes a long time and the traumas last even 
longer. Natural disasters will not cease to exist and their impact appears to be ever 
growing. It is therefore of great importance that the response to a disaster is as 
effective and adequate as possible. If the disaster is too large for the affected state to 
cope with, other states, international organisations and NGOs are usually willing to 
assist. Although there is no guarantee that the situation of disaster survivors will 
greatly improve by external assistance, such help could be the difference between 
suffering due to a lack of supplies and being able to obtain at least the most basic 
resources. Nonetheless, some states affected by a disaster refuse international 
humanitarian assistance. They do this for a variety of reasons, a decision which can 
aggravate the effects of the disaster. Public international law offers hardly any 
instruments explicitly directing states’ behaviour regarding humanitarian assistance 
in response to a disaster. This research has therefore aimed to answer the following 
question: 
 
To what extent does public international law contain standards for affected states 
determining whether they must accept international humanitarian assistance after 
the occurrence of a disaster? 
 
As a first part of the research, a number of (legal) instruments and documents has 
been selected which potentially can be used to find clues for answering the main 
research question. Together with an analysis of the past attempts to organize the 
response to disasters on the international level, the consideration of fields of 
international law, resolutions, guidelines and other instruments has resulted in an 
overview of legal rules and principles depicting where the law on accepting 
humanitarian assistance in response to a disaster currently stands. Based on this a 
framework is designed departing from the primary role of the affected state and 
giving three steps for initiating and accepting international humanitarian assistance, 
together with three limitations of the affected state’s freedom to withhold consent. 
Next to that, these findings have been placed in the light of and have been 






the application of the rules ‘in real life’. Here it was found that although the rules 
give certain direction for states on accepting assistance, more concrete standards are 
required before it is possible to speak of an obligation for states to accept 
international humanitarian assistance in response to disasters. From the analysis of 
legal sources it followed that the most promising field for concretizing standards is 
human rights law. In particular the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) turned out to be useful since a number of its rights is of 
particular importance for disaster contexts, like the right to housing, food, water and 
health. In addition, the general obligations of the ICESCR speak of using 
‘international assistance and cooperation’.  
In the following, the results will be discussed. First, it will be considered what 
the current legal framework (apart from the ICESCR) entails and where the 
limitations and challenges lie. After this, it will be explained how especially the 
ICESCR contributes to the legal framework, before ending with an overview of 
obligations directing states on accepting international humanitarian assistance in 
response to a disaster.  
 
2 THE CURRENT STANDING OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ACCEPTING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO A DISASTER 
 
2.1 International approaches to disaster response versus state sovereignty: the 
origin of the conflicting notions 
 
Public international law does not contain a clearly demarcated field of law created 
for the sole purpose of disaster response. The sources that form the basis of a 
common set of rules and principles identified in this research are mostly of soft-law 
character and created for specific practical purposes, like improving the quality of 
humanitarian operations. This scattered legal framework is the result of conflicting 
views on disaster response, reflected in past attempts to organize this response on 
the international level. 
The only attempt to set up an international organization with the main task of 
actively responding to a disaster, the International Relief Union (IRU), created in 
1927 under auspices of the League of Nations, rested on the assumption that 
affected states must be helped by an international collective, but was handicapped 
by the preservation of state sovereignty and territorial integrity in its mandate. It 
was generally accepted that a disaster can be beyond an affected states’ capacity to 
respond and that international support is therefore necessary, but at the same time 
states were reluctant to set the door open widely for others to enter. These 
conflicting views have resulted in an unsuccessful organisation. The IRU’s mandate 
was limited to responding only to exceptionally devastating disasters and it needed 
permission of the affected state to operate. Only in two disasters did the IRU come 
to action, but only managed to channel resources through the Red Cross. After 






UN system, the IRU’s end became final with the transfer of its remaining scientific 
tasks to UNESCO in 1967.  
The two conflicting views on international disaster response – i.e. preserving 
state sovereignty whilst acknowledging the importance of a coordinated 
international response in some cases – determine the working methods of today’s 
main international organisations dealing with humanitarian assistance in response to 
disasters. Within the UN context, there is a specific body that is created for the 
coordination of humanitarian responses to disasters. This Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is headed by the Emergency Relief 
Coordinator and is the result of the development of the UN’s branch of disaster 
response since the establishment of the UN Disaster Relief Organisation in 1971. 
OCHA works with affected states that are willing to cooperate with the organisation 
and in this way respects the sovereignty of states. With permission of the affected 
state, OCHA can coordinate the international response to a disaster or assist in the 
coordination.  
The other main organisation working on humanitarian assistance in response to 
disasters is the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC). 
The IFRC is a private initiative that was first set up in 1919 as the League of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, being the umbrella organisation of National Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies which aim at delivering humanitarian assistance 
in peacetime disasters. The IFRC leans strongly on principles like impartiality, 
neutrality and independence making affected states more comfortable to accept 
assistance from the IFRC. In addition, the IFRC often has access to disaster 
situations through national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies already on the 
ground. Accordingly, from the first attempt to organise the response to a disaster 
internationally, state sovereignty has limited the possibilities of the organisations set 
up for this purpose. These conflicting notions have also found their way into the 
legal framework on humanitarian assistance. 
 
2.2 The common rules and principles on humanitarian assistance in disaster 
response 
 
When looking at the sources from which common rules and principles are derived 
on accepting international humanitarian assistance in response to a disaster, it can 
be clearly seen that on the one hand it is acknowledged that an affected state 
sometimes needs external assistance, yet that at the same time the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states must remain intact. The document currently forming the 
basis for most peacetime humanitarian relief operations, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182, adopted in 1991, reflects this conflicting idea and encompasses 
the main common rules and principles also found in other instruments. Here, the 
main common rules and principles will be mentioned where it will suffice to refer 
to Resolution 46/182 as the basis instead of including again all documents and 






The Resolution explicitly recognizes the importance of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national unity. Departing from these principles, the affected state has 
the primary responsibility to take care of the victims of disasters. If additional 
assistance is required because the magnitude and duration of a disaster is beyond 
the response capacity of the affected state, Resolution 46/182 articulates that 
assistance should only be provided with the consent of and on the basis of an appeal 
by the affected state. Without the leading role of the affected state (and the 
requirement of consent), the response to a disaster could potentially be very chaotic 
because too much goods and personnel enter at the same time, clogging distribution 
chains with items that are perhaps not even needed. Offers of international 
humanitarian assistance must meet the humanitarian principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality and independence, making it easier for the affected state to 
decide on the acceptance of the offer, and Resolution 46/182 determines that the 
provision of assistance must also be in line with these principles (although the 
Resolution does not mention the principle ‘independence’, which is mentioned by 
others like OCHA). 
According to Resolution 46/182 it is the primary task of the affected state to 
respond to a disaster by bringing relief to the affected population. International 
assistance and cooperation is ‘of great importance’ when the affected state comes to 
the conclusion that its own response is inadequate or will be inadequate in the near 
future. Other states, international organisations and NGOs must await the request of 
the affected state and subsequently the consent by the affected state before they can 
provide humanitarian assistance. These rules are to a large extent recognizable in 
the entire set of (legal) sources on humanitarian assistance, although it is now 
accepted (in practice) that external actors do not have to await a request by the 
affected state but that they can also make an unsolicited offer.  
Comparing this set of rules to that found in the field of international 
humanitarian law – often believed to be more advanced in this respect than the field 
of peacetime disasters – leads to the conclusion that the same rules dictate the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance within IHL, albeit in different phrasings. The 
point at which a state must seek external assistance is, for example, based on the 
undue hardship suffered by a civilian population. Consent is also explicitly required. 
The main difference between the rules for armed conflict situations and for 
peacetime disasters is that for the first category the rules are laid down in the 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols. This means that the rules can 
be found in widely ratified conventions which for a large part even constitute 
customary international law. Another difference between humanitarian access in 
armed conflict situations and in peace-time disasters is that in the case of Syria the 
Security Council has taken the step to grant access for humanitarian organisation in 
the state’s stead. This decision has been preceded by earlier resolutions asking the 
state to grant access (to which the state did not comply) and has been based upon 
considerations of the severity of the humanitarian crisis and the many refugees and 
IDPs in the case. It is questionable whether the Security Council would ever come 






found in the field of IHL, it can be concluded that even in this field many questions 
and difficulties remain regarding humanitarian access and giving consent thereto. 
Taking the findings from the sources relating to disaster response and 
humanitarian assistance together results in the following legal framework. The 
process of international humanitarian assistance consists of three steps where 
certain rules or standards determine whether an affected state must move on to the 
next step. The affected state has the primary role to respond to a disaster. First, the 
affected state must make a needs-assessment to determine whether it has the 
capacity to respond to the disaster (1). If the affected state is of the opinion that it 
needs additional assistance because its capacity is overwhelmed or because it will 
violate a norm of international (human rights) law without external assistance, it 
moves on to the next step, which is (2) the triggering or initiation of international 
humanitarian assistance. In this stage, states make requests for assistance based on 
the needs-assessment and they consider offers of assistance made by other actors to 
determine whether the offer is needed, whether what is being offered is suitable and 
whether the offer meets the humanitarian principles. However, there are three rules, 
summarized in the work of the International Law Commission in its work on the 
‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’ and derived from a variety of 
sources like UNGA Resolution 46/182, general obligations under human rights law 
and refugee law, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the IFRC’s 
International Disaster Response Laws Guidelines and many other instruments of a 
soft-law character, dictating the transition to the point at which the affected state 
must give its consent (3). This point is reached when the capacity of the affected 
state is overwhelmed, if a norm of international law will be violated by withholding 
consent (which could result in an internationally wrongful act) and/or when the 
affected state only has arbitrary reasons for withholding consent. At this stage, the 
affected state can only withhold consent when there is a valid reason, for example if 
the offer does not meet the humanitarian principles. Depicted schematically, the 




















































This legal framework on international humanitarian assistance follows the line 
highlighted so far: it is recognized that there should be room for international 
assistance, but sovereignty and territorial integrity give plenty of room for the 
affected state to withhold consent. When looking at the practical applicability and 
actual application of the framework, it has become clear that the standards are not 
concrete enough to really determine at what point an affected state must accept aid. 
Currently, three developments are ongoing that each in their own way (perhaps 
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2.3 Ongoing developments trying to combine international humanitarian 
assistance and state sovereignty  
 
2.3.1 Preparing national legal frameworks for accepting international assistance 
Quite often, accepting humanitarian assistance is delayed because the affected state 
is not equipped to make a needs-assessment, to coordinate targeted requests for 
assistance and to create the room for speedy transfer of goods and personnel. The 
International Disaster Response Law-project (IDRL) of the IFRC, started in 2001, 
aims at preparing national legal systems for the future possibility that the state 
comes into the position that it needs international humanitarian assistance. 
Departing from the same common principles as found throughout the legal 
framework (consent is required, initiation of assistance through a request), the IFRC 
helps states to make the necessary adjustments to the national legal systems during 
the time that no disaster is taking place. Within this project there is no hurry or 
pressure from an occurring disaster leaving more room to gently convince states to 
critically assess their national systems.  
Because the IDRL-project works with states that are willing to participate, there 
is no breach of sovereignty or territorial integrity. Yet the voluntary basis and the 
explicit recognition of the requirement of consent make that the IDRL-project 
cannot solve the problem of a state that refuses to accept assistance when that 
assistance is necessary. It does, however, help to reduce underhandedly refusing 
assistance through delaying the entry of goods and personnel. 
 
2.3.2 Development of a new legal basis: the ILC’s draft articles on the Protection of 
Persons in the Event of Disasters 
The International Law Commission (ILC) is working on the issue from a different 
angle. In the project ‘Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters’, included in 
2007 in the ILC’s programme of work, the ILC is establishing rules on state action 
in response to a disaster, going into a full range of issues like disaster preparedness 
and mitigation, the primary role of the affected state, the duty to international 
cooperation, the role of consent, delivery of external assistance and underlying 
considerations like human dignity and respect for human rights. The draft articles 
adopted so far by the ILC depart from acknowledging state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, but link these principles to the existence of certain duties. It is 
recognized that the primary role lies with the affected state, but that affected state 
must make use of international cooperation and must seek external assistance when 
its national capacity is overwhelmed. States are granted the right to give consent, 
but it is at the same time determined that consent may not be withheld for arbitrary 
reasons. According to the ILC, a refusal is not arbitrary when the affected state has 
sufficient resources to respond to a disaster, when assistance is accepted from other 
actors, or when the offer does not meet the humanitarian principles. In addition, the 
ILC argues that it is possible that a limitation of a state’s freedom to withhold 
consent grounded in international law may be justified. When looking at certain 






certain obligations under, for example, human rights law or refugee law and cannot 
fulfil these obligations due to a lack of resources or capacity, there is an argument 
that the state has no room for withholding consent. 
The strength of the draft articles lies in the all-encompassing basis it provides 
for humanitarian assistance in disaster settings. Since Resolution 46/182 (dating 
from 1991), it is the first instrument establishing clear legal rules on the acceptance 
and delivery of humanitarian assistance. The draft articles further give a full 
overview of the entire process by providing underlying principles and including 
disaster preparedness, by discussing the initiation and provision of assistance, the 
termination of operations and by looking at questions of protection of relief staff. 
Nonetheless, due to those parts of the draft articles that dent state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, many states do not appear inclined to ratify the draft articles in 
case these would turn into a treaty. The question is whether opening the treaty for 
ratification would indeed be a sensible future step. The possibility exists that only a 
handful of states will ratify the treaty. Rather, given the support the draft articles 
have received from humanitarian relief workers and organisations, the draft articles 
can be used as guiding principles replacing the former operational basis provided by 
Resolution 46/182. Possibly, when picked up by those working in practice, states, 
and in time perhaps even by courts, some of the provisions will become rules of 
customary international law.  
The draft articles clearly acknowledge the existence of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and grant states the primary role of responding and the right to 
give or withhold consent accordingly. However, at the same time the draft articles 
link these privileges with the existence of certain obligations. In this way a 
framework is created in which the rights of affected states are qualified by duties, 
laying the foundation for a legal framework on accepting international humanitarian 
assistance. Only the legal status of the draft articles makes it difficult to value the 
impact of the rules.  
 
2.3.3 Bypassing sovereignty through humanitarian action: usefulness of RtoP 
That sovereignty comes with responsibilities towards the population is certainly not 
only acknowledged in the ILC’s draft articles on the Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disasters, but is in the meantime broadly accepted in international law. 
Running parallel with emerging concepts like ‘human security’, the Security 
Council started to authorize action for humanitarian purposes against the will of 
states primarily insofar the humanitarian situation at hand poses a threat to 
international peace and security. In addition, over the last few decades sometimes 
the concept of (non-authorised) humanitarian interventions has been used in 
situations where (a group of) states felt that action was necessary to protect the 
needs of a civilian population but where no Security Council authorization could be 
obtained. However, this has never been done in relation to natural disasters. 
Contrary to that, within the relatively new concept of the Responsibility to Protect 
(RtoP) the response to disaster has been originally foreseen. The idea behind RtoP 






crimes in a conceptual framework. Under this framework, various options exist for 
preventing gross violations of human rights, for responding to such violations and 
for rebuilding after the response. Underlying RtoP is the idea of responsible 
sovereignty, meaning that sovereignty entails certain responsibilities towards the 
population.  
Within the framework of RtoP, sovereignty is understood as having 
responsibilities to protect the population against gross human rights violations and 
other security concerns (hence ‘responsible sovereignty’). If a state fails this 
responsibility, the responsibility transfers to the wider community of states. Within 
the responsibility to react the peaceful means are strongly emphasized, but if 
necessary and when meeting certain precautionary criteria more invasive action is 
in principle – with Security Council authorization – possible.  
The original report laying the foundations for RtoP explicitly foresaw in 
applicability of the framework in response to a disaster. However, in the document 
depicting the general consensus of states on the concept RtoP, the UN World 
Summit Outcome Document of 2005, no reference to disasters can be found. When 
Myanmar refused practically all humanitarian assistance offered to it in response to 
devastating cyclone Nargis, an international debate arose on whether or not RtoP 
should be invoked to force humanitarian assistance into the country.  
Opponents of invoking RtoP argued that the World Summit Outcome of 2005 
only speaks of applicability in case of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Those supporting the use of RtoP in the case of Myanmar 
saw the refusal to accept assistance and the apparent lacking national response to 
the cyclone in the context of earlier acts against the population and argued that the 
refusal to accept resulted in a crime against humanity. Although it is difficult to 
determine if there was truly a crime against humanity in the case of Myanmar, it 
cannot be denied that in principle poor disaster response in a context of severe 
crimes already committed against a population can in extreme cases result in a 
crime against humanity. In such extreme cases, it does not matter whether the crime 
against humanity is the result of armed conflict or of a disaster. Thus, while the 
occurrence of a disaster in itself is not enough to invoke RtoP, application of RtoP 
in disaster-contexts cannot be excluded on forehand. 
Even when accepting that RtoP can be used in some disaster settings, the 
question remains what the implications would be. If a civilian population is 
suffering from the lack of basic resources, it is possible to take increasing 
intervening steps (from negotiations to sanctions to more forceful action) to deliver 
relief to that population. As the case of Myanmar has illustrated (where the regional 
organisation ASEAN played an important role in Myanmar’s ultimate consent to 
relief), negotiations can take place outside the scope of RtoP. Intervening measures 
require Security Council authorization (which also poses a potential barrier, 
possibly leaving the non-authorised humanitarian intervention as an alternative 
under very special conditions) and it can be wondered whether the population 
benefits from pressure put on their state. Especially if there is any kind of force 






conflict. Only when RtoP is used to put slight pressure on a state to accept 
humanitarian assistance, without using armed force, it may be beneficial for the 
civilian population but it can be wondered if the concept RtoP is crucial for such 
pressure. It appears therefore that RtoP can be used in extreme situations of 
inadequate disaster response, but it is difficult to pinpoint where the added value 
lies. 
 
2.4 The persisting problems in applying the legal framework  
 
The most important developments within the field of international assistance in 
response to disasters do not provide an immediate answer to situations in which 
states refuse to accept assistance after a disaster while they clearly need it for the 
survival of the disaster victims. The IDRL-project does not give any standards on 
giving consent. Within the work of the ILC such standards are given, but for now it 
is unclear what the legal status will be. The discussion surrounding humanitarian 
intervention and RtoP goes beyond the question when a state must give its consent 
and focuses mainly on the subsequent phase. As a consequence, the problems 
surrounding the practical application of the legal framework on accepting 
humanitarian assistance remain because the standards directing states from one step 
to the next are not concrete enough to constitute clear obligations. The IDRL 
Guidelines and RtoP do not give new legal indicators based on which it can be 
determined when the capacity of the affected state is overwhelmed, what norm of 
international law is violated by refusing aid or what arbitrary reasons for 
withholding consent are. The Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the 
Event of Disasters do to a certain extent, but it is not clear what their legal status 
will be in the future. What remains, therefore, is the legal framework with its 
accompanying difficulties in practical application.  
While studying the possibly applicable standards it soon became clear that the 
ICESCR in the end is the most promising instrument for concretizing the legal 
framework due to the basic needs which disaster survivors are often deprived of 
(shelter, food, water and access to basic health care) which are laid down as rights 
in the ICESCR and also due to the Covenant’s general obligation to make use of 
international assistance and cooperation. In the following, it will be explained how 
the ICESCR complements the legal framework.  
 
3 USING THE ICESCR TO COMPLEMENT THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1 Using the ICESCR for making a needs-assessment and for triggering 
international assistance  
 
Through the phrase ‘individually and through international assistance and 
cooperation’ in the general obligations of article 2(1) ICESCR it has been made 
clear that state parties are not expected to merely work alone on the progressive 






cooperation is a necessary supplement. State parties must make use of that 
supplement when the resources available within the state prove insufficient for 
meeting the obligations under the Covenant, according article 2(1). What these 
obligations are follows from the substantive rights (to which end the well-known 
tripartite typology can be used) but is co-determined through the formulation of 
progressive realization. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) has defined what is expected from state parties. It has done so especially 
in its General Comments, while also standards have been set through the state 
reporting mechanism, although these standards are less general in character. With 
the phrase ‘maximum of its available resources’ the ICESCR obliges its state 
parties to seek additional resources internationally if insufficient progress can be 
made, as such indicating when an affected state must move from its individual 
response to seeking assistance. 
For each of the rights included in the research (i.e. the rights to housing, food, 
water and health) it is at least clear that state parties must realize the core 
obligations, even immediately after a disaster. Based on the needs-assessment 
which an affected state must make after the occurrence of a disaster, the affected 
state determines if it can fulfil its core obligations. If insufficient resources are 
available for this goal, international assistance must be sought. Moving beyond the 
core obligations, the criterion is that sufficient progression must be made. This 
aspect arguably falls under the recovery-phase of disaster response and to that 
extent lies outside the scope of the research.  Still, making plans for the full 
realization of rights falls under the core obligations and therefore these plans must 
be part of the needs-assessment. While certain standards can be discerned for each 
right, it depends on the context of the state and the size of the disaster how much 
progression may be expected. A method that appears useful for disaster settings is 
the adequacy-formulation used by the CESCR in the General Comments. 
Temporary housing in the form of tents is for example no longer adequate during a 
hurricane season. By considering what is adequate in specific contexts, states can 
use these standards in their needs-assessments and in their requests for assistance. 
This way, it becomes possible to make more targeted requests because the human 
rights standards help determine what is needed in terms of shelter, food, water and 
health care.  
Although the strained resources are taken into account in determining how much 
progression can be expected from a state party, the fact that a disaster occurs cannot 
be used as an argument for derogation. Truly, by limiting the expectations on 
progression, standards are lowered, but the general obligations to move forward 
(continuous improvement) and to seek international assistance to this end remain 
intact. Only if no progression is made due to insufficient resources and the state 
party can demonstrate it has done everything in its power to obtain additional 
resources the lack of progression can be justified. Article 2(1) therefore serves only 







3.2 The role of the ICESCR in limiting the freedom to withhold consent    
 
The core contents of each right of the ICESCR are non-derogable and must 
therefore be realized at all times, even immediately after a disaster. If a state party 
(fears that it) does not have the capacity to achieve this, it must seek additional 
resources internationally and is under an obligation to accept international 
assistance. This means for example with regard to the right to food that state parties 
have an obligation to alleviate hunger, so after a disaster they must provide food aid. 
Taking too long to conduct a needs-assessment could in this case already result in a 
violation of obligations.  
States have an obligation to make plans on how they will progress from the core 
obligations towards full realization (making such plans is often even mentioned as a 
core obligation). Within these plans, there is room to take the disaster into account, 
yet states have an obligation to move forward. With regard to the right to housing, 
the transition from shelter to permanent housing must be ‘speedy’. The elements 
determining progression are privacy, having enough space, lighting, ventilation and 
access to basic infrastructure. In relation to the rights to water, food and access to 
basic health care it is explicitly determined that the state party must provide food 
and water when people are unable for reasons beyond their control to obtain it. In 
addition, disaster victims can be considered as a marginalized and vulnerable group, 
for whom special attention is required in terms of obligations of state parties. This 
means, for example, that affected states must give due priority to groups living in 
unfavourable conditions and must ascertain how many people are homeless or live 
in inadequate housing.  
For the rights to water and health also disaster-specific obligations have been 
identified. With regard to the right to water, it is explicitly recognized that 
progression includes the preparation for the occurrence of a new disaster. 
Realization of the right to health must also aim at preventing the outbreak of 
epidemics and endemic diseases by creating a system of urgent medical care and the 
provision of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. 
Based on the obligations stemming from the ICESCR as described above, it can 
be concluded that refusing offers of international assistance after a disaster when a) 
core contents are not realized or b) access of disaster victims to certain rights is not 
provided results in a violation of obligations under the ICESCR. Through this, 
standards are set for measuring whether the capacity of an affected state is 
overwhelmed or when an affected state violates a rule of international law by 
refusing assistance. Consequently, offers of assistance can be refused when an 
affected state party is able to realize the core contents immediately after a disaster 
(so when it does not need assistance). In addition, affected state parties have a 
margin of discretion for refusing assistance when that assistance is not meeting 
certain standards like the humanitarian principles, for example by being conditional. 
Nonetheless, this discretionary room for refusing offers of assistance decreases as 
the affected state struggles to comply with its obligations under the ICESCR. 






very weighty and valid reasons for refusing. Whether or not a refusal to give 
consent is arbitrary is depending on context and content of the offer and on the 
needs within the affected state, but not giving consent to international humanitarian 
assistance when core obligations are not realized would in most cases be a violation 
of international human rights law and a breach of an obligation to accept. 
With the findings from the ICESCR, the legal framework as provided in figure 1 
above can be given more concrete standards, making it possible to determine more 


































Figure 2: Legal framework on accepting assistance with inclusion of the ICESCR 
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Whenever a disaster occurs, the affected state responds by coordinating and 
delivering assistance. In situations where the affected state’s capacity is 
overwhelmed, international actors are usually willing to assist. Problems arise when 
the affected state is unable (or unwilling) to adequately respond to a disaster and 
refuses to accept international humanitarian assistance. There is no explicit legal 
framework on humanitarian assistance in disaster response explaining to what 
extent states should accept international humanitarian assistance. A variety of 
sources of international law can nonetheless be identified which contain rights, 
rules and principles on state action after a disaster took place. Within this legal 
framework, principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention, non-interference and 
territorial integrity grant the freedom to an affected state to determine which aid is 
needed after a disaster and to decide which international actors are allowed to cross 
the borders of its territory to provide assistance. 
Considering that the affected population is suffering even more in the aftermath 
of a disaster when the affected state refuses to accept international humanitarian 
assistance and does not adequately respond itself and taking into account that the 
largely scattered legal framework is not helpful here, this research answers the 
following question:  
 
To what extent does public international law contain standards for affected states 
determining whether the affected state must accept international humanitarian 
assistance after the occurrence of a disaster?  
 
To answer this question, the (legal) instruments containing pieces of the puzzle 
have been analysed resulting in a framework of rules on accepting international 
humanitarian assistance. These findings have been placed in the light of the practice 
of disaster response to determine to what extent they constitute clear standards for 
states. Here it was found that the rules are not concrete enough for this purpose and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has 
been identified as the most promising solution to this problem. Therefore, it is 
analysed what standards can be derived from the ICESCR. 
Throughout the study, examples of disaster situations have been used to 






explain how the legal framework on disaster response described here can be and is 
applied in practice. In selecting the cases and being the point of departure for this 
research, a definition of ‘disaster’ is used inspired by definitions made by a variety 
of organisations for different purposes. In this research a ‘disaster’ is: an event 
occurring in peace-time with natural causes, man-made causes or a combination of 
both, which causes harm to the affected population to an extent that it is beyond the 
affected state’s capacity to address. This includes situations in which the affected 
state is not willing to address the consequences and refuses to accept international 
assistance.  
 
2 DISASTER RESPONSE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE: 
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The current legal framework on disaster response and international humanitarian 
assistance has been influenced by developments taking place in the nineteenth and 
twentieth Centuries. Especially the creation of the Red Cross system and 
developments taking place within the context of the UN left their marks on the 
contemporary rules and principles on accepting humanitarian assistance. The Red 
Cross (and mainly the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies, IFRC) and the UN are part of a system in which the need for international 
humanitarian assistance in addition to the national response to a disaster is colliding 
with state sovereignty and where reconciliation of these two elements of disaster 
response is ever under consideration. The failure of the only international 
organisation ever set up for the sole purpose of disaster response, the International 
Relief Union, illustrates the consequences of not being able to reconcile 
international disaster response and state sovereignty. Still, in the (legal) instruments 
relevant for answering the main research question, the incompatibility becomes 
immediately visible. 
Although situations of armed conflicts are excluded from the definition of 
‘disaster’ in this research, international humanitarian law is nonetheless included to 
understand the difference between the rules applicable in peace-time disasters and 
disasters taking place in armed conflict. From international humanitarian law it 
becomes clear that states – whether occupying powers or parties to an armed 
conflict – are under an obligation to accept relief when the civilian population is in 
need of humanitarian assistance. However, before humanitarian relief can be 
delivered, consent must be obtained from the state and this consent may not be 
withheld arbitrarily. Also, if (offers of) humanitarian assistance meets the 
humanitarian principles (these are the principles of neutrality, impartiality and 
humanity) it cannot be understood as unfriendly or as interference in domestic 
affairs, which is in line with the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
the Nicaragua-case.  
In peace-time, human rights law is highly relevant in disaster settings. Through a 
rights-based approach to assistance survivors of a disaster can be considered as 






duties of states could result in an obligation to accept humanitarian assistance where 
the rights of survivors cannot be fulfilled. Due to the relevance of certain rights of 
the ICESCR in post-disaster settings (i.e. the rights to housing, food, water and 
health) and because of the formulation of the general obligations for state parties, 
the ICESCR appears to be a useful instrument for considering whether an obligation 
to accept assistance exists. 
Other fields and instruments included in the legal framework are refugee law 
and the rules on IDPs, instruments taking away practical barriers of delivering 
humanitarian assistance (like customs regulations or the Tampere Convention on 
Telecommunication), General Assembly resolutions (of which Resolution 46/182 of 
1991 is still the basis for most relief operations today), regional mechanisms (for 
example that of ASEAN which proved useful in the context of Myanmar) and 
instruments containing principles on humanitarian operations and delivering 
disaster relief (the Sphere Handbook, IFRC Guidelines). In addition, two standard-
setting developments are ongoing relevant for the field of international 
humanitarian assistance. The IFRC started its International Disaster Response Laws, 
Rules and Principles (IDRL) programme in 2001 to explore the role of law in the 
response to disasters, particularly in international disaster relief. Also, in 2006, the 
UN’s International Law Commission (ILC) included the ‘Protection of Persons in 
the Event of Disasters’ in its long-term programme of work which has to date 
resulted in almost twenty draft articles on disaster response. 
Still, currently sovereignty still plays a dominant role in the field of 
humanitarian assistance in response to disasters. Commonly, sovereignty can be 
used to prevent international humanitarian assistance from entering, which is an 
expression of a rather traditional reading of the concept. Such a reading of 
sovereignty appears to be caught up by developments within international law and 
politics. While originally meant to maintain or restore international peace and 
security exclusively, it has been gradually accepted that the Security Council also 
uses its powers to react on gross and systematic human rights violations since also 
non-military causes of instability can form a threat against peace and security. The 
new (non-legal) concept of ‘Human Security’ captured this and placed the 
protection of civilians and respect for human rights as priorities on the international 
agenda, arguing that gross human rights violations could also constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, and thus qualify for Security Council intervention.  
With this focus on the protection of civilians a method of action in case of gross 
human rights violations was created.  
Returning to situations of disaster, it is possible that a civilian population is 
suffering undue hardship after a disaster as a consequence of their state’s decision 
to not come to their aid and where the state is at the same time not accepting 
international humanitarian assistance. In extreme situations, this may prompt the 
international community to discuss the option of undertaking action to come to the 
assistance of the civilian population. Being such an extreme situation, in the case of 
cyclone Nargis in Myanmar it was debated whether a humanitarian intervention (if 






authorization, would not be realized) should take place. Also, with regard to the 
same disaster, it was being discussed whether the concept of RtoP (endorsed at the 
World Summit outcome of 2005) would be applicable (this discussion is 
summarized under section 3). As no clear answer was found in these discussions, 
presently the story of sovereignty finds its temporary end in the developments 
underway (like the work of the ILC), yet while acknowledging that both assisting 
and victim states retain virtually unfettered sovereignty in the context of natural 
disaster policy.  
Based on the (legal) sources described here and keeping the current role of 
sovereignty in mind, the following framework on accepting international 
humanitarian assistance is identified. The primary role to respond to a disaster lies 
with the affected state. The affected state must make a needs-assessment to 
determine whether it is in need of assistance. If the state is in need of assistance, it 
can initiate the process of delivery of such assistance. After considering the offers 
of assistance made to the affected state, that state is granted the right to give or 
withhold consent to international humanitarian assistance. Indicators are identified 
explaining when the affected state must give its consent to offers. These three 
indicators entail that the affected state must accept assistance when its domestic 
response capacity is overwhelmed, when not accepting assistance would result in 
the violation of a legal norm (in which case the refusal could arguably constitute an 
internationally wrongful act) or when the affected state only has arbitrary reasons to 
refuse. To determine what arbitrary reasons are, the humanitarian principles 
(humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence) play a role: states have less 
ground to refuse offers meeting these principles than offers which are violating 
them in any way.  
Two observations must be made with regard to this framework before 
continuing with the practical application of the framework. In the first place it is 
noted that although the rules identified here return in various instruments and 
documents, it cannot be said that these are rule of customary international law. In 
the second place, comparing the rules for accepting assistance in peace-time 
disasters to those applicable in armed conflict shows that the rules following from 
international humanitarian law are not that much more elaborate than those 
applicable in non-armed-conflict situations.  
 
3 PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE RULES ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO DISASTERS 
  
The first step in the framework on international humanitarian assistance is to make 
a needs-assessment to establish the capacity of the affected state. The affected state 
should decide in a ‘timely’ manner whether or not to request relief and to 
‘communicate its decision promptly’. However, there is no set of standards that 
explains how to make a needs-assessment. Although the first step in the affected 
state’s response to a disaster appears quite straightforward (determining through a 






required), it is difficult to pinpoint if and when the affected state should start 
seeking international humanitarian assistance. It is left to the discretion of the 
affected state to determine whether it needs such external assistance.  
If the affected state decides that it needs international humanitarian assistance, it 
can initiate the process by requesting what is needed (basing the requests on the 
needs-assessment) or by reacting to offers made. Offers can be a response to the 
request made by the affected state or can be unsolicited. Offers must meet the 
humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. 
Especially when this is the case, offers cannot be considered as unlawful 
intervention in the receiving state’s internal affairs and must be accepted sooner 
than offers which do not meet these principles. The rule that consent may not be 
withheld for arbitrary reasons therefore contains two components: the context in 
which the offer is made (for example by a political enemy or being conditional 
upon certain counter performances) and the content of the offer (is the content of 
the offer suitable for the circumstances of the case?). 
After the process of international humanitarian assistance is triggered, the 
affected state must decide which offers of assistance are being accepted and which 
refused. Through giving consent, the state accepts assistance and allows activities 
on its territory which would otherwise be violations of non-intervention and 
territorial integrity. Because it has this function, consent is discretionary and can be 
subjected to conditions. Usually, it lays down the terms for the relief operation in 
question. Due to this implication, it is problematic to understand a request or the 
expression of the ‘willingness to accept’ as giving (blanket) consent. Therefore the 
problem remains that the providers of relief must await consent, something which 
can be abused by the affected state. In addition, it is accepted that a state can 
withhold its consent for valid reasons, making it even more difficult to value the 
lack of response or the refusal to give consent by the affected state.  
It remains unclear what can be done if the affected state refuses to give its 
consent to international humanitarian relief. After the military regime in Myanmar 
refused to accept international humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of cyclone 
Nargis in 2008, the options were extensively debated but the discussion mainly 
evolved around possible application of RtoP. According to the World Summit 
Outcome Document of 2005, RtoP can be invoked when gross human rights 
violations amount to one of four predetermined crimes: genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes or crimes against humanity. Some argue that refusing to accept 
assistance when the affected population is in need and by not providing sufficient 
relief itself, this refusal could amount to a crime against humanity. Looking at the 
definition of a crime against humanity, it is arguable that not granting access to 
humanitarian assistance when it is needed for the survival of the population within a 
wider context of acts committed against that population, the refusal to give consent 
could indeed constitute a crime against humanity. That it is taking place in a context 
of disaster should not matter for the status.  
Although only in rare and extreme cases RtoP would possibly be applicable, it is 






when it is combined with intrusive or forceful measures. Currently, there appears to 
be no better response from the international community other than trying to 
negotiate access.  
At this point, a preliminary conclusion is made to answer the main research 
question. From the first part it becomes clear that rules on accepting international 
humanitarian assistance indeed exist (although based on a scattered legal 
framework), but that these rules are not specific enough to create concrete standards 
on when to accept international humanitarian assistance. Especially when 
considering the three limitations to the freedom to withhold consent, the lack of 
concrete standards becomes visible. Affected states must accept assistance if their 
own capacity is overwhelmed, yet it is the affected state that decides whether this is 
the case (based on a needs-assessment). No objective standards exist. Second, if the 
affected state is violating a norm of international (human rights) law by not 
accepting international humanitarian assistance, it must give its consent but it is not 
entirely clear what norm would exactly be violated by not giving consent. Third, 
consent may not be withheld for arbitrary reasons. If what is being offered is needed 
according to the needs-assessment, is suitable for the situation at hand and meets 
the humanitarian principles, there is less ground – if any – for the affected state to 
refuse the offer.  
To come to a more satisfying answer to the main research question, something is 
needed that gives the rules found so far more detail, so that they can constitute 
concrete standards. The ICESCR has proved the most promising option for 
concretizing the framework on accepting international humanitarian assistance. The 
ICESCR contains the rights to housing, food, water and health, rights that are of 
special importance in disaster settings. In addition, the ICESCR contains a 
provision on general obligations stating that apart from working on human rights 
realization individually, international assistance and cooperation must be used as 
well. To find out to what extent the ICESCR can be used to make the framework 
concrete enough to constitute standards, the content of the ICESCR must be 
assessed closely. 
 
4 THE CONTENT AND MEANING OF ARTICLE 2(1) ICESCR 
 
Part II of the research is dedicated to establishing the post-disaster obligations for 
state parties under the ICESCR. First, the provision on general obligations for states 
is closely scrutinized to establish what the content and meaning is of these general 
obligations. In the fifth Chapter, these findings will be applied on the substantive 
rights of the ICESCR which are most relevant in disaster settings. To establish the 
content and meaning of article 2(1), the rules on treaty interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties are used in a slightly adapted version. 
As a first step, it is determined whether article 2(1) ICESCR is generally 
formulated as a provision containing concrete, justiciable obligations. Although for 
quite some time the ICESCR was understood to be merely consisting of policy 






clear, considering the place of article 2(1) within the Covenant and also due to the 
adoption of the Optional Protocol establishing an individual complaint mechanism, 
that article 2(1) contains concrete obligations. The nature of the obligations follows 
from the object and purpose of the ICESCR, where the purpose is understood as the 
goal that the Covenant aims to achieve and the object as the whole set of obligations 
directed at achieving the purpose. The long-term obligation of result is the full 
realization of rights; the obligations of conduct (immediate as well as long-term) 
follow from the phrases of article 2(1). Although the obligations formulated by the 
CESCR are directed at the state parties to the ICESCR, certain obligations to 
respect (and other obligations acquiring abstention from states to meet that 
obligation) must be adhered to by non-state parties under the ‘do no harm’-principle. 
In addition, arguably a certain core of the rights of the ICESCR have obtained the 
status of customary law.  
Although the full realization of the rights of the ICESCR is the obligation of 
result – and therefore a goal that state parties must aim to achieve – the phrases 
‘undertakes to take steps’ and ‘with a view to achieving progressively’ indicate that 
the full realization does not have to be achieved at the moment of becoming a party. 
This does not mean that state parties are free in setting a pace. States must take 
steps from the moment of becoming a party and these steps must be deliberate, 
concrete and targeted towards the full realization of rights. Progressive realization 
indicates that there is no room for doing nothing and that retrogressive measures are 
in principle not allowed. Despite these clear obligations, the size of the steps or the 
progression made is determined by the context of a state and the capacity the state 
has for working on the economic, social and cultural rights. Lack of capacity cannot, 
however, be used as an excuse for non-compliance in all situations. 
The phrase ‘to the maximum of its available resources’ indicates that states must 
not only rely on their national resources, but must seek additional resources 
internationally when national resources are not yielding sufficient result. Here, the 
states have an obligation to make use of international assistance and cooperation. If 
a state is in any way violating its obligations and argues that this is due to resource 
constraints, it must prove that it has done everything in its power to obtain 
additional resources. Also, certain elements of the ICESCR are non-derogable, 
meaning that for these elements the lack of resources can never be justified. 
Examples of the non-derogable elements are the principle of non-discrimination and 
the core contents of the substantive rights. 
To determine in more detail what the obligations of state parties are in post-
disaster settings, the findings of Chapter IV must be considered in a disaster-context 
and be applied to substantive rights, in this case the rights to housing, food, water 
and health. 
 
5 APPLYING THE ICESCR ON DISASTER SITUATIONS: SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS 
 
Before discussing specific disaster-obligations, it is necessary to determine the 






emergency situation, as compared to the state of emergency derogation-clause of 
the ICCPR. There is no derogation-clause present within the ICESCR, but the 
formulation of the general obligations makes clear that due to the special 
circumstances and resource constraints, some flexibility is given with regard to the 
performance of affected states, yet there is an obligation to seek and use 
international assistance and cooperation when the resources of the state are 
insufficient for making the required progress. Derogation during an emergency is 
therefore only to a certain extent possible and only when the affected state can 
demonstrate that it has tried to obtain additional resources.  
Considering the general obligations in the light of disasters and analysing the 
substantive rights in terms of their disaster-specific obligations lay bare a number of 
issues. Within the General Comments formulated by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) the same terminology for determining 
obligations returns, making clear what is generally expected from state parties but 
lacking the detail to be precise in the formulation in post-disaster obligations. 
One clear obligation is that the core contents of each right must be realized at all 
times and there is no justification for non-compliance. If a state does not have the 
resources for fulfilling the core contents, it must seek additional resources and 
therefore accept international assistance. Consequently, the core obligations provide 
a clear standard on when an affected state is obliged to accept international 
humanitarian assistance. Recognized generally as core content is to make plans for 
progressive realization (explaining the steps the state will take towards full 
realization) and to provide access to rights for those groups who are particularly 
vulnerable or marginalized (like disaster survivors).  
At this point lies a check for the CESCR: a willing state is able to demonstrate 
what it has done to obtain assistance for the fulfilment of its obligations. An 
unwilling state that does not make sufficient progression through even the smallest 
of steps cannot demonstrate what it has done to obtain international assistance and 
is therefore in violation of its obligation to accept humanitarian assistance. The way 
in which article 2(1) is formulated therefore functions to a certain extent as a 
derogation clause. In situations of severe resource constraints, less progression can 
be expected from states than in ordinary situations, yet what exactly the standards 
are must be determined for each right. 
In the plans for the realization of each right which form a part of the core 
obligations, states must consider the steps they will take, including the recovery 
after a disaster. While not falling under the scope of the present research, it must be 
noted that through this obligation affected states must take progression into account 
in their needs-assessment. The formulation by the CESCR of what ‘adequate’ is – 
consisting of elements like availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality – can 
help in making these plans for progression.  
The obligation to use (and therefore accept) international assistance and 
cooperation – i.e. humanitarian assistance in the context of disasters – is not 
recognized as a general obligation, yet exists in the context of what has just been 






no steps can be taken and as such obligations under the ICESCR are violated, the 
state has an obligation to accept.  
 
6 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The first part of the research has shown that a framework for accepting international 
humanitarian assistance exists, but that the steps in this framework are not concrete 
enough to constitute standards for affected states. The findings of the ICESCR can 
be used to make the framework more concrete. When the affected state makes a 
needs-assessment, being the first step, the obligations of the ICESCR can be used to 
determine whether the capacity of the affected state is sufficient. If the affected 
state is not able to realize the core contents, the capacity is overwhelmed and the 
affected state has an obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation. 
This is in line with the general obligations of article 2(1) ICESCR telling state 
parties to make use of international assistance and cooperation when insufficient 
resources are available. If the affected state cannot realize the core contents after a 
disaster occurred, it violates its obligations under international law, giving the 
affected state an obligation to accept assistance.  
Based on the needs-assessment – specified through the use of human rights 
standards – the affected state can make targeted requests for assistance. It must then 
value any offers made to determine whether these offers are acceptable (do the 
offers meet the humanitarian principles and are they suitable for the context at 
hand?). If the state’s capacity is overwhelmed (not being able to meet the core 
contents), if the state is violating its obligations under international human rights 
law (not meeting the core contents, not being able to fulfil or provide access to the 
rights for those unable for reasons beyond their control to access the rights by 
themselves), and the state has no valid reasons for refusing assistance, the state 
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